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1. Introduction
The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world’s only super-
power, militarily dominating any potential adversary or coalition. Inter-
ventions around the globe and the large margin between the United States 
and the next largest state in terms of military expenditure underscore this 
point. This global advantage translates into an unprecedented freedom of 
action following the demise of the bipolar structure of  the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, the United States has remained active in what has arguably 
been the most successful alliance in history—the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (). 
While it is becoming increasingly hard to imagine in hindsight, the persis-
tence and continued importance of  were far from preordained or 
uncontested.1 Indeed, the changes in the international system wrought by 
the end of the Cold War and the quarter century since have been signifi-
cant. Beginning in the early s, the strategic vacuum after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union spawned a debate over the utility of alliances in gen-
eral and  in particular. With the United States being the major actor 
in , this debate was always led with an emphasis on U.S. strategy. 
For example, Rajan Menon in his  book The End of Alliances pre-
dicted “a new turn in American strategy—one that abandons cold war 
alliances and the military commitments associated with them.”2 Menon 
1 Robert P. Grant, “Sustaining the US Commitment to NATO,” in A History of 
NATO - The First Fifty Years, ed. Gustav Schmidt, vol. 2 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 
2001), 43.
2 Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.
1
argues further that the United States would increasingly turn to ad-hoc 
coalitions and other flexible arrangements to pursue its aims.3
Regardless  of  whether  one  agrees  with  Menon’s  thrust, his  argument 
serves as a useful reminder that alliances are but one way of pursuing for-
eign policy. States can just as well pursue their foreign policy goals unilat-
erally. This is especially true for the single-most powerful country in the 
current system, the United States, which has a range of alternative means 
to conduct foreign policy at its disposal. Indeed, the United States had not 
entered  into  a  formal  alliance  for  over    years  before    was 
founded in .4
1.1. Puzzle
The puzzle this dissertation seeks to address is the fact that the United 
States has remained an active member of , despite emerging as the 
single-most powerful state in the international system after the end of the 
Cold War. Theoretically, this  dissertation inquires whether neorealism’s 
predictions for the unipole’s behavior in alliances can help us understand 
U.S. behavior in .
3 For other skeptical views of the value of U.S. alliances, see e.g. Ted Galen Carpenter, 
A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After the Cold War (Washington, DC: 
Cato Institute, 1992); Ted Galen Carpenter, Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign  
Policy for America (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2008); Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. 
Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in 
the Face of Temptation,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 5–48; Christopher 
Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); 
Robert J. Lieber, Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the 
Problem of World Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jennifer 
Lind, “Keep, Toss, or Fix? Assessing US Alliances in East Asia,” in Sustainable 
Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy, ed. Jeremi Suri and 
Benjamin Valentino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Joseph M. Parent and 
Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 
(2011): 32–47; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand 
Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
4 Not since the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France.
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To this end, this dissertation examines U.S.  policy from the end of 
the Cold War to the early presidency of George W. Bush. ’s survival 
and the United States’ continued engagement in it were not to be taken 
for granted—many prominent scholars and pundits predicted its demise 
or called for its dissolution, and several of the central theories of interna-
tional relations, e.g. realism, suggested  would disintegrate.5 I set out 
to  answer  the  following  theoretical  and  empirical  questions:  Have 
motives suggested by structural realism underpinned U.S. behavior in the 
alliance? How has U.S. policy with regard to ’s mission, transforma-
tion, and expansion evolved after ? Have there been patterns of U.S. 
behavior? What constraints has  placed on U.S. foreign policy?
I try to answer these questions through a disciplined configurative single 
case study of U.S.  policy, analyzing both primary and secondary 
material.
1.2. Significance
As the review of the historical and international relations literature will 
demonstrate,  individual  countries’    policies  have  received  scant 
attention—this  is,  as  one  historian  of  the  alliance  claims,  “a  largely 
uncharted field of research.”6 While general histories of  touch upon 
individual countries’ roles, few investigate national policies beyond singu-
lar decisions.7 There is some work on the major countries in the alliance, 
5 See e.g. the overview in David G. Haglund, “Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths, and 
Policy Dilemmas,” International Journal 50, no. 4 (1995): 651–74.
6 Klaus Schwabe, “Commitments to NATO and Domestic Politics,” in A History of 
NATO - The First Fifty Years, ed. Gustav Schmidt, vol. 2 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 
2001), 225.
7 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “After Forty Years: Reflections on NATO as a Research Field,” 
in NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. 
Francis H. Heller and John Gillingham (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
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e.g. the United States,8 France,9 and Germany.10 The case of  has 
been a perennial battleground for competing theories, hence a neorealist 
contribution is vital and the dearth of single-country studies all the more 
puzzling.11 While a research gap in and of itself is a weak justification for 
conducting research, several theoretical and empirical considerations but-
tress the relevance of this dissertation’s subject matter.
1.2.1. Theoretical
Theories of international relations assert hypothetical links between inde-
pendent and dependent variables, i.e. observable outcomes. Therefore, the 
end of  the bipolar  configuration of  the international  system results  in 
changed predictions in the observable  dependent variables  for theories 
that use the structure of the international system as an independent vari-
able. The most prominent structural theory of international relations is 
Kenneth Waltz’s “neorealism” or structural realism.12 ’s persistence 
8 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1988).
9 Frédéric Bozo, “Sarkozy’s NATO Policy: Towards France’s Atlantic Realignment?,” 
European Political Science 9, no. 2 (2010): 176–88; Charles G. Cogan, Forced to 
Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO - Then and Now (London: Praeger 
Publishers, 1997); Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 
1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
10 Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling, The Federal Republic of Germany and 
NATO: 40 Years after (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Marco Overhaus, Die 
Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum Kampf Gegen Den  
Terrorismus (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).
11 Gunther Hellmann, “A Brief Look at the Recent History of NATO’s Future,” in 
Transatlantic Tug-of-War: Prospects for US-European Cooperation (Festschrift in 
Honour of Helga Haftendorn), ed. Ingo Peters (Münster: LIT, 2006), 181–216; 
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security 
Community,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
12 Ashley first suggested the monicker “neorealism,” one of several cases of theories 
being named by their critics (Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” 
International Organization 38 [1984]: 225–86). Another example is the so-called 
“English School.” This dissertation uses neorealism and structural realism 
interchangeably.
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and the continued U.S. commitment is a key proving ground for struc-
tural realism given three considerations:
1.2.1.1. Neorealism’s Explanatory Power
The persistence of  has been one of the ostensible failures of neoreal-
ist scholarship.13 While initial predictions saw  as a “disappearing 
thing,”14 it is still around, has expanded its membership to include former 
adversaries, and for the first time acted on the collective defense provision 
enshrined in  Article  5. Competing  theories, mainly  institutionalist  and 
constructivist, have been employed to  explain the phenomenon of  
outliving its original purpose. Scholars working in the neorealist para-
digm,  however,  have—after  initial  efforts—largely  conceded  the  field, 
retreating to a “time will tell” stance. Said Waltz: “’s days are not 
numbered, but its years are.”15 This claim is unsatisfactory over  years 
after the end of the Cold War, with the alliance being larger than ever and 
the United States remaining the decisive actor in it. The dearth of scholar-
ship and its  indeterminate predictions is  compounded by the fact that 
 should be a prime case for neorealists. At heart, it is an organiza-
tion of states cooperating on security. If neorealists cannot explain a sys-
13 Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Why Does NATO Persist? An 
Institutional Approach,” Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1996, 
2; Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security 
Institutions,” in Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. 
Helga Haftendorn and Robert O. Keohane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
21. Furthermore, NATO as such has been a battleground for constructivists and 
neorealists (cf. Risse-Kappen, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security 
Community”; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The 
European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997]).
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of 
International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 21–37; quoted in Gunther Hellmann and 
Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” 
Security Studies 3, no. 1 (1993): 17.
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International 
Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 76.
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tem-level phenomenon in the realm of security politics, i.e. “high politics,” 
structural realism’s explanatory power is in dire straits.
1.2.1.2. Integrity & Theory Development
Kenneth N. Waltz’s  seminal  work  Theory of  International  Politics  has 
been the subject  of  manifold  critiques  since  its  original  publication in 
, as has structural realism, the theoretical paradigm that developed 
in its wake.16 The book has been a touchstone for innovation in interna-
tional relations theory, both by authors working in the tradition of Waltz 
and  authors  rejecting  his  theory.  The  need  for  refinement  of  Waltz’s 
propositions has sparked innovations within the neorealist paradigm over 
the last  years. Examples include Walt’s balance of threat proposition, 
the debate on offensive versus defensive realism,17 work on the offense-
defense balance,18 and work by scholars labeled “neoclassical realists.”19 
Recently, neoclassical realists have been criticized for diluting realism by 
incorporating “assumptions and causal mechanisms [from] within alter-
16 As Banks notes, Theory of International Politics is “the single most widely read 
contribution to neorealism, establishing [Waltz] as the paradigmatic successor to 
Morgenthau.” (Michael Banks, “The Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in International 
Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, ed. Margot Light and Groom [London: 
Frances Pinter, 1985], 14).
17 Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51, no. 3 
(1997): 445–78; Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-
Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 50–90; Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in 
Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 
7, no. 1 (1997): 114–55; Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the 
Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 1–49.
18 See James W. Davis et al., “Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory,” 
International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 179–206; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim 
Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?,” 
International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82; Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the 
Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 71–104; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-
Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (1995): 660–91; Stephan 
van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 
4 (1998): 5–43.
19 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 
51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72.
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native paradigms.”20 Legro and Moravcsik paint a picture of neoclassical 
realists as plugging explanatory leaks in a sinking ship with ad-hoc vari-
ables  drawn  from  competing  paradigms.21 This  dissertation,  however, 
supports the view that neorealism—especially in its recent incarnations—
is a vibrant research program. 
1.2.1.3. Hegemonic Behavior
Further, this dissertation contributes to the literature analyzing the for-
eign policy behavior of hegemons. Besides the general literature on hege-
mony and its implications, a healthy theoretical debate has emerged over 
the specific configuration of the international system after the end of the 
Cold War.22 The debate gravitates around the questions whether there is 
something special about the nature of the U.S. hegemony that, contrary to 
balance  of  power  predictions, makes  it  durable. One common line  of 
argument is e.g. that U.S. hegemony is stable because the United States is 
seen as a benevolent hegemon. An inquiry into U.S. policy in and towards 
 contributes to this debate by investigating whether U.S. behavior in 
the crucial area of security policy is in fact that benevolent. Further, it will 
20 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” International  
Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 7.
21 Interestingly, they seem to claim an exclusive right of paradigms to certain sets of 
variables.
22 Stephen G. Brooks, “Can We Identify a Benevolent Hegemon?,” Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2012): 27–38; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: 
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); G. John Ikenberry, America 
Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, “American 
Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 
3 (2004): 353–367; Norman Podhoretz, “Strange Bedfellows: A Guide to the New 
Foreign-Policy Debates,” Commentary Magazine 108, no. 5 (1999): 19–31; Robert 
Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, no. Summer (1999), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/1998/06/01/benevolent-empire; for an overview, see 
Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, “What’s at Stake in the American Empire 
Debate,” American Political Science Review, no. 2 (2007): 253–271.
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shed light on specific patterns of behavior of hegemon in the alliance, 
helping us better understand the peculiarities of hegemonic behavior.
1.2.1.4. Alliances as a Key Phenomenon of International Relations
Alliances have been central to the study of international relations since 
the discipline first emerged. , as the most durable and arguably most 
successful instance of an alliance in world history, is a particularly worth-
while subject of inquiry. This is all the more so given that the long-time 
dominant theory of international relations, realism, predicted a demise of 
the alliance after its raison d’être, the Cold War’s confrontation between 
East and West, had ceased to exists. Further, realism’s adherents actively 
contributed to the U.S. policy debate in the s, advocating U.S. disen-
gagement from the alliance and Europe.
1.2.2. Empirical
Several empirical considerations reinforce the theoretical significance of 
this dissertation.
1.2.2.1. Understanding U.S.  Policy
To  date,  very  few  studies  of  individual  countries’    policy  exist, 
including  for  its  largest  member, the  United  States. Understanding the 
hegemon’s policy in the alliance, however, is vital for policymakers. Like 
no other ally, the United States’ behavior and policies have the potential 
to  shape    both  organizationally  and  in  terms  of  its  substantive 
agenda. Likewise, U.S. material capabilities have been key to the alliance’s 
functioning, as evidenced by the preponderance of U.S. assets in all of 
’s deployments to date.
1.2.2.2. A Changing Alliance
Never before has the alliance changed so dramatically across so many 
aspects than in the s and early s. Three areas in particular have 
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seen significant changes: ’s membership, mission, and internal orga-
nization.
The dissertation proceeds as follows: I begin by reviewing the historical 
and theoretical literature on  and U.S. behavior in the alliance. The 
following  sections  then  outline  the  research  questions, approach, and 
methodology. I then turn to the two case studies on U.S. policy on  
enlargement, and the alliance’s changing mission.
9
2. Literature Review
Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in , a vast literature on 
 and transatlantic relations more generally has evolved in the histor-
ical disciplines and international relations. This body of literature focuses 
on  as an organization and how to explain the alliance’s formation, 
maintenance, and persistence. It is striking that in spite of the enormity of 
this literature, there is little work on individual countries’  policies—
the perspective has been one of looking at  as an institution, rather 
than at the parts that make up this institution. It is a truism that  
members  differ  in  their  importance and influence in  the alliance. It  is 
therefore vital to take a more bottom-up perspective, examining individ-
ual  countries’  expectations  and  understandings  of  ’s  functions. I 
argue below that this is even more important in unipolar international 
systems, where structural incentives and disincentives are less easily dis-
cernable. In the following, I review the historical literature on , theo-
retical work on alliances, and the implications of unipolarity for U.S. for-
eign policy and international relations theory.
2.1. History
Various aspects of ’s history have attracted scholarly attention and 
generated a voluminous body of literature over the decades. Among the 
most prominent work is that on the making of the Atlantic Treaty and 
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.23 A large part  of  these accounts  are historical  and biographical 
works outside the remit of political science.24
A further focus has been ’s viability, crises, and alleged imminent 
breakup, with Henry Kissinger judging the alliance in serious trouble in 
every decade of its existence.25 This line of reasoning is far from extinct: 
the last twenty-or-so years have seen a renewed skepticism of  and 
alliances,26 with  scholars  arguing  that  values  and  interests  drive  the 
United States and its allies apart.27 Besides ’s theoretical and practi-
cal viability, the better part of the post-Cold War literature has gravitated 
around  three  issues:  ’s    and    expansions,28 its  internal 
23 Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO 1945-1950 (New York: Arbor House/W. 
Morrow, 1989); Francis Howard Heller and John Gillingham, NATO: The 
Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992); Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1983); Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The 
Formative Years (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984); Kaplan, 
NATO and the United States; Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 1948 (Plymouth: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); 
Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990); 
Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, “The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The 
Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty,” International Affairs 59, no. 3 (1983): 
351–63.
24 Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper & Row, 
1970).
25 Wallace J. Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 6. Or, as Robert Hunter puts it: “NATO has had about as many crises as 
birthdays.” Robert E. Hunter, “Will the United States Remain a European Power?,” 
Survival 30, no. 3 (1988): 210.
26 Rajan Menon, “The End of Alliances,” World Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2003): 1–20; 
Menon, The End of Alliances, 2009; Richard E. Rupp, NATO After 9/11: An 
Alliance in Continuing Decline (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
27 Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 147–66; 
Graham Hallett, European Security in the Post-Soviet Age: The Case Against NATO 
(York: William Sessions, 2007); Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Foreign 
Affairs, 2002; Hugh de Santis and Robert C. Hughes, “The Case for Disestablishing 
NATO,” in Security Arrangements for a New Europe, ed. William D. Wharton 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992).
28 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a 
New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); James M. Goldgeier, Not 
Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: 
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transformation,29 and its  engagements  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
and Afghanistan.30
As far as individual countries’  policies are concerned, the picture is 
much more  bleak. While  most  of  the general  histories  of   touch 
upon individual countries’  roles, countries’  policies  are seldom investi-
gated across time and issue areas from an international relations perspec-
tive.31
2.2.  in theory
Alliances—with  as an instance—have received considerable atten-
tion in international relations to the extent that one author claims that 
“the two often merge in all but name.”32 Alliances have been studied as 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Robert W. Rauchhaus, Explaining NATO 
Enlargement (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001).
29 John R. Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 
21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Philip H. Gordon, NATO’s 
Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s 
New Roles in International Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1998).
30 Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s 
War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Ivo H. Daalder and 
Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
31 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); 
Overhaus, Die Deutsche NATO-Politik. Vom Ende Des Kalten Krieges Bis Zum 
Kampf Gegen Den Terrorismus; Gustav Schmidt, A History of NATO - The First 
Fifty Years (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
32 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1968), 3.This point has become a mantra repeated in most major 
works on alliances (cf. Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, 
Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance [Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995], 11; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and 
John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances [New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1973], 1–2; Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, 
and World Wars [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996], 12–13; Stephen M. 
Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 
[1985]: 1–5). Morgan calls entering into an alliance “one of the oldest practices of 
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independent and intervening, but mostly as dependent variables and with 
considerable variance with regard to the specific aspect of alliances exam-
ined, e.g. their formation and maintenance, their institutional design, and 
the sharing of costs among allies. Most alliance-specific research has been 
conducted within the collective action framework first put forward by 
Olson.33 While not a theory of alliances per se, public goods theory makes 
predictions about burden-sharing in .34 Another strand in alliance 
theory focuses on domestic determinants of the formation and mainte-
nance of alliances. Authors in this group claim that systemic theories are 
unsuited for explaining alliance decisions and point to domestic factors, 
such as states’ extractive capabilities and governments’ power-preserving 
interests.35 Others consider regime types and their effect on alliances, e.g. 
whether democracies are better or worse allies.36
statecraft, one that can be traced back many hundreds of years before Christ” 
(Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are 
We to Think? [New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1987], 208). 
Others note that “alliances are the central feature of of international political life” 
and among “the dozen or so key terms of International Relations” (Julian R. 
Friedman, “Alliance in International Politics,” in Alliance in International Politics 
[Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970]; George Modelski, “The Study of Alliances: A 
Review,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 4 [December 1, 1963]: 773; both 
quoted in Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1990], 1).
33 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Mancur Olson and 
Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and  
Statistics 48, no. 3 (1966): 266–79.
34 For applications to EU security policy, see e.g. Malcolm Chalmers, Sharing Security. 
The Political Economy of Burdensharing (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); 
Han Dorussen, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling, “Sharing the Burden of 
Collective Security in the European Union,” International Organization 63, no. 4 
(2009): 789–810.
35 Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments 
- the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (1991): 369; 
Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political 
Economy, and Third World Security,” The Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations 14, no. 4 (1992): 19–40; Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World 
Alignment,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 233–56; Steven R. David, Choosing 
Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991).
36 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International 
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The following section outlines the main strands in the theoretical litera-
ture, beginning  with  alliance-specific  theories  and  then  moving  on  to 
grand theories of international relations as they relate to U.S.  pol-
icy.
2.3. Alliance theory
If there is one thing scholars working in the field of alliance theory agree 
on,  it  is  the  immense  and  growing  size  of  the  literature:  It  is 
“enormous,”37 “voluminous,”38 and thus “[…] no one book could distill 
the alliance literature in its entirety […].”39 Indeed, even in analyzing the 
evolution of a subset of alliance theory since the end of the Cold War, 
Oest finds that “[…] it is extremely difficult to get a general overview of 
the trends […].”40 Part of the reason for the vast body of literature on 
alliances is the centrality of the concept to the discipline of International 
Relations. While  one need not  agree with Liska’s  claim that “the two 
often merge in all but name,”41 the point has been made time and again in 
the  introduction  to  every  major  work  on  alliances  and  need  not  be 
repeated here.42
Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 109–39; William Reed, 
“Alliance Duration and Democracy: An Extension and Cross-Validation of 
‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,’” American Journal 
of Political Science 41, no. 3 (1997): 1072–78; Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann 
Emmons, “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in 
the Twentieth Century,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1, 1991): 
285–306.
37 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 6.
38 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War 
(Stanford University Press, 2004), 13.
39 Ibid., 12.
40 Kasja Ji Noe Oest, “The End of Alliance Theory? A Literature Review of Realist 
Alliance Theory,” University of Copenhagen Institut for Statskundsab Arbejdspapir, 
2007, 6.
41 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, 3.
42 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 
1–2; Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs, 12–13; Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of 
14
Besides  its  unwieldiness,  further  criticism  of  the  alliance  literature 
includes the scarcity of general theories43 and the much-maligned lack of 
cumulative  research,  hypotheses  testing,  and  work  integrating  these 
insights.44 In sum, not much seems to have changed since Holsti et al. 
claimed that “even a generous appraiser must conclude that the alliance 
literature taken as a whole falls short of being satisfactory.”45
This  literature  review  seeks  to  provide  an  overview  over  the  central 
strands of research on alliances. Economists, sociologists, historians, and 
political  scientists  alike  have  studied  alliances. Given  the  volume and 
scope of work on alliances, it it useful to distinguish this body of research 
along two axes: as which variable alliances are considered, and whether 
the work focuses on  or other alliances. Along the first axis, alliances 
have  been  studied  equally  as  independent, dependent, and intervening 
variables. The second axis splits the field according to the object of analy-
sis. This cleavage separates work that addresses alliances in general (in 
particular  historical  alliances  up  to  and including  World  War  II), and 
work that focuses exclusively on . The two seem to coexist rather 
than  overlap—there  are  two  significant  bodies  of  work,  but  little 
exchange between  specialists and alliance theorists. Partially, this 
may be due to the prevalent notion of  being  sui generis and not 
necessarily amenable to the same analyses as other alliances. Moreover, 
much of the development of political science and International Relations 
as disciplines occurred against the backdrop of the Cold War and the cen-
Power,” 1–5.
43 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 1–3.
44 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances; 
Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 7–8; Michael Ward, “Research Gaps in Alliance 
Dynamics,” Monograph Series in World Affairs 19, no. 1 (1982): 1–101; Weitsman, 
Dangerous Alliances, 11.
45 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 
41.
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trality of  to it, which likely further promoted a focus on  over 
other alliances. Overlaying this distinction are the grand theories of inter-
national relations, which, to differing degrees have generated predictions 
for alliances as well.
This review focuses on alliances as dependent variables and thus does not 
consider e.g. the literature on whether alliances promote peace.46 None-
theless, even in the work treating alliances as dependent variables, there is 
considerable variance with regard to the specific aspect of alliances stud-
ied, including inter alia the formation and maintenance of alliances, their 
institutional design, and the sharing of costs among allies. On the second 
axis, the bulk of of work has focused on , not other alliances.
While not exhaustive, the following review aims to touch upon most of 
the central questions pursued, while focusing on the issue of the persis-
tence of alliances generally and  specifically. It begins by discussing 
theories developed specifically with regard to explaining the formation 
and maintenance of alliances and then turns to the predictions of grand 
theories of international relations.47
2.3.1. Public Goods & Collective Action
Mancur Olson first put forward Collective Action theory in his  The 
Logic of Collective Action, in which he examined why rational individu-
als often fail to cooperate to attain their goals,48 and in later work with 
Zeckhauser.49 One of their key findings was that cooperation is especially 
46 David H. Bearce, Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros, “Alliances, Internal 
Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States,” International 
Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 595–625.
47 Notably, realists, both classical and structural, have focused considerable attention 
on alliances.
48 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
49 Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances.”
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fraught when involving public goods. Public goods are such that are non-
exclusive, i.e. “the exclusion of those who do not share the cost of the 
good is impractical or impossible.”50 Further, they are nonrival in that 
enjoyment of the good by one state does not diminish the supply for oth-
ers. A common example is a lighthouse: Its beam of light is a navigational 
aid for all ships within its reach, and no ship can feasibly be excluded 
from enjoying this benefit. Moreover, the number of ships is irrelevant to 
the utility each ship derives from the lighthouse. However, public goods, 
such as the lighthouse’s guiding beam in the above example, come with 
certain problems: Because they are nonrival and non-exclusive, actors can 
enjoy the goods’ benefits without paying for or helping to supply them. 
Being rational, actors thus have strong incentives to freeride. While not a 
theory  of  alliances  per  se, public  goods  theory  does  make predictions 
about a very distinct aspect of : burden-sharing between allies.
Public goods theory tackled the issue of alliances from the outset. Indeed, 
Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal  article is entitled “An Economic 
Theory of Alliances.” The authors assumed that the good alliances pro-
vide to their members is security, and that this good can be considered a 
public good.51 Rather than focusing on the emergence of alliances, public 
goods theory looks at allies’ defense burdens,52 finding a strong correla-
tion between it and the ally’s economic size. In other words, states with 
larger  gross  domestic  products  () will  devote  a  disproportionately 
high share of   to providing security in the alliance, whereas smaller 
members are prone to free-ride and enjoy the spoils without footing the 
bill  (exploitation hypothesis). Olson and Zeckhauser’s contribution has 
spawned a significant literature on burden-sharing in  that is mostly 
50 Ibid., 273.
51 Olson and Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances.”
52 Measured as the percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditures (ibid.).
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situated in economics and policy-focused work rather than international 
relations theory.
Most of the criticism levied against public goods and collective action 
theory  gravitates  around  its  applicability  to  alliances, and  the  use  of 
defense spending as an indicator for public goods provision. Firstly, it is 
unclear whether security indeed qualifies as a pure public good in Olson 
and Zeckhauser’s sense. For example, while the U.S. nuclear guarantee for 
other  members may justifiably be considered public  in that it  is 
nonrival and non-exclusive, this  is  not true for conventional forces:  It 
does matter where troops are based, as troops in country A cannot be 
used in country B. Moreover, armed forces can be used for other purposes 
than increasing the alliance’s security, such as quelling domestic unrest or 
disaster relief, thus providing distinctly private, i.e. exclusive, benefits to 
host nations. This is illustrated by the change in  strategy from mas-
sive retaliation, which involved the immediate all-out use of U.S. nuclear 
weapons in case of attack, to flexible response in . The latter envi-
sioned a more gradual escalation from conventional to nuclear forces. 
Olson and Zeckhauser’s predictions are generally accepted as more on-
point until , whereas the increased reliance on conventional forces—
which are private and exclusive—meant that defense spending after  
was not directly correlated to .53 Hence, the value of collective action 
theory  in  accounting  for    members’  spending  patterns  remains 
unclear. It is now generally accepted that its predictions for  have 
53 John R. Oneal and Mark A. Elrod, “NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of 
Change,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1989): 435–56.
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been inaccurate since  at  least  the  late  s,54 and even  its  relevance 
before that has been questioned.55
Secondly, the underlying assumption of public goods theory that defense 
spending by allies  translates  into public  goods is  dubious, as  outlined 
above nations derive both public and private goods from defense spend-
ing. Turkey and Greece are cases in point: While their defense burden was 
above average in the s and s, this can be attributed mostly to 
their conflict and military rivalry, rather than providing collective goods 
for .56 The defense burden figure then tells us little about the nature 
of the good, i.e. whether it is public or private/exclusive in nature, and 
indeed most goods are joint in that they provide both public and private 
benefits. Furthermore, states  can  undertake  measures  to  increase  their 
contribution to the public good that do not necessarily result in increased 
state  spending, such  as  improving  elements  of  what  van  Creveld  has 
called “fighting power,” e.g. troop discipline, structure, and command.57 
Furthermore,  Ringsmose  has  recently  argued  that  the  burden-sharing 
debate in  is moving towards being measured in terms of output, 
such as how much risk is assumed and which specialist capabilities are 
provided, rather than the input side of how much money is spent.58
54 Bruce M. Russett, What Price Vigilance? Burdens of National Defense (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970); Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley, “On the Economic 
Theory of Alliances,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 19, no. 2 (1975): 330–48.
55 Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride. Alliances and Security in the Postwar 
World,” International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995): 39–71.
56 Oneal and Elrod, “NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change,” 445–48.
57 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-
1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).
58 Jens Ringsmose, “NATO - Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the 
Cold War,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 2 (2010): 319.
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In sum, Olson and Zeckhauser’s work and the substantial literature it has 
generated59 are of little help in answering the questions raised in this dis-
sertation. While their work illuminates important aspects of intra-alliance 
burden  sharing  that  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  policy  and  public 
debate and are likely to continue to do so in the future, it does not tackle 
the question of why alliances are formed or persist other than the generic 
rational assumption of members’ positive cost-benefit calculus. Not least 
due to the practical importance of who pays how much, the burden-shar-
ing literature remains one of the most vibrant and voluminous to this 
day.60
2.3.2. Domestic Influences
Another  strain  of  work  on  alliances  specifically  focuses  on  domestic 
determinants of whether states form and maintain alliances. While much 
of the existing work looks at third world states, there is nothing in it that 
should  preclude the  utility  of  the  suggested  hypotheses  for  explaining 
other states’ alliance behavior, as Morrow has done.61 Domestic politics 
59 Beyond those mentioned above, cf. also Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler, and Hirofumi 
Shimizu, “Sharing the Financial Burden for UN and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-
1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (1998): 176–95; Todd Sandler and 
John T. Tschirhart, “The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey,” Journal 
of Economic Literature 18, no. 4 (1980): 1481–1521; Todd Sandler and Hirofumi 
Shimizu, “NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance,” Foreign Policy 
Analysis 10, no. 1 (2012): 43–60; Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, 
“Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994-2000,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 
6 (2002): 651–68.
60 Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Forster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO 
Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); Songying Fang 
and Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Nonbinding 
Alliances,” Political Research Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2010): 188–202; Ringsmose, 
“NATO - Burden-Sharing Redux”; Binyam Solomon, “NATO Burden Sharing 
Revisited,” Defence and Peace Economics 15, no. 3 (2004): 251–58; Wallace J. 
Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Benjamin Zyla, Sharing the Burden?: NATO and Its Second-
Tier Powers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).
61 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 
(November 1, 1991): 904–33; James D. Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in 
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approaches generally share the assumption that alliances are but one of 
two fundamental means of increasing a state’s external security, the sec-
ond being increased armament (or “internal balancing” in neorealist par-
lance).  What  then  determines  the  choice  between  those  two  options? 
Authors working in this strand hold systemic theories to be underdeter-
mined and point to the importance of domestic considerations in deciding 
between  armament  and alliances.62 This  section  proceeds  by  outlining 
Morrow’s and Barnett and Levy’s work on domestic variables in alliance 
formation.
Besides  analyzing  the  differences  between  asymmetric  and  symmetric 
alliances with regard to allies’ relative power positions,63 Morrow’s work 
also  explores  the  trade-off  between  internal  armament  and  forming 
alliances for major powers.64 In responding to external threats, both are 
viable foreign policy options to attain the same goal, each with their own 
distinct  internal  and  external  consequences.  Both  thus  impose  certain 
domestic costs and benefits on the respective leadership, e.g. armament 
might lower the unemployment rate and boost domestic support, or fos-
ter criticism of the government.65 When it  comes to choosing between 
arming or forming an alliance, governments will pursue the course that 
has the lower marginal cost, i.e. the course that will  provide the next 
increment of security at a lower cost than the respective other.66 However, 
it is important to note that for both alliances and armaments, marginal 
the Search for Security,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 207–
33.
62 Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies,” 216, 231–33.
63 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry.”
64 Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies.”
65 Ibid., 213, 215.
66 Morrow fully acknowledges the further differences between allying and arming, 
such as e.g. the timeframe, but his focus here is on the different costs and how they 
influence the mix of the two pursued by states (ibid., 215).
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costs necessarily rise: Domestic resources and arms production capabili-
ties are finite, and alliances cannot be infinitely tight or big. This should 
lead to states pursuing a combination of both courses at any given time.67
In  contrast  to  Foreign  Policy  Analysis  ()  approaches,  Barnett  and 
Levy’s  and  David’s  work  looks  into  the  state-society  constellation  to 
explain why alliances are attractive foreign policy options for third world 
states. For them and following Waltz, states have two means of generat-
ing fungible power in their external relations: Internal mobilization and 
forming alliances with other states. Much of the third world alliance liter-
ature reads like an add-on to systemic theories, and Barnett and Levy 
stress  the  importance  of  a  multi-level  approach:  “A model  limited  to 
either domestic or systemic variables cannot provide an explanation for 
alliance behavior that is adequate or valid for all states.”68 For Barnett 
and Levy,69 internal mobilization requires a high extractive capability of 
the state vis-à-vis society, allowing it to raise men and arms in adequate 
numbers. As third world states to a significant extent face constraints on 
their ability to mobilize internally, e.g. because of cronyism, the danger of 
coups, long-term damage to the economy and a weak governance appara-
tus, alliances become an attractive means of augmenting national power. 
Needless to say, both international mobilization and alignment carry risks
—but the flexibility and rapid increases in power alliances make possible 
certainly are attractive when juxtaposed with the uncertain availability of 
resources domestically, the potentially detrimental effects on the economy, 
and the reduced ability to pursue other domestic goals, all of which com-
67 Ibid., 214.
68 Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - the Case of 
Egypt, 1962-1973,” 395.
69 Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - the Case of 
Egypt, 1962-1973”; Barnett and Levy, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political 
Economy, and Third World Security.”
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bine  to  potentially  exacerbate  the  precarious  situation  of  most  third 
world  governments.  In  short,  Barnett  and  Levy  challenge  the  realist 
assumption of all states being equally able to internally mobilize “men, 
money, and material,”70 and point to the trade-offs third-world govern-
ments face that make alliances attractive.
David’s  work shares Barnett  and Levy’s  focus on the third world and 
domestic variables.71 However, he sees the leadership’s power-preserving 
interest  as  the  most  important  factor  explaining  third-world alliances, 
rather than Barnett  and Levy’s  more economic/resource-extractive out-
look. Contrary to established and fully-sovereign states, third-world gov-
ernments face existential threats from the outside and inside and must 
seek to balance both.72 From this constellation, David proffers three mod-
ifications of systemic balance of power theory: Firstly, leaders of third-
world states will focus on balancing the primary threat and align with 
secondary threats. In the Third World, this frequently means aligning with 
other states and countering the more pressing domestic threats. Lastly, 
“Third  World  leaders  […]  will  sometimes  protect  themselves  at  the 
expense of the interests of the state.”73 In sum, David challenges a purely 
systemic outlook and suggests a modified realist approach incorporating 
internal threats as variables in explaining alliance choices in the Third 
World. Furthermore, he takes issue with the capability-aggregation model 
of alliances, i.e. an understanding of alliances as motivated by the aggre-
gation of allies’ capabilities. Rather he sees alliances in the Third World as 
70 Barnett and Levy, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third 
World Security,” 28–29.
71 David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World; David, 
“Explaining Third World Alignment”; cf. also Steven R. David, “Why the Third 
World Still Matters,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 127–59.
72 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” 238.
73 Ibid., 236.
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motivated by the leadership’s desire to stay in power, which can mean 
that leaders are more likely “to align with states that ensure their hold on 
power rather than with states that may increase their power, but at the 
risk of endangering their survival.”74
A further strand of research has focused on the regime-type of states, and 
what role it plays in predicting the formation, maintenance, and dissolu-
tion of alliances.75 Gaubatz looked into the issue of the stability of liberal 
democracies’ commitments.76 As a subset of the literature of democracies’ 
disadvantages in foreign policy and warfare, the classical view holds that 
democracies are less able to stay committed to a certain course of action 
or treaty over extended period of times. This putative democratic fickle-
ness is explained by a variety of factors, including frequent changes in 
government, and a public that has a say but is ill-informed about foreign 
policy and frequently changes its mind,77 to name but two. Contrary to 
this view, Gaubatz finds that while some of the variables used to question 
democracies’  ability  to  uphold  long-term commitments  exist  (e.g.  fre-
quent changes in government), their impact is vastly overstated and other, 
positive  attributes  of  liberal  democracies  are  neglected. These  include 
inter alia the significant number of domestic stakeholders and veto-play-
ers that have an interest in upholding agreements, and democracies’ open-
ness, which provides for added channels of communication and verifica-
tion of whether agreements are kept, making it harder to cheat. Examin-
ing  the  case  of  alliances, Gaubatz  finds  that  alliances  between  liberal 
74 Ibid., 244.
75 Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations”; Reed, 
“Alliance Duration and Democracy”; Siverson and Emmons, “Birds of a Feather.”
76 Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations.”
77 William R. Caspary, “The ‘Mood Theory’: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy,” American Political Science Review 64, no. 2 (1970): 536–47; Ole R. Holsti, 
“Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 (1992): 439–66.
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democracies  last  significantly  longer  than alliances  of non-democracies 
and between democracies and non-democracies, with a median duration 
of  years for democratic alliances and seven for mixed and non-demo-
cratic alliances.78
2.3.3. Balancing This, Balancing That—Realism and Alliances
Having  reviewed  some of  the  most  prominent  approaches  specifically 
dedicated to explaining the formation and maintenance of alliances, this 
section turns towards international relations theory more generally and 
realism in particular.
Alliances have been considered “central phenomena”79 in realism, as they 
are one of the central tools at the disposal of states to ensure their secu-
rity. Clearly, a major component of the realist understanding of alliances 
is the notion that alliances are a means for states to increase their individ-
ual capabilities (capability aggregation). Why and how states choose to 
pool  their  capabilities,  however,  differs  between  the  distinct  strands 
within the realist school of thought. The central cleavage runs between 
scholars seeing balancing—and hence alliances as a symptom thereof—as 
directed against the materially most powerful state or alliance, and those 
that claim states balance against the most threatening state or alliance. 
Within this spectrum, however, there have emerged over the last  years 
or  so  a  number  of  new approaches  that  eschew simple  classification. 
These  include  e.g.  Reiter’s  learning-based  approach80 and  Weitsman’s 
refinement of states’ reactions to threats.81 I begin by reviewing Kenneth 
N. Waltz’s structural realism and the balance of threat approach proposed 
78 Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,” 131.
79 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs, 12.
80 Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the 
Past,” World Politics 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 490; Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs.
81 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances.
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by Stephen Walt and then turn to more recent realist work on alliances 
generally and  more specifically.
2.3.3.1. Structural Realism
In  its  original  Waltzian  guise,  structural  realism  frames  alliances  as 
directed against material capabilities. Hence, because of anarchy and the 
resultant self-help system, states guard against possible future threats by 
balancing  against  the  most  materially  powerful  state  or  alliance.82 
Accordingly, structural realism predicts a loosening of the intra-alliance 
ties in  as Soviet material capabilities wane.83 While  may still 
exist on paper, for structural realists it is just that: a paper tiger. Any seri-
ous test of the alliance would unveil large divisions and minimal cohesion 
and eventual lead to its break-up.
2.3.3.2. Refining Structural Realism—Balance of Threat Theory
While this strictly materialist theory performs reasonably well in explain-
ing ’s foundation and maintenance during the Cold War,84 it is gen-
erally  considered  to  be  underdetermined. Stephen Walt, in  one  of  the 
major improvements of Waltz’s theory, developed the balance of threat 
concept: States do not balance against the materially most capable state, 
but rather against states perceived as threatening. This threat perception 
is influenced by four variables: geographic proximity, offensive capabili-
ties, overall capabilities, and perception of aggressive intentions.85 ’s 
82 Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, 
and the Future of NATO,” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (1993): 11.
83 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”; Kenneth N. Waltz, 
“NATO Expansion: A Realist’s View,” Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 2 
(2000): 23–38; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 
International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.
84 John S. Duffield, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory,” in 
Explaining International Relations Since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 344.
85 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power”; Walt, The Origins of 
Alliances.
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continued existence thus depends on whether Russia—as the major suc-
cessor state of the Soviet Union—keeps up the offensive and aggregate 
capabilities of the Soviet Union, and whether its behavior is continued to 
be perceived as aggressive in  countries.86 Geographic proximity and 
threat  perception open up the field for differing interpretations of the 
Russian  threat  within  ,  potentially  fostering  intra-alliance  rifts. 
However, ’s maintenance could also be due to the emergence of new, 
unforeseen threats that justify its existence. As Hellmann and Wolf argue, 
balance of threat theory actually leads us to expect an even faster break-
up of   than Waltzian structural realism: The perception of hostile 
intentions and offensive capabilities can decrease faster than actual aggre-
gate capabilities.87 Furthermore, proximity encourages regional balancing 
of Russia by Soviet successor states, which catch the buck and take the 
burden off .
2.3.3.3. Post-Cold War Trajectories of Realist Theories
With  increasing  intensity  and  frequency,  both  realism  generally  and 
Waltz’s structural realism and Walt’s balance of threat theory have been 
heavily criticized since the end of the Cold War. These critiques span the 
entire gamut from realism’s explanatory power regarding the Cold War88 
86 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice - What Lies Ahead?,” Journal of 
International Affairs 43, no. 1 (1989): 8–9.
87 Hellmann and Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of 
NATO,” 1993, 19.
88 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of 
Realism,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 249–77; John Lewis Gaddis, 
“International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International 
Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 5–58; Ted Hopf and John Lewis Gaddis, 
“Correspondence: Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong,” International Security 
18, no. 2 (1993): 202–10; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Waltz and World 
History: The Paradox of Parsimony,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 446–
63. For a realist rebuttal, see William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the 
Cold War,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 91–129; Stephen M. Walt, “The 
Gorbachev Interlude and International Relations Theory,” Diplomatic History 21, 
no. 3 (1997): 473–79.
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and the democratic peace phenomenon89 to the veracity of its predictions, 
its  theoretical  integrity,90 and its  utility  in explaining individual  states’ 
foreign policies.91 Specifically, discussions in the realist camp have gravi-
tated around three issues: the phenomenon of unipolarity, the theoretical 
and philosophical integrity of realism as a paradigm, and whether or not 
realism can and should make predictions regarding individual states’ for-
eign policies.
2.3.3.3.1.Unipolarity 
Since  the  end of  the  Cold  War, criticism of  neorealism has  gravitated 
around a number of issues. While leading neorealists had claimed balanc-
ing would lead to a return to multipolarity within “the fairly near future, 
say ten to twenty years,”92 critics maintain that realism has largely failed 
to explain international relations in the s. A key debate has thus 
played out over the durability of unipolarity, with some claiming that the 
original balancing prediction will eventually be borne out.93 Others, how-
89 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science 
Review 80 (1986): 1151–70; Bruce Russett, “Why Democratic Peace?,” in Debating 
the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant. The 
Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 5–49; 
Daniel Deudney, “Publius before Kant: Federal-Republican Security and Democratic 
Peace,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 3 (2004): 315–56; 
David E. Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,” International Security 19, 
no. 2 (1994): 50–86.
90 Peter D. Feaver et al., “Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever 
a Realist?),” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 165–93; John A. Vasquez, “The 
Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An 
Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American 
Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 899–912.
91 For an overview, see Michael P Sullivan, “‘That Dog Won’t Hunt’: The Cottage 
Industry of Realist Criticism, or Must You Play That Waltz Again?,” Journal of 
International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 327–54.
92 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 50.
93 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” 
International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 5–51; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar 
Illusion Revisited,” International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 7–41; Waltz, “The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics.”
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ever, see this unipolarity as exceptional and thus durable,94 or balancing 
as actually occurring, albeit in other shapes—a kind of proto-balancing 
called “soft balancing.”95 Not only were realist predictions for the post-
Cold War international system challenged, but also its claims regarding 
much of  the historical  evidence have been severely  criticized:  Whereas 
realists see balancing as the prevalent response of states to threatening or 
powerful states, respectively, historian Schroeder claims that balancing is 
actually a rather less common course of action. More frequently, states 
actually bandwagoned with more powerful states, pace realism.96
2.3.3.3.2.Theoretical Integrity and Applicability to Foreign Policy
The second and third issues are closely linked: Do recent developments in 
neorealism violate the paradigm’s core assumptions and thus render real-
ism a degenerative paradigm?97 Can and should neorealism be used to 
explain foreign policy?98
94 Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. 
Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88; 
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 
24, no. 1 (1999): 5–41.
95 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” 
International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 72–108; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. 
Wohlforth, World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of 
American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Robert A. 
Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 
(2005): 7–45; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International 
Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 46–71; Kai He and Huiyun Y. Feng, “If Not Soft 
Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward 
China,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 363–95.
96 Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality versus Neorealist Theory,” International Security 
19, no. 1 (1994): 108–48; Paul Schroeder, Miriam Fendius Elman, and Colin Elman, 
“History Vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 
182–95.
97 Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”
98 Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign 
Policy?,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–61; Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any 
Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of 
Structural Realism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 294–321; Kenneth N. Waltz, 
“International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54; 
Anders Wivel, “Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The 
Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,” Journal of 
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While neorealists  have been on the defensive in  the first  two of these 
debates,99 the third over neorealism’s utility for explaining foreign policy 
has fostered wide-ranging theoretical innovation.100 An emerging body of 
neorealist reasearch uses the structure of the international system and a 
state’s position in it as independent variables, but argues that additional 
intervening variables are required to generate explanations for individual 
states’ foreign policies.
Rose first identified this strand of research as “neoclassical realism.”101 Its 
hallmark is its insistence that there is no “perfect transmission belt linking 
material  capabilities  to foreign policy behavior.”102 Hence, states’  posi-
tions in the international system do not neatly translate into specific for-
eign policies. Rather, systemic effects are mediated through intervening 
domestic variables. While maintaining the logical primacy of system-level 
independent  variables,  neoclassical  realists  incorporate  intervening 
domestic variables that mediate systemic effects. Crucially, these do not 
have  an  independent  causal  role.103 Thereby,  neoclassical  realists  can 
make  predictions  for  both  how individual  states  will  respond  to  the 
incentives presented by the international system in its anarchic self-help 
state, and for why states react differently to the same systemic pressures.
International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 (2005): 355–80.
99 Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War”; Legro and 
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”; Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and 
Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional 
Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition.”
100 Elman, “Horses for Courses”; Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical 
Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”; Waltz, 
“International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy”; Wivel, “Explaining Why State X 
Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign 
Policy Analysis.”
101 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.”
102 Ibid., 146–47.
103 Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and 
Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.”
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The authors Rose considers neoclassical differ widely in the intervening 
variables used. This dissertation suggests loosely grouping the variables 
used into two sets: Ideational variables and domestic politics.104 The first 
focuses  on  the  role  of  perceptions  and  psychology  for  foreign  policy. 
Examples include Taliaferro and Wohlforth,105 both of whom focus on 
decision-makers’  perceptions  of  relative  power  positions  and  changes 
thereof. Writing about East Asia, Victor D. Cha explains alliance behavior 
through elite perceptions of the United States’ commitment to Japan and 
South Korea.106 Domestic politics variables include state strength vis-à-vis 
society,107 which determines the fungible power available to a state. Chris-
tensen tries to explain Chinese and U.S. policies by showing how elites in 
both countries used the respective other to pursue domestic aims.108
As argued above, domestic  factors  play a more prominent  role  in  the 
post-Cold War world without the clear bipolar incentives. Since neoclassi-
cal  realists  employ  a  wide  range  of  different  intervening  variables,  a 
104 Authors, as opposed to variables, can and do cross this border. A notable example 
of this is Taliaferro, who uses regime-type and perceptual variables, respectively 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism 
Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–61; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Power Politics and the Balance of 
Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery,” Political 
Psychology 25, no. 2 (2004): 177–211.
105 Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery; Taliaferro, 
“Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in 
the Periphery”; William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions 
During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
106 Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The 
United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 
261–91; Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” 
International Security 34, no. 3 (2010): 158–96.
107 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the 
Resource-Extractive State,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 464–95; Fareed 
Zakaria, From Wealth to Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
108 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, 
and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996).
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coherent set that applies outside the specific cases reviewed by the respec-
tive author has yet to emerge.
With regard to the historical accuracy of realism’s balancing prediction, 
Weitsman has put forward an interesting refinement of the balance of 
threat approach.109 In contrast to Walt, for her the relation between the 
level  of  threat  a  state  faces  and balancing  behavior  is  not  linear, but 
rather curvilinear. In other words, states are not more likely to balance 
the greater the threat. Rather, states balance only against medium-level 
threats. Once, however, a  state’s  existence  is  threatened, it  will  band-
wagon with the threatening state.110 At the lower end of the threat level 
spectrum, states hedge by making low-commitment moves towards states 
“with which there is little or no conflict, yet little or no amity either” so 
as to remain flexible in the choice of future allies.111 Vis-à-vis adversaries 
posing a low level of threat, states tether, that is form an alliance aimed at 
conciliating said adversary and thus reducing the likelihood of conflict.112
Tackling the issue of indeterminacy of realist  approaches, Reiter looks 
into a key puzzle for balance of threat theory: While it sees alliances as 
responses to threat, some of the most threatened states in the th century 
chose  to  remain  neutral,  while  some  of  the  least  threatened  joined 
alliances. To resolve this puzzle, Reiter turns to learning from history as a 
crucial factor in determining whether small powers will ally or not. In his 
theory, states learn from their experience of either allying or remaining 
109 Patricia A. Weitsman, “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances,” 
Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 156–93; Patricia A. Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion 
and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente,” Security Studies 12, 
no. 3 (2003): 79–113; Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances.
110 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 18–19.
111 Ibid., 20.
112 Ibid., 21, 23; For a discussion of the problems states face in discerning others’ 
intentions, see Charles L. Glaser et al., “Correspondence: Can Great Powers Discern 
Intentions?,” International Security 40, no. 3 (2016): 197–215.
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neutral in world wars. Based on whether this experience was positive or 
negative, a small power will draw “the lesson that alliance is best or that 
neutrality is best and chooses alliance or neutrality in peacetime years fol-
lowing the war based on this lesson.”113
2.3.4. The United States, Unipolarity, and International Relations 
Theory
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Warsaw 
Pact, bipolarity gave way to a new international structure—unipolarity. 
Since  much  of  the  theorizing  in  international  relations  had  occurred 
against the backdrop of the Cold War and its juxtaposition of the  
and  the  , unipolarity  has  been  puzzling  scholars  since. This  goes 
beyond some of the more immediate issues, such as why the  col-
lapsed and what the impact of the Reagan buildup was. To this day, it 
remains contested whether the structure of the international system ever 
was  unipolar,  and,  indeed,  whether  it  matters.114 The  “unipolar 
moment”115 left  the United States as the sole superpower—a historical 
novelty: Previously, great powers had become great by rising through the 
ranks, not by their main competitor disintegrating. Despite claims that 
the United States is in relative decline,116 it can be seen as a unipole in the 
period under  review here. This  is  especially  true for  military capabili-
ties,117 where  the  qualitative  and quantitative  gap between the United 
113 Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs, 13.
114 See for example Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance. International 
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy; Stephen G. Brooks and William 
C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: 
China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, 
no. 3 (2016): 7–53. While the distribution of power—and thus polarity—plays a 
role in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, this is less clear in constructivism.
115 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 
23–33.
116 For an overview, see Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony - Myth or 
Reality?,” International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 147–72..
117 In Paul Kennedy’s words: “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power 
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States and others has been growing: The United States spent more on 
defense than the next eight states combined in , more than the next 
 in , and for a time more than all other countries combined.118 In 
, the United States still accounted for  percent of global military 
expenditures—more  than  three  times  the  share  of  the  next  biggest 
spender.119 Within , the United States has always held a supremely 
influential position. As Calleo points out, “[m]uch of ’s internal his-
tory reflects the influence of American security policy.”120 This remains 
true after the Cold War, with  continuing to be “[…] an American-
run  show.”121 This  basic  truth  is  reflected  institutionally  e.g.  in  the 
alliance’s highest military figure—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
()—always being an American.122 In the period under review here, 
spanning the administrations  of  George H. W. Bush (–), Bill 
Clinton (–), and George W. Bush (–), the U.S. mate-
rial position relative to its allies changed very little—the United States 
remains the central actor in .
[between the United States and the rest of the world, DJR]; nothing. I have returned 
to all of the comparative defence spending and military personnel statistics over the 
past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no 
other nation comes close” (Paul Kennedy, “The Eagle Has Landed,” Financial Times, 
February 2, 2002).
118 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The United States: Alone in the World,” in Imbalance of Power:  
US Hegemony and International Order, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2009), 29.
119 SIPRI, “Trends in World Military Expenditure Data, 2014” (Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2015), http://books.sipri.org/product_info?
c_product_id=496#.
120 David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance 
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), 27.
121 Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement,” in 
Explaining NATO Enlargement, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2001), 175.
122 Who concurrently serves as Combatant Commander of the U.S. European 
Command (), one of six regional Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. 
Department of Defense.
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Unipolarity,  its  durability,  and  ’s  persistence  pose  challenges  for 
structural  realist  theories  of  international  relations.  Structural  realism 
maintains that unipolarity is the least stable configuration of the interna-
tional system. Other states are expected to balance against and eventually 
catch up with the unipole.123 Realists thus expected the system to revert 
to multipolarity in “the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years,” i.e. by 
the first decade of the s.124 However, there are few signs of hard, mil-
itary balancing today. Two ways of explaining this puzzle have been sug-
gested: This unipolarity is exceptional and thus durable, or that balancing 
is occurring, albeit as “soft balancing.”125
For , Waltz’s  structural  realism predicts  a  loosening of  the intra-
alliance ties in  as Soviet material capabilities wane.126 While  
may still exist, any serious test of the alliance would reveal the deep fis-
sures and result in its break-up. Similarly, in the balance of threat refine-
ment of Waltz’s theory, ’s persistence depends on whether Russia as 
the successor of the Soviet Union maintains the offensive and aggregate 
capabilities of the Soviet Union, and whether  countries continue to 
perceive Russia’s behavior as aggressive.127 This, in turn, should result in 
123 Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”; Layne, “The 
Unipolar Illusion Revisited.”
124 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 50.
125 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”; He and Feng, “If Not Soft 
Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward 
China”; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the 
World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 109–39; 
Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. Grand 
Strategy after the Cold War”; Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States”; Paul, 
“Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy”; Waltz, “The United States: Alone in the 
World,” 29; Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World.”
126 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”; Waltz, “NATO 
Expansion: A Realist’s View”; Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War.”
127 Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice - What Lies Ahead?,” 8–9; The Origins of 
Alliances; “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 86–120.
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renewed efforts to strengthen . However, states could uphold  
against new, unforeseen threats that justify its existence.
What are the implications of being the unipole for U.S. foreign policy 
generally, and policy  in  and toward  specifically?  The commonly 
held view in the literature is that structural incentives and disincentives 
are less important for the dominant power in unipolar systems: It can do 
as it sees fit and need not worry about balancing a competitor.128 Even for 
structural  realists, domestic  factors  matter  more  in  unipolarity:  Under 
bipolarity, structural constraints are high and prescribe certain policies. In 
unipolarity, constraints are weaker; the United States has a larger freedom 
of action and domestic variables become more important.129 What ani-
mates U.S. behavior is unclear from a structural perspective and one must 
still account for the domestic processes that led to one foreign policy out-
come rather than another—the “spirit” moving the dominant power as 
Waltz calls it. 130
The problem poses itself in similar form for the other two main theories 
of international relations, rational institutionalism and constructivism. In 
contrast to neorealism, both have generated a sizable and broadly opti-
mistic literature on the subject of .131 In predicting  ’s  persis-
tence, institutionalists drew on ’s uniquely high degree of institution-
alization,132 the adaptability of its institutional design,133 and vested orga-
128 For one example of many, see e.g. Waltz, “The United States: Alone in the World,” 
31.
129 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 24; Waltz, “The United States: 
Alone in the World.”
130 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 25.
131 Hellmann and Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of 
NATO,” 1993.
132 Duffield, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory.”
133 John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War,” Political Science 
Quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994): 763–88; Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and 
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nizational interests.134 Constructivist scholarship has examined the under-
lying  community  of  values  and established  practices.135 None of  these 
three approaches has, however, investigated whether the utility, values, or 
functions they claim  retains actually play a role in the policies of 
individual allies.
Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization 54, no. 4 
(2000): 705–36; Wallander and Keohane, “Why Does NATO Persist? An 
Institutional Approach”; “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions.”
134 Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War,” International 
Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 445–75.
135 Emanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, 
Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” European Journal of 
International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230; Christopher Hemmer and Peter 
J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, 
and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 
575–607; Risse-Kappen, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security 
Community”; “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of 
NATO,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 
ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Cooperation 
Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy; Frank 
Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” Security 
Studies 8, no. 2–3 (1998): 198–234; Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, 
“From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity,” 
Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 357–87.
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3. Theory & Approach
Structural  Realisms  proposes  a  coherent  and  parsimonious  theory  of 
international relations, aiming to explain particular configurations of the 
international system rather than individual states’ foreign policies. It does 
so based on two assumptions: . The international system is anarchical. 
. States at a minimum seek to survive.136 From these assumptions, struc-
tural realism deducts a tendency of the international system to balance.
Logically, the emergence of a state of balance of power in the interna-
tional system can only be the result of state behavior. If states do not 
form coalitions, that is  if  they do not balance the strongest power or 
strongest coalition, the system would remain lopsided. Structural realists 
therefore do not per se discount the role of subsystemic factors in the 
form of state behavior. Rather, they purposely exclude the state level from 
their theoretical remit, arguing that a parsimonious and general theory of 
international  relations  would simply be impossible. Factors that shape 
state behavior and foreign policy are too diverse, too multifaceted, and 
cannot be generalized across cases, structural realists argue. Instead, they 
confine themselves to explaining which incentives and disincentives result 
from  the  international  system’s  anarchical  structure.  Neorealists  thus 
intentionally disregard how states react to these incentives and disincen-
tives. All they set out to explain is which behavior the international sys-
136  Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 121.Whether or not Waltz’s theory relies on states behaving rationally is 
debatable. In my opinion, the theory does not require rational actors for outcomes 
consistent with its predictions to emerge. If the system punishes suboptimal 
behavior, actors not complying with incentives are weeded out, regardless of their 
rationality.
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tem rewards, and which it punishes. Whether or not and why states abide 
by structural incentives does not concern neorealists.
The tension between on the one hand predicting which behavior carries 
rewards and which behavior is detrimental, and on the other hand ignoring 
how states  react  to these pressures is  manifest. Waltz  notes his  theory is 
intended to explain general phenomena, and that any such theory cannot 
explain specific events.137 This section proceeds by briefly laying out Waltz’s 
theory of international politics. I then elaborate on two central problems of 
Waltz’s theory: first, his assumption regarding the goals states pursue, and 
second, and whether or not structural realism can (and should) be applied 
to individual states’ behavior.
3.1. Waltz’s Structural Realism
Waltz’s  Theory  of  International  Politics puts  forward a  theory  of  the 
international system’s incentives for state behavior and the system-level 
outcomes that result.138 He aims at parsimony and a pure system-level 
theory to generate predictions for “[…] how the structure of the system, 
and variations in it, affect the interacting units and the outcomes they 
produce. International structure […] constrains [units] from taking cer-
137 Ibid., chap. 1.
138 This section builds on Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International 
Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al., 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
See also Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Colin S. Elman and Michael A. Jensen, eds., Realism Reader 
(Milton Park: Routledge, 2014); Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist International Theory 
and the Study of World Politics,” in New Thinking in International Relations 
Theory, ed. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1997); Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A 
Reinterpretation. (London and New York: Routledge, 1992); Robert Jervis, 
“Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 
(1998): 971–91; Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Martin Wight, 
International Theory: Three Traditions (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 
1991).
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tain actions while propelling them toward others.”139 Logically, this also 
allows for generating predictions for the optimal behavior in any given 
system: Acting in accord with the systems’ incentive is optimal, all other 
behavior suboptimal. Said Waltz: “[T]hose who conform to accepted and 
successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier  to stay 
there.”140
Waltz’s point of departure is the international system. The system consists 
of a structure and units, and the two components are kept rigorously sep-
arated. Indeed, units are easily defined in Theory of International Politics:  
They are sovereign states.141
3.1.1. Structure
In keeping with his strict distinction between structure and units, Waltz 
seeks to “[…]  leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, 
their  behavior, and their  interactions”142 in  his  definition  of  structure. 
Waltz argues that any structure, be it in the domestic or in the interna-
tional realm, can be defined using three elements: the ordering principle, 
the functional specification of units, and the distribution of capabilities.143 
These three elements suffice to characterize a structure, i.e. the positions 
of units relative to each other or the “arrangement of the parts of a sys-
tem.”144
139 Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” 29.
140 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 92.
141 Ibid., 94.
142 Ibid., 79.
143 Ibid., 82.
144 Ibid., 88.
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3.1.1.1. Ordering Principle
At heart, Waltz’s understanding of the ordering principle of a structure is 
binary. Systems are either hierarchical or anarchical. Domestic political 
systems, for example, are ordered hierarchically. “Relations of super- and 
subordination” in  which  “[s]ome are entitled to  command; others  are 
required to obey”145 characterize hierarchical orders. In contrast, anarchi-
cal orders know no relationships of super- and subordination. All parts of 
an anarchically ordered system are equals, with no binding relationships 
of authority. Waltz’s theory does not stray from the assumption that in 
international politics—the systems level—anarchy is the rule of the game. 
Nevertheless, anarchy is not the absence of order. On the contrary, anar-
chy  is  a  form of  order, as  Waltz  argues  drawing on microeconomics, 
specifically  the  market. Assuming  that  states  seek  to  survive,146 states 
coexisting interact like firms on the marketplace and, purely by virtue of 
coexisting, are subjected to the same structural incentives and disincen-
tives. 
3.1.1.2. Functional Differentiation
The specialization of units on specific tasks is contingent on the first ele-
ment of the definition of structures, the ordering principle. If one follows 
Waltz in assuming all units seek to survive, a division of labor between 
units  can  only  arise  if  the  structure  guarantees  a  unit’s  survival. The 
ordering principle thus determines the potential for functional specializa-
tion. As outlined above, Waltz assumes anarchy is the ordering principle 
of the international system’s structure. With no central authority, states in 
the international  system live in  a  self-help system, meaning they must 
ensure their survival themselves. In this, all states are the same—they are 
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 91–93.
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“like units,”147 or “unitary actors with a single motive—the wish to sur-
vive.”148 In contrast, hierarchical systems allow for functional differentia-
tion. Since the ordering principle of a structure determines the potential 
for functional differentiation of units, it is more of an appendix to the 
ordering principle element than a definitional element in its own right.
3.1.1.3. Distribution of Capabilities
The third element of Waltz’s definition of structure are the capabilities of 
units to perform certain tasks, or more specifically how one unit’s capa-
bilities compare to that of the others, i.e. the distribution of capabilities, a 
system-level  phenomenon.149 In  Waltz’s  words:  “States  are alike in  the 
tasks they face, though not in their ability to perform them,”150 and thus 
“[t]he  differences  [between  states]  are  in  capability,  not  function.”151 
Importantly, the focus on the distribution of capabilities allows Waltz to 
maintain the abstraction of the system-level. Specifically, the difference of 
units with regard to their relative capabilities is the only characteristic 
that matters. While seemingly a unit-level phenomenon, the capability of 
any given unit to perform a task is meaningless unless put in context by 
other units and their ability to perform the same task.
3.1.2. Theoretical Implications
Above we have seen how Waltz sets up his theory’s independent variable, 
the international system, which comprises a structure and units. Three 
elements define a structure: its ordering principle, i.e. anarchy or hierar-
chy, the functional differentiation between units, and the distribution of 
147 Ibid., 93.
148 Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” 54.
149 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 98.
150 Ibid., 96.
151 Ibid.
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capabilities. As for the units, Waltz posits that states are the central actors 
in international politics.
3.1.2.1. Independent Variable Largely Static
These four elements of Waltz’s definition of the international system are 
of different importance. Three of the four elements are considered largely 
static: Anarchy is unlikely to be overcome, and therefore the structure 
will remain functionally undifferentiated. Likewise, states will remain the 
central actors, and their desire to survive is a constant. The element that 
can change, however, is the distribution of capabilities in any given sys-
tem. 
3.1.2.2. Waltz’s Key Predictions
Anarchy is a given in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. The nature 
of units  and the functional differentiation are static and a function of 
anarchy, respectively. Waltz  therefore relies  on two factors to generate 
hypotheses about international politics: The anarchic order of the inter-
national  system  and  the  distribution  of  material  capabilities  between 
units.
As Waltz frequently noted himself, the predictions his theory can generate 
are indeterminate. Whether or not that is a problem depends to a consid-
erable degree on one’s view whether or not hard theories with definite 
predictions are possible in international relations and the social sciences 
more generally. For the sake of his theory’s consistency and parsimony, 
Waltz intentionally limits the scope of what he seeks to explain. The cen-
tral  conclusions  that  can be  drawn from neorealism is  that  states, by 
virtue of coexisting under anarchy, face structural pressures. The anarchi-
cal international system incentivizes states to pursue certain behaviors, 
while foregoing others. Crucially, Waltz lays no claim to there being a 
law-like link between the international system’s structure and state behav-
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ior. Whether or not states come to terms with these incentives is a differ-
ent matter, and one Waltz consciously left out of his theory. Says Waltz: 
Actors may perceive the structure that constrains them and 
understand how it serves to reward some kinds of behavior 
and to penalize others. But then again they either may not see 
it or, seeing it, may for any of many reasons fail to conform 
their actions to the patterns that are most often rewarded an 
least often punished.152 
Similarly, he posits states seek survival. Waltz’s theory is thus not entirely 
abstract from all unit-level phenomena other than a state’s capabilities: 
His theory is  predicated on a certain motivation that  is  shared by all 
states, i.e. survival.153 However, Waltz acknowledges many other motives 
are conceivable: “Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be 
endlessly varied; they may range from seeking to conquer the world to 
the desire merely to be left alone.”154 This opens the theory for any num-
ber of motives, which may result in entirely different dynamics of unit-to-
unit  interactions.  Indeed,  Waltz  himself  has  at  times  asserted  other 
motives states pursue may include economic prosperity,155 “peaceful coex-
istence” or “mastery” over others,156 autonomy and independence157 as 
well as sovereignty. 
152 Ibid., 92.
153 Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” 52.
154 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91. Or, as Waltz puts it elsewhere, states “at 
minimum, seek their own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal 
domination” Ibid., 118.
155 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics. A Response to 
My Critics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 337; Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of 
International Politics,” 54.
156 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 144.
157 Ibid., 204, 104.
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3.1.2.3. The Problem of States’ Likeness and Motives
Waltz’s conceptualization of neorealism has been met with staunch criti-
cism from a variety of angles, e.g. institutionalism,158 and, more funda-
mentally,  constructivism  and  post-positivist  theory.159 Above,  I  have 
shown that Waltz rests his argument on all states seeking to survive, but 
professes  many  other  motivations  can  and  do drive  state  behavior  in 
actuality.160 Within  the  neorealist  school,  however,  disagreement  over 
158 Pars pro toto for the institutionalist critique, see: Robert O. Keohane, After 
Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its 
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, 
“International Institutions: 2 Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 
(1988): 379–96; Robert O. Keohane and Robert Axelrod, “Achieving Cooperation 
under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (1985): 226–54; 
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 
International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51; Robert O. Keohane and Kenneth N. 
Waltz, “The Neorealist and His Critic,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000): 
204–5. Institutionalists share neorealism’s core assumptions to the extent that 
“institutional theory is the half-sibling of neorealism” Robert O. Keohane and Lisa 
L. Martin, “Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation” (Progress in 
International Relations Theory: A Collaborative Assessment and Application of Imre 
Lakatos’s Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, Scottsdale, AZ, 1999), 2. 
159 The post-positivist turn in political sciences resulted in more fundamental criticism 
of neorealism and its epistemological underpinnings. See Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917; Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 4, no. 1 (June 2001): 391–416; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Constructing a New 
Orthodoxy? Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ and the Constructivist 
Challenge,” Millennium 29, no. 1 (2000): 73–101; Friedrich Kratochwil, “History, 
Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate and Assessing Its 
Importance for Social Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 
1 (2006): 5–29; John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 
52, no. 4 (1998): 855–85; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: 
The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 
(1992): 391–425; Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State,” The American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 384–
396; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
160 For an instructive overview of assumed state motivations different strands of 
realism, see Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Malign Autocracies and 
Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy, and International Relations Theory,” Security 
Studies 10, no. 3 (2001): 46–79; cited in Colin S. Elman, “Realism,” in International  
Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century, by Martin Griffith (Milton Park: 
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states’ motives has been one of the core issues of debate in the wake of 
Waltz.161 This debate has seen authors disagree whether states really only 
seek to survive, or whether other motives, including those suggested by 
Waltz, may be a better starting ground for explaining international poli-
tics. A variety of motives have been suggested, ranging from mere sur-
vival,162 as posited by Waltz, to global domination at the other end of the 
spectrum. The two variants are commonly referred to as defensive and 
offensive  realism,  with  Walt’s  balance  of  threat  theory163 and 
Mearsheimer’s  work  being  the  most  sophisticated  statements,  respec-
tively.164 Obviously,  predicted  outcomes  and  behavior  vary  greatly 
depending on which motives one assumes to drive states.
Routledge, 2007), 13.
161 Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies  
Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1993): 75–77; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: 
Bringing the Revisioist State Back in,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 92–
99.
162 E.g. Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 
(1988): 485–507; Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, 
“Toward a Realist Theory of State Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 
(1989): 457–474.
163 Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest 
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Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack L. Synder (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991); Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to 
Kaufman and Labs,” Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 448–82; Stephen M. Walt, 
“Revolution and War,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (1992): 321–68; Stephen M. Walt, 
Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen M. Walt, 
“Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156–79; Stephen M. 
Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counter-
Proliferation,” in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and 
World Order, ed. Viktor A. Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Walt, 
“Alliances in a Unipolar World.”
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International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 5–56; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False 
Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 10–
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3.2. Expanding Beyond the Structure—Neorealist Predictions 
for Foreign Policy
The previous sections outlined Kenneth Waltz’s  theory of international 
politics, and  showed  that  his  ambiguity  regarding  states’  motives  has 
sparked debate over alternative assumed motives. A closely related albeit 
distinct issue is whether neorealism can and should generate predictions 
for individual states’ foreign policies. There are two aspects to this ques-
tion: One is whether expanding an originally structural theory to make 
predictions about foreign policy violates Waltz’s strict separation of these 
levels of analysis. It is worthwhile considering whether doing so would 
open up a sparse, systemic theory to the Pandora’s Box of subsystemic 
variables, jeopardizing its theoretical coherence and elegance. The second 
issue is whether neorealism must make predictions about state behavior 
as opposed to system-level outcomes in order to be policy relevant and to 
generate falsifiable hypotheses. Scholars working in the neorealist tradi-
tion have answered these questions by sacrificing some of Waltz’s theory’s 
parsimony to explain individual countries foreign policies.165 Indeed, this 
move underpins most neoclassical realist work.
3.3. The Free and Easy Life? The United States after the End of 
the Cold War
Emerging from the Cold War as the unrivalled superpower, the United 
States appeared to be slated to enjoy “the free and easy life,”166 with few 
if  any constraints  on its  foreign and security  policy. As argued above, 
165 Stephen E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffery W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery; Zakaria, 
From Wealth to Power.
166 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 96.
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structural realist theories lay out an optimal behavior for the other states 
in a unipolar system—to balance, that is. Structural realist theories have, 
however, remained relatively silent on the issue of what the United States 
should do with its new position. Based on his balance of threat approach, 
Walt has suggested the United States should restrain itself in its foreign 
policy so as not to trigger balancing behavior by others.167 
Implicit in the pessimistic forecasts put forward by writers in the realist 
tradition  is  the  assumption  that  remaining  in   comes  with  costs 
attached for the United States. The costs can occur across the bandwidth 
of policy, e.g. by requiring the United States to spend more, by dragging it 
into conflicts it would not otherwise have fought, or by limiting its free-
dom of maneuver. If on balance, remaining in the alliance comes at little 
or no cost, there is little reason for the United States to abandon it. The 
argument of those authors discarding  and calling for the United 
States to leave it thus relies on a negative cost calculation: costs for the 
hegemon would have to outweigh possible benefits. These benefits can 
mainly take two forms: material and political. Materially, alliances can 
serve to amalgamate their members’ individual military capacities. Politi-
cally, alliances can help increase any given policy’s legitimacy by garner-
ing support of allies.
Flowing from the indeterminacy of structural realist theory’s assumptions 
regarding states’ motives is a spectrum of optimal behavior for the hege-
mon in its alliances. This ranges from the quest for hegemony suggested 
by offensive realists to the concern for maintaining one’s status relative to 
other countries, as defensive realists argue. Separate from this split, Beck-
167 Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. G. John 
Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Stephen M. Walt, Taming 
American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2005).
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ley has identified two approaches to the costs and benefits of  for the 
United States in the U.S. academic debate: entanglement theory and free-
dom of action theory.168 The former emphasizes the downsides of U.S. 
involvement  in  alliances, whereas  the  latter  argues  that  because  of  its 
superior position, the hegemon can participate in alliances while forego-
ing any of the downsides. Whilst neither constitutes a full-fledged theory, 
both  approaches  make  predictions  concerning  the  costs  of  being  in 
alliances  for  the  United  States.  These  predictions  are  consequential 
regardless of whether one adheres to an offensive or a defensive realist 
logic. If the costs are as dramatic as predicted by entanglement theory, 
both offensive and defensive realists would consider leaving the respective 
alliance as preferable. Likewise, both schools of thought would predict 
the hegemon remaining in an alliance in which it can extricate itself from 
the costly downsides.
3.3.1. Entanglement Theory
This approach warns of the dangers of entanglement, as first professed by 
the second president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson: “[…] peace, 
commerce, and honest  friendship with all  nations, entangling alliances 
with none […].”169 Jefferson’s predecessor George Washington had voiced 
a similar sentiment in his  farewell remarks: 
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of 
Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of 
European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?
168 Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks 
of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 14–22.
169 Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1801, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. The notion that NATO is such 
an entangling alliance is not uncommon, see Ronald E. Powaski, Toward an 
Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-
1950 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991); Ronald E. Powaski, The Entangling 
Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-1993 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1994).
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It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with 
any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now 
at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of 
patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. [...] I repeat it, 
therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine 
sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be 
unwise to extend them.
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable 
establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may 
safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.170
Entanglement thus boils down to “loyalty trump[ing] self-interest: state is 
driven by moral, legal, or reputational concerns to uphold an alliance 
commitment without regard to, and often at the expense of, its national 
interests.”171 Being entangled is thus an intervening variable between the 
system pressures highlighted by neorealists and the observed outcomes. 
As such, an “entangling  alliance” could  contribute  to  states  failing to 
appropriately heed the systemic incentives. Entanglement is a broad con-
cept  that  arguably  comprises  Snyder’s  distinct  conception  of  “entrap-
ment.”172
3.3.2. Freedom of Action Theory
In contrast to entanglement theory, this approach is optimistic about a 
great power’s ability to successfully insulate and extricate itself from any 
negative impact  of  an alliance. Powerful  states  simply do not  become 
entangled,  but  retain  their  “freedom  of  action.”  Great  powers  are 
expected to be able to shirk responsibilities within an alliance through a 
170 George Washington, “1796 Farewell Address,” accessed April 27, 2016, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp.
171 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. 
Defense Pacts,” 12.
172 Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 
20, no. 3 (2011): 350–77; Snyder, Alliance Politics.
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variety of means, e.g. “by inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, 
sidestepping costly commitments, maintaining a diversified portfolio of 
alliances, and using alliances to deter adversaries and restrain allies from 
initiating or escalating conflicts.”173 Missing from Beckley’s description is 
the flip side of the ability to shirk alliance responsibilities: Great powers 
can  vice  versa  use  an  alliance  in  which  they  hold  superior  influence 
towards their own ends, e.g. by shoring up political support and material 
contributions.
Beckley’s work focuses on the military implications of alliances for the 
United States, i.e. whether alliances have drawn the United States into 
military engagements it would not have otherwise participated in. There 
is nothing, however, precluding the application to areas beyond immedi-
ate military conflict. In any given issue area, the mechanisms of entangle-
ment or freedom of action theory should be observable. 
Further, the spectrum of predictions Beckley presents at first glance seems 
to align neatly with the distinction commonly drawn between offensive 
and defensive neorealists. This distinction rests on the different motives 
the two groups assume for states. The initial impression is misleading, 
however. Beckley’s  classification does  not operate at  the motives level. 
Rather, his  predictions  are  for  observable  effects  of  the  United  States 
power  advantage  within  alliances. Strictly  speaking, entanglement  and 
freedom of action theory are both agnostic about state motives (as Waltz 
claims his theory is). The two approaches merely make different predic-
tions as to the likelihood U.S. motives, whatever they are, will prevail 
within an alliance—for entanglement theory, the likelihood is lower than 
for freedom of action theory. Equally, the cost of alliances in terms of lim-
173 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. 
Defense Pacts,” 18.
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itations placed on the United States varies. It is high in entanglement the-
ory—states cannot extricate themselves from their commitments and are 
drawn into conflicts—and low in freedom of action theory, which pre-
dicts powerful states will be able to forego any of the disadvantages of 
alliances. 
The argument presented here is thus that the United States has remained 
an active  member of   because  the  costs  of  its  commitment  have 
either been low or outweighed by advantages. The real issue, as Rauch-
haus has correctly argued, is thus “how the United States managed to use 
 to advance its own agenda” and  “whether  serves America’s 
‘perceived or misperceived interests’ in Europe.”174 The low-cost part of 
the argument works with both defensive and offensive realist theories as 
well as other theories of international relations. In contrast, the notion 
that benefits for the United States outweigh any disadvantages of  
membership because the power differential allows the United States to 
forego any disadvantages is distinctly realist and squares with the predic-
tions of freedom of action theory. This requires an assumption of what 
purpose the United States pursues in . As discussed above, defensive 
approaches stress that states seek to avoid losses of relative power; they 
are defensive positionalists.175 In contrast, offensive realists come to dif-
ferent conclusions regarding optimal behavior under anarchy. For them, 
174 Rauchhaus, “Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement,” 13.
175 Joseph M. Grieco, “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: 
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model,” The Journal of Politics 50, 
no. 3 (1988): 600–624; Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of 
International Cooperation: The Limitations of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the 
Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary 
Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph 
Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal, “The Relative-Gains Problem for 
International Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 
727–43.
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any state  must  continually  maximize  its  power  relative  to  others  and 
strive for the greatest possible amount of power. 
3.3.3. Hypotheses
In the logic of structural realism, the following hypotheses could explain 
the U.S. commitment to :
. Costs and benefits of  membership are either equal or benefits 
outweigh costs. Costs can here be understood both in material and in pol-
icy terms, i.e. expenditures and pursuing policies not in line with U.S. 
interests, i.e. entanglement broadly understood as presented above.
. Because of its power advantage, the United States has successfully used 
 to pursue national goals and kept costs for itself low. This includes 
the expectations of freedom of action theory that the United States can 
extricate itself from costly commitments.
.  has buttressed the United States’ relative position by giving the 
United States a way to maintain a hierarchical system and to influence 
allies’ foreign policies. This prediction emphasizes the structuring func-
tion  has served for the United States.
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4. Methodology
Specifically, the policy areas under review here are U.S. policy towards the 
enlargement of the alliance in the s and early s as well as U.S. 
policy on the alliance’s strategy and missions on the Balkans. The follow-
ing will apply the theoretical framework and hypotheses developed in the 
previous section to U.S.  policy, focusing on these instances. Whether 
these should be considered separate cases or not is  a largely arbitrary 
decision, given that any single case could be broken down further. In my 
view, it is more useful to consider U.S.  policy as a single case that is 
analyzed with an emphasis on enlargement, missions abroad, and strategy 
developments, rather than considering these separate cases or considering 
the  different  administrations  separate  cases. Structural  realist  expecta-
tions would support this view, given that the decisive structural variable 
for them remained constant throughout. 
This dissertation is a disciplined configurative single case study of U.S. 
 policy between  and the early s, providing an explanation 
of a single case using theory.176 Harry Eckstein first identified the disci-
plined configurative type in a seminal   classification of case stud-
ies,177 characterizing it as a study that is guided by a well structured theo-
retical framework. This type of case study thus focuses on those aspects 
176 Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages,” in 
Models, Numbers & Cases, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Alexander L. George and Andrew 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2004); Stephan van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political 
Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
177 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Strategies of 
Inquiry, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 7, Handbook of Political 
Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–132.
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of the case that are variables in the underlying theory, whilst sidelining 
aspects that fall outside the theory’s theoretical remit. 178
The single case study approach is suitable for several reasons. Firstly, it 
allows for exploring new or neglected variables in a specific case and give 
a historical explanation of this case. Given the novelty of this proposed 
dissertation, I expect to find new variables and hypotheses in the course 
of the research, which would be significantly  harder in  other research 
designs. Secondly, U.S. policy towards  is a best case for neorealist 
approaches. If realism failed to generate predictions about the unipole’s 
behavior  in  history’s  most  important  alliance, this  would  cast  serious 
doubt on the theory’s continued relevance. As a best case, it can therefore 
make an important contribution to theory development by providing a 
crucial test. Thirdly, a detailed single case study allows me to conduct 
process tracing. Observing whether the causal mechanisms suggested by 
the theory operate by providing a continuous account in turn makes it 
possible to test and refine the original hypotheses.179 Fourthly, choosing 
an intra-case design allows for minimizing the variance of third variables, 
while providing for variance in the independent, intervening, and depen-
dent variables.
Several additional considerations support this dissertation’s case selection. 
The availability of data and literature on U.S. foreign policy is generally 
high, both as regards primary and secondary sources. Indeed, U.S. policy 
may be one of the best studied areas in international relations. As for pri-
mary sources, most relevant documents in the United States remain classi-
178 Such case studies have also been described as “case-explaining” or “theory-guided” 
case studies, see Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of 
Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (2008): 4; van Evera, 
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 74–75.
179 Bennett, “Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages,” 19.
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fied. While this may pose problems for writing diplomatic history of the 
topic at hand, this is less significant for international relations studies.180 
While single-case studies in international relations have certain similari-
ties with works of diplomatic history, their goals are very different. Where 
historians aim for detailed and highly specific accounts, political science 
aims  for  generalizations, parsimonious  explanations, and  theory-based 
explanations. Further, political scientists strive to make their causal argu-
ment and assumptions explicit.181 Through the available sources, includ-
ing official, scholarly, and biographical literature, it will nevertheless be 
possible to generate meaningful answers to the questions raised here. Fur-
ther, there is strong variation of the independent and intervening variables 
as outlined above. 
Despite the aforementioned advantages, single-case studies face method-
ological concerns.182 A frequent argument against single-case studies is the 
“trade-off between generalizability and specificity.”183 While single case 
studies may provide good explanations of individual cases, the study itself 
usually does not consider the generalizability of its findings, saying noth-
ing about the question whether the examined case is a frequent one or an 
outlier: How often do cases such sufficiently similar to the one examined 
occur? Can the findings for one case be potentially applied to other cases 
180 On the difference between approaches in political science and diplomatic history, 
see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: 
Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2001).
181 cf. Jack S. Levy, “Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political 
Science, and the Analysis of International Relations,” in Bridges and Boundaries. 
Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations, ed. Colin 
Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 39–84.
182 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
183 Bennett, “Case Studies: Design, Uses, and Comparative Advantages,” 43.
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as well, or are they case-specific?184 This dilemma is mitigated by the fact 
that historically, unipolarity has been a rare phenomenon. Further, this 
dissertation  makes  no  claims  to  generalizations  across  countries  or 
time.185 Instead, it seeks to provide a specific explanation for U.S. policies 
in a defined time frame.
One common way to address the problems of single-case studies outlined 
above is conducting comparative research, e.g. in focused studies compar-
ing  different  countries’  policies,  the  same country’s  policy  in  different 
cases, or in large-n studies. In the latter, the larger number of cases exam-
ined usually allows for much improved generalizability, which, however, 
comes at the cost of reduced detail. The United States’ unique position 
within  means the comparative approach is of limited use here for 
lack of suitable comparative cases.186 With the United States being the 
most powerful and influential country occupying key positions in , a 
comparison between the  policies  of  the United States and other 
allies would be pointless—the differences are too significant for meaning-
ful comparisons, and span the gamut of independent variables used in 
international relations theory.187
These problems could be addressed by comparing U.S. policy in different 
cases across time. For example, an alternative research design could have 
selected cases between which structural variables vary—in this case, the 
polarity of the system. Such a design would allow to focus more expressly 
184 Ibid.
185 A common, albeit problematic theme in the alliance literature: “[T]here is limited 
theoretical mileage to be gained from efforts to spell out propositions purported to 
be valid for all alliances” (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration 
in International Alliances, 222).
186 In fact, some authors argue that NATO itself is “quite a unique alliance” and 
“difficult to generalize about” Chernoff, After Bipolarity, ix.
187 cf. also ibid., 3.
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on the direct  impact of structural  variation and mitigate variations of 
intervening  variables  across  cases.  For  example,  an  alternative  design 
could have compared U.S.  policy in comparable instances during 
the Cold War and after. Arguably, another alternative would have been to 
compare U.S. post-Cold War policy to that of previous unipoles or that of 
other dominant actors in their respective alliance. A major problem for 
either is the nature of the current international system. While previous 
unipoles  have risen through the ranks, the U.S. became the dominant 
actor in the international system when the Soviet Union eventually disin-
tegrated. Rather than rising to displace other powers, the U.S. emerged as 
the unipole over night. This and the resulting unusually large power dif-
ferential necessarily limit the insights that can be drawn from comparing 
such disparate cases. Likewise, a comparison to e.g. the Soviet Union’s 
policy would be hampered by stark differences on the unit level as well as 
between the Warsaw Pact and .
Equally, large-n studies, such as the one by Kaufman et al. on the balance 
of power, cannot be applied in a study of U.S.  policy under unipo-
larity.188 Generally speaking, the timeframe chosen by Kaufman et al.—
the last   years of human history—is incompatible with the kind of 
in-depth research envisioned here. Further, a large-n study is not feasible 
for the simple fact that there have been very few if any historical prece-
dents  to  the  current  unipolar  structure of  the  international  system, as 
Brooks and Wohlforth argue at length.189 
188 Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Curtis Wohlforth, eds., The Balance 
of Power in World History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); William C. 
Wohlforth et al., “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” European 
Journal of International Relations 23, no. 2 (2007): 155–85.
189 Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance. International Relations and the 
Challenge of American Primacy.
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The following chapters will test the hypotheses generated in the previous 
section in a structured, focused comparison,190 that is the hypotheses and 
research questions will be applied to each instance. The method is thus 
structured in  that  the same questions  are asked in  each instance, and 
focused, in that only aspects relevant to the theoretical framework out-
lined in the previous section will be considered.
Regarding operationalization, phenomena in line with entanglement the-
ory would serve to heighten costs of  for the U.S., whereas phenom-
ena predicted by freedom of  action theory would lower them. Of the 
observable outcomes of freedom of action theory191, “sidestepping costly 
commitments” should  be  particularly  relevant  in  the  case  examined 
here.192 Possible examples could include the U.S. avoiding being pulled 
into  conflict,  foregoing  commitments  in  strategic  concepts  beyond  its 
national interests, and managing to extricate itself or limit its contribu-
tions in  and its operations, e.g. in the Balkans missions. Further, evi-
dence that the U.S. successfully used the alliance to influence other allies’ 
—e.g. by convincing them to support U.S.-preferred policies and forego-
ing others—would also support  freedom of  action theory. On the flip 
side, evidence suggesting that allies successfully drew the U.S. into con-
flicts, significantly limited policy options available to the U.S., or success-
fully forced the U.S. to abandon strongly held positions would support 
entanglement theory. Neither theory’s predictions are likely to be borne 
out exclusively, but per this dissertation’s theoretical approach, dynamics 
predicted by freedom of action theory should prevail.
190 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
64–72.
191 See p. 50 (3.3.2).
192 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. 
Defense Pacts,” 19.
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5. The U.S. Role in  Expansion
I do not agree that  is dead. 
—President Bill Clinton, June , 193
5.1. Czechoslovakia’s, Poland’s, and Hungary’s Path to 
Membership
One of the most visible ways in which  has changed since the end of 
the Cold War is by expanding its membership to include the post-Soviet 
countries of Eastern Europe. Article  of the North Atlantic Treaty had 
from the outset  envisioned that   would maintain an ‘open door’ 
towards new members:
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
European State in a position to further the principles of this 
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area to accede to this Treaty.194
Whilst the alliance was conceptually open to take in additional members, 
the  East-West  conflict  meant  that  the  provision  was  rarely  invoked 
between ’s inception in  and the end of the Cold War. Only 
four new members joined during this time: Turkey and Greece in , 
West Germany in , and, after its successful restoration of democracy, 
Spain in .
193 William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference. June 17, 1993,” in Book 1. 
Presidential Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993, ed. Office of the Federal 
Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 1994), 868.
194 , “The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed May 6, 2016.
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In contrast, the two rounds of  enlargement in  and  have 
been “the most spectacular, in terms of numbers and political impact,” as 
’s public diplomacy division claims.195 Ten new members acceded to 
the alliance:  the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in  ’s  first 
round of post-Cold War enlargement in , in time for the alliance’s 
th anniversary that year. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia followed in .
The idea that the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe 
could join  was first suggested not by the alliance or its members, 
but by the aspiring members themselves. The first Eastern European offi-
cial to publicly avow his country’s desire for closer ties with  was 
Hungary’s then Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. In a series of public state-
ments in February of , he suggested Hungary could join  within 
a couple of years.196 Other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe followed suit.197
5.2. Extending “the Hand of Friendship”198
The alliance did not ignore these tentative expressions of interest in mem-
bership. Rather, it  responded by expressing the principal willingness to 
reform  to better suit the “dramatic changes in the security environ-
195 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 
183.
196 Celestine Bohlen, “Upheaval in the East: Hungary; Budapest Broaching a Role in 
NATO,” New York Times, February 24, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/24/world/upheaval-in-the-east-hungary-budapest-
broaching-a-role-in-nato.html, last accessed May 7, 2016.
197 Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance?: NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from 
Truman to Obama (New York: Continuum, 2010), 93–99; Jane Perlez, “Czech 
Leader Pushes for Open NATO,” New York Times, October 22, 1993, sec. World, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/22/world/czech-leader-pushes-for-open-nato.html.
198 NATO Heads of State and Government, “London Declaration on a Transformed 
North Atlantic Alliance,” July 5, 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c900706a.htm, last accessed May 8, 2016.
61
ment”199 the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe had wrought. At 
the July -, , meeting of the North Atlantic Council () in Lon-
don,  Heads of State and Government () issued the  London 
Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.200 A seminal docu-
ment, the London Declaration emphasized the need for the alliance to 
reform: “Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation.”201
In particular,  was 
[…] to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. 
The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of 
the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and 
extend to them the hand of friendship202 
and to work “[…] with all the countries of Europe, […] to create endur-
ing peace on this continent.”203 To this end, cooperation with the six War-
saw Pact nations was to be intensified, and  invited them to establish 
diplomatic liaisons at .204
Yet the aspirations of the newly independent states only gathered steam 
after ’s former rival, the Warsaw Pact, dissolved in . Before this 
juncture, no one considered  expansion a realistic possibility—nei-
ther in the West, nor in the East,205 where the push for expansion first 
199 NATO, “20 Years Ago: London Declaration Marks Birth of New NATO,” 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_64790.htm, last accessed May 8, 2016.
200 NATO Heads of State and Government, “London Declaration on a Transformed 
North Atlantic Alliance.”
201 Ibid., nr. 23.
202 Ibid., nr. 4.
203 Ibid., para. 23.
204 The Warsaw Pact comprised the , the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the 
Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, and 
Romania.
205 Otto Pick, “The Demise of the Warsaw Pact,” NATO Review 39, no. 2 (April 
1991): 12–16.
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emerged.  expansion “was simply beyond the scope of imagination 
even for anti-communist dissidents.”206 Only after Soviet troops had with-
drawn and the  Warsaw Pact  dissolved  did  rapprochement  with   
become a realistic option for the newly independent states
To this end, the foreign ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland—which later became known as the Visegrád Group—on January 
, , called  for  “the  quickest  possible  dissolution  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact.”207 If  no summit of the Warsaw Pact had been called by March 
, the foreign ministers threatened their  countries would withdraw 
unilaterally. Their hopes were borne out at the February , , sum-
mit of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest. There, the foreign and defense minis-
ters of the six members of the Warsaw Pact announced their decision to 
abandon the alliance’s military structures by March , .208 
A flurry of trips by Central and Eastern European officials to Brussels 
ensued, with the implicit goal of sounding out possibilities for intensified 
cooperation  with  .  In  March  ,  Vaclav  Havel,  president  of 
Czechoslovakia, became the first head of state of the newly independent 
states to visit  headquarters in Brussels. He was keenly aware that 
full membership was not on the table. In remarks to the North Atlantic 
Council on March , Havel acknowledged that “for a number of differ-
206 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 7.
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ent reasons, our country cannot become a regular member of  for 
the time being.” This notwithstanding, Havel also looked ahead, arguing 
that “an alliance of countries united by the ideals of freedom and democ-
racy should not forever be closed to neighboring countries that are pursu-
ing the same goals.”209 President Havel and his Polish counterpart Lech 
Wałęsa again emphasized their countries’ desire to join the alliance when 
they visited Washington, DC, on occasion of the opening of the Holo-
caust  Museum  in  late  April  .  President  Clinton  remembered  his 
exchange with the Eastern European leaders months later. In a June  
press conference, the president rejected the notion that  was dead, 
citing  the  newly  independent  states’  enthusiasm for  the  alliance. Said 
Clinton: “When they [Eastern European leaders, DJR] came here a few 
weeks ago for the Holocaust dedication, every one of those Presidents 
said that their number one priority was to get into .”210
Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and German For-
eign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher moved the debate on  out-
reach towards its new neighbors forward. During Genscher’s visit to the 
United States, the two issued a joint statement on May , , which 
laid out a set of proposals for the upcoming  ministerial in Copen-
hagen in June of .211 Notably, the two foreign ministers suggested 
 further expand the “liaison concept” enshrined in the London Dec-
laration, which foresaw intensified contacts between  and its new 
209 “Documentation: President Havel Visits NATO,” NATO Review 39, no. 2 (1991): 
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eastern neighbors. Inter alia, Baker and Genscher called for stepping up 
civilian and military contacts at all levels, offering training for Eastern 
European military officers  at   facilities, and having experts  from 
these countries participate in  exercises.212
 made good on its  offer  of  intensifying relations  with the  newly 
independent states by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Coun-
cil () at its Rome summit in November of . ’s Secretary 
General Manfred Wörner hailed the summit “a watershed not only in the 
history of  but also of Europe.”213 Wörner was mainly referring to 
the upgrade of relations with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Roma-
nia, and the three Baltic countries.  invited them “to join the Allies 
in an institutionalized framework of consultations”214 to be held at  
headquarters—the .215 The new body began its work shortly after 
the Rome summit, convening for the first time on December , . 
Importantly, the  was not considered an avenue to full-fledged mem-
bership for the non- participants. Rather,  envisioned the body 
to serve as a “more institutional relationship of consultation and cooper-
ation  on  political  and  security  issues”216 at  a  ministerial  level  on  an 
annual basis.217
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5.3. The Enlargement Debate Kicks Off
German Defense Minister Volker Rühe was the first official from a  
country to publicly raise the option of expanding the alliance eastwards, 
breaking what was effectively a “public taboo.”218 In March , , 
remarks at London’s International Institute for Strategic  Studies, Rühe 
stated emphatically that he did not see why Central and Eastern Euro-
pean  countries  should  not  eventually  join  . Rühe  warned:  “The 
Atlantic Alliance must not become a ‘closed shop’. I cannot see one good 
reason for denying future members of the European Union membership 
in .”219 Going further, Rühe even questioned “whether membership 
in the European Union should necessarily precede accession to .”220 
Rühe’s vision was met with skepticism both at home in Germany and 
abroad.
The thinking in Washington at the time remained focused on finding an 
arrangement that would ensure no security vacuum emerges in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Whilst full  membership for the newly indepen-
dent countries remained hard to conceive, supportive voices within the 
United States was on the rise. Officially, however, the incoming adminis-
tration of Bill Clinton continued to push for mechanisms to engage the 
aspirants and to foster closer cooperation short of putting them on track 
for membership. At the   ministerial  in Athens, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher clearly stated: “At an appropriate time, we may 
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choose  to  enlarge    membership.  But  that  is  not  now  on  the 
agenda.”221
The most vivid illustration of this thinking was the launch of “a new pro-
gramme [that] goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real part-
nership—a  Partnership  for  Peace.”222 The  Partnership  for  Peace  () 
aimed  at  stabilizing  Eastern  Europe  and  increasing  cooperation  with 
 on a number of civilian and military fields. Specifically,   envi-
sioned the partner countries working alongside  in operations. Fur-
ther,  promised to assist its partners in establishing civilian control 
over  their  militaries  and in  ensuring compatibility  and interoperability 
with  countries.  was open to the  members and “other 
  countries  able  and  willing  to  contribute  to  this  programme,”223 
which included Russia. The allies formally launched the program at their 
January -, , summit in Brussels. As Sloan argues, it was a “poli-
cymaker’s dream.”224 It was a nod to Eastern European’s ambitions with-
out  committing to membership offers  or  suggesting a timeline,225 and, 
equally important, was a middle-of-the-road policy that players in the 
Clinton administration could agree on.
Besides creating , the Brussels Summit document also for the first time 
included detailed language on the eventual possibility of  member-
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ship for Eastern European states: “We expect and would welcome  
expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of 
an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security devel-
opments in the whole of Europe.”226 The message was dampened by the 
reference to security developments and by characterizing any admission 
process as a gradual, evolutionary one. Nevertheless, the Brussels Summit 
document did send an important message to Eastern European capitals—
i.e. “that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European 
countries.”227 
U.S. President Bill Clinton buttressed this message in a January , , 
press conference with the Visegrád heads of state in Prague. For the first 
time, the president publicly supported enlargement: “While the Partner-
ship is not  membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It 
changes the entire  dialogue so that now the question is no longer 
whether  will take on new members but when and how.”228 Held in 
Prague on the heels of Clinton’s first participation in a  summit and 
on his first trip to Europe, his message carried particular weight. Clinton’s 
posturing also sent an important message to his administration’s officials, 
among whom the issue of  enlargement was contested.229 Indeed, a 
majority  in  the  U.S. bureaucracy  was  “almost  completely  opposed  to 
expansion.”230 While  Clinton  and  a  handful  of  senior  officials  leaned 
towards  supporting   enlargement, there  were  important  holdouts 
226 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
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Declaration,” para. 12.
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among the upper echelons in the Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Defense.231 Effectively, the Clinton administration was “internally 
deadlocked”232 on the issue, a state of affairs  that was only gradually 
resolved over the course of the first half of .233
5.4. From If to How and Who
At their January  summit, the allies committed to expanding . 
While the question of whether the alliance should expand had been set-
tled, the how and when remained contentious. The  and , which 
by  year’s  end  had  attracted    members,  including  Russia,  were  not 
intended to serve as mechanisms resulting in eventual  membership. 
The  alliance  was  thus  confronted  with  the  difficult  questions  of  how 
many and which countries to take in as new allies, when to do so, and 
how to get there. For the United States, President Clinton continued to 
press the alliance on moving forward on enlargement. In a speech to the 
Polish Sejm in July of , the president acknowledged Poland’s partici-
pation in  and reiterated: “Bringing new members into , as I have 
said  many  times, is  no  longer  a  question  of  whether,  but  when  and 
how.”234 Poland would be among those new members, Clinton explained: 
“[…] [T]he United States believes that when  does expand, as it will,  
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a democratic Poland will have placed itself among those ready and able 
to join.”235
To explore these issues further, the alliance embarked on a formal process 
of  internal  deliberation  at  the  December  -,  ,    ministerial. 
There, the  initiated a study on  expansion.236 U.S. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher hailed the prospect of “a measured process of 
 expansion” that is “steady, deliberate and transparent.”237 Christo-
pher argued enlarging    would make an important contribution to 
European security, and urged the alliance to begin internal deliberations 
forthwith. To this end, the  initiated the enlargement study to explore 
the “why and how”238 of enlargement. 
Two important  issues  thus  remained outside the scope of  both offical 
 deliberations and the study commissioned at Brussels: The timeline 
for expansion as well as which countries were to join.239 The study, which 
was published in September , did, however, for the first time set out 
a list of criteria aspiring members should fulfill.240 Regarding the why and 
how  questions,  the  report  suggested  countries  should  accede  to  the 
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alliance as full members as envisioned by Article  of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. This forestalled alternative models such as a privileged partner-
ship, and entailed that  the aspirants  would enjoy Article    protection 
after their accession. As for the “why,” the study argued that the end of 
the  Cold  War  had  created  both  a  “unique  opportunity” for   to 
“enhance stability”241 by taking in new members. Further, the authors 
saw a need to expand so as to respond to the security  void that had 
emerged in Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The 
report also envisioned enlargement would strengthen the alliance and its 
ability to contribute to international security and stability.
However, hopes that the release of the study would give new momentum 
to the debate over whom to invite when did not materialize. For much of 
late  and , relations with Russia and the end of the war in 
Bosnia took up most of the attention of the United States and . In 
fact,  President  Clinton  had  assured  Russian  President  Yeltsin  in  May 
 that he would “do nothing to accelerate  enlargement” and 
ensure “nothing is done to cause you a problem.”242 Specifically, Clinton 
pledged that if Russia joined the  and cooperated on -Russia dia-
logue, he would “get [Yeltsin] past the next election with no discussion of 
‘who’ [will be invited to join , DJR] or ‘when’.” Yeltsin agreed, and 
Clinton had won Russia’s participation in  at the cost of deferring a 
decision on which countries to invite to join  until after Russian par-
liamentary  elections  in  . Conveniently,  this  delay  also  meant  the 
enlargement issue would not by default be a major issue in Clinton’s cam-
paign for reelection in .
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Clinton’s agreement with Yeltsin did not, however, translate into silence 
of the entire U.S. administration. At the meeting of  foreign minis-
ters in Brussels in December , Secretary of State Christopher laid out 
the administration’s course for the next year.243 Christopher announced 
that  in  Brussels,    had  begun  “the  next  phase  in  the  process  of 
enlargement, a  process  that  was launched by President  Clinton at  the 
 summit in January ,” and that prospective members would 
begin consultations with the alliance in .244 At the heart of these con-
sultations would be the alliance’s expectations of any new members. 
Clinton kept his promise: it was only after the Russian elections in June 
and July  that he once more stepped up his public rhetoric arguing 
for enlargement. Eventually,  enlargement was to become a more 
prominent  topic  in  Clinton’s  second term in office, with the president 
deciding “to adopt the enlargement of  as the emblem of his foreign 
policy.”245 
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Christopher delivered a major speech in 
Prague in the spring. There, Christopher on March , , stated: “We 
are determined to move forward.  has made a commitment to take 
in new members and it must not and will not keep new democracies in 
the waiting room forever.  enlargement is on track and it will hap-
pen.”246
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Out of the eyes of the public, Clinton made the U.S. case for enlargement 
to the British, French, and German heads of government in an August  
letter. In it, Clinton argued that  must make a decision on  
enlargement in the course of the next year.247 Publicly, Clinton himself 
only took up the issue of the timing of  enlargement shortly before 
the U.S. presidential election in November . In a  rare reference to 
foreign policy on the campaign trail, Clinton on October  in Detroit 
stated: “By , ’s th anniversary and  years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should be 
full-fledged members of .”248 
Already in September, Clinton had directed U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to call a  summit for “the spring or early summer”249 of 
, at which the allies should identify a first group of countries to join 
. Christopher delivered that message publicly in a speech in Stuttgart 
on  September  ,  ,  marking  the  anniversary  of  his  predecessor 
James F. Byrne’s speech promising U.S. assistance for German reconstruc-
tion  after  World  War  II.  In  his  remarks,  Christopher  announced  the 
alliance would invite new members at its  summit. Said Christopher, 
using  the  same  language  as  in  his  March  speech  in  Prague:  “ 
enlargement, too, is on track and it will happen.”250 
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In Detroit, Clinton had set out what his timeline was for enlarging , 
and the North Atlantic Council adopted his schedule. On December , 
, the  recommended that  Heads of State and Government 
invite at next year’s summit meeting one or more countries 
which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to 
start accession negotiation with the Alliance. Our goal is to 
welcome the new member(s) by the time of ’s th 
anniversary in . We pledge that the Alliance will remain 
open to the accession of further members in accordance with 
Article  of the Washington Treaty. We will remain ready to 
pursue consultations with nations seeking  membership, 
as we have done in the past.251
By year’s end of , the alliance had finally decided to take in one or 
more  new members  before  its  th anniversary  in  —the question 
remained which country or countries to invite.
In the run up to the   summit in Madrid, which would formally 
invite one or more countries to join the alliance, the Clinton administra-
tion had to establish its position on whom to invite. Cognizant of the 
positions of the allies—which ranged from inviting three to five countries
—the inter-agency process settled on the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. The  Deputies Committee agreed on May , and the princi-
pals committee, the highest inter-agency body consisting of the secretaries 
of  defense and state  as  well  as  the national  security  advisor, formally 
endorsed the proposal on May .252 The adminstration did not make 
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this decision public, in keeping with its approach of maintaining a degree 
of ambiguity on its position regarding enlargement. However, Secretary 
Albright was to convey at the upcoming meeting of  foreign minis-
ters that the United States preferred a small first enlargement round. By 
the same token, however, Albright was to refrain from discussing individ-
ual countries’ prospects and to note that the president’s final decision was 
still pending.253
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland emerged as the lowest com-
mon denominator for all  allies at the May -, , meeting of 
 foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal. While all allies could support 
inviting these three, a majority of allies favored inviting more countries. 
At the Sintra meeting, this group of nine countries including France and 
Italy strongly argued for inviting Romania and Slovenia as well.254 With 
less than a month to go until the  summit in Madrid, the question of 
how many countries to invite was thus left unresolved and for the heads 
of state and government to decide. 
In the meantime, President Clinton on June  for the first time officially 
enunciated the U.S. position on whom  should invite at the Madrid 
summit: 
After careful consideration, I have decided that the United 
States will support inviting three countries—Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic—to begin accession talks to join  
when we meet in Madrid next month.
253 Ibid.
254 Chris Hedges, “Slovenia Discards the Yoke That Was Yugoslavia,” New York Times, 
May 31, 1997, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/31/world/slovenia-
discards-the-yoke-that-was-yugoslavia.html, last accessed May 18, 2016; Steven Lee 
Myers, “U.S. Now at Odds with NATO Allies On New Members,” New York Times, 
May 30, 1997, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/30/world/us-now-at-
odds-with-nato-allies-on-new-members.html, last accessed May 18, 2016; Stanley R. 
Sloan, “NATO: July 1997 Madrid Summit Outcome,” CRS Report for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 14, 1997), 2.
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We have said all along that we would judge aspiring members 
by their ability to add strength to the alliance and their 
readiness to shoulder the obligations of  membership. 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic most clearly meet 
those criteria—and have currently made the greatest strides in 
military capacity and political and economic reform.
As I have repeatedly emphasized, the first new members 
should not and will not be the last. We will continue to work 
with other interested nations, such as Slovenia and Romania, 
to help them prepare for membership. Other nations are 
making good progress--and none will be excluded from 
consideration. [...]255
The president thus reiterated that the process of  enlargement would 
remain an ongoing one, and specifically mentioned Romania and Slovenia 
as potential future candidates—a nod to the majority position among the 
allies and France in particular. Importantly, Clinton’s remarks finally clar-
ified the U.S. position, which until  then had officially been ambiguous 
with regard to which aspirants  should invite.256 
Clinton’s June  statement was flanked the same day by newly minted 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. In his press conference after his 
first  meeting of defense ministers, Cohen said:
After extensive discussion with Allies and candidate countries, 
with members of Congress, and within the Administration 
itself, the President decided that the United States will support 
Poland, Hungray [sic], and the Czech Republic for the first 
round invitations.257
255 William J. Clinton, “Statement on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization on June 12, 1997,” in Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to 
June 31, 1997, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1999), 724.
256 And intentionally so. For example, Asmus reports that National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake expressly forbade official meetings to discuss who should join NATO 
during the run-up to Sintra in 1996. By the same token, a 1994  memo tasked 
out by Lake suggested the United States retain a position of ambiguity for as long as 
possible. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 214, 73–74.
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Cohen further stressed that while “[w]hat happens ultimately, of course is 
a matter of consensus,” the president’s position was “firm.”258 Eventually, 
the U.S. position President Clinton articulated would underpin the com-
promise wording found at the Madrid summit.  formally invited the 
three countries preferred by the United States, but also noted the possibil-
ity of inviting more allies, i.e. Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries, 
later on.259
5.5. It’s Settled—The  Madrid Summit Invites Three 
Countries to Join the Alliance in 
The spring and summer of  proved to be “a particularly lively and 
formative time”260 for the alliance as it headed into “one of the most con-
tentious  summits”261 in its  history. It  is  important to  recall  that  
takes decisions by unanimous vote and that, as outlined above, the United 
States had committed to a small-group approach to the first round of 
enlargement. That the United States faced a French-led majority going 
into the summit therefore did not mean the United States would have to 
seek compromise. On the contrary, because any decision would be a con-
sensus decision, the situation ahead of Madrid worked in Washington’s 
favor:  The consensus—or rather lowest common denominator—reached 
in the first half of  was for  to go forward and invite three 
countries. This was in line with the U.S. position. The question of inviting 
257 William S. Cohen, “Press Conference at NATO Headquarters,” June 12, 1997, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970612c.htm.
258 Ibid.
259 NATO Heads of State and Government, “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic 
Security and Cooperation,” July 8, 1997, paras. 6, 8, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, last accessed May 12, 2016.
260 Paul Cornish, Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO 
(London: Pinter, 1997), 1.
261 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 213.
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more  countries  beyond  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  and  Poland 
remained unresolved, however. Both were left for heads of state and gov-
ernment to discuss at the Madrid summit in July , where they were 
front and center.
By then, a total of twelve countries had expressed their interest in joining 
the  alliance.  Which  of  them  to  invite  remained  contested  within  the 
alliance, with the United States having maintained a public position of 
ambiguity during the run-up to the summit. As late as May , , U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had said: “The United States has 
come to no final conclusions about which nations should be invited to 
join  in Madrid.”262 In contrast, the U.S. position to keep the first 
round of enlargement small was well known. The position of other allies 
was even less equivocal, with France in particular arguing for a larger 
round of expansion including Romania and Slovenia.
In  his  remarks  to  the , President  Clinton made the  case  for  three 
countries  joining : the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He 
argued these three countries had “proved their readiness to join,” “met 
the highest  standards  of  democratic  and market  reform,” and ensured 
confidence that these reforms are “irreversible.” Clinton further sought to 
squash any notion that countries could be “disinvited.”And, in line with 
the U.S. goal of keeping  enlargement an open process, the U.S. pres-
ident noted that “the smooth and successful integration of these three 
countries  will  create  momentum for  others  to  follow” and that   
262 Madeleine K. Albright, “Press Conference Following North Atlantic Council 
Ministerial Meeting in Sintra, Portugal,” May 29, 1997, http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/statements/970529a.html.
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must maintain an “open door” and “exclude no European democracy.”263 
Said Clinton: 
[O]ur position is that we should decide today to admit three 
countries to the alliance. Since this is an irreversible step, we 
should offer membership to those countries that are 
irreversibly committed to democratic reforms, while keeping 
the door firmly open to the admission of other countries in the 
future.264
On July , the North Atlantic Council  eventually adopted the  Madrid 
Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation.265 With it, the 
alliance invited the three countries  identified  by Clinton to commence 
membership negotiations with . Ideally, the aspirants should sign the 
accession protocols by December of . Allowing for the necessary rat-
ification  of  the  protocols  by  all   members, this  was  expected  to 
ensure accession of the three new members at the   summit, 
where the alliance would celebrate its th anniversary.266 
Besides extending three invitations, the declaration also expressly stated 
the possibility of further expansion in the future, with Romania, Slovenia, 
and the Baltic  countries  being named specifically. This  wording was a 
compromise  struck  between  the  United  States  and  a  group  including 
France and Italy that represented the majority of  members. The lat-
ter group preferred including Romania and Slovenia in the first round of 
263 William J. Clinton, “Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the North Atlantic Council 
in Madrid, July 8, 1997,” in Book 2. Presidential Documents - July 1 to December 
31, 1997, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1999), 922.
264 Clinton, “Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the North Atlantic Council in Madrid, 
July 8, 1997.”
265 NATO Heads of State and Government, “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic 
Security and Cooperation,” July 8, 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-
081e.htm, last accessed May 16. 2016.
266 Ibid., para. 6.
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 enlargement, whereas the United States, Britain, and Germany pre-
ferred taking in only three members.267 
The compromise struck in Madrid meant the three aspirants could begin 
negotiations  with  the  alliance  on  their  respective  accession  protocols. 
These were concluded on December , . Per  the North Atlantic 
Treaty, all  allies had to ratify these three accession protocols. Only 
then would the secretary general of  invite the three aspirants to 
accede to . In the United States, the advice and consent of the Senate 
were required.268 The U.S. president submitted the protocols to the Senate 
on February , . Ratification in the Senate was smooth, not least 
because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Forces 
Committee had already held a number of hearings on the issue beginning 
in April .269 In the most prominent and final hearing on February , 
, Secretary  of  State  Madeleine  K. Albright,  Secretary  of  Defense 
William S. Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. 
Shelton  once  more  strongly  made  the  administration’s  case  for   
enlargement.
On the whole, Congress solidly backed the course on  enlargement 
the Clinton administration had been charting since . In particular, 
both houses of Congress supported the bids for membership of the Czech 
267 Myers, “U.S. Now at Odds with NATO Allies On New Members.”
268 Whilst not a formal requirement, Senate advice and consent for NATO 
enlargements has been the standing practice since the Truman presidency. On 
occasion of the Senate giving its advice and consent on the North Atlantic Treaty, 
President Truman promised that future enlargements of the alliance would be 
subject to the same procedure. All administrations since have honored this 
commitment. See Michael John Garcia, “NATO Enlargement: Senate Advice and 
Consent,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, January 16, 2009).
269 Four Senate Committees held a total of 12 hearings between them. See The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet on NATO Enlargement,” May 21, 
1998, https://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/nato/whitehouse052198.html.
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Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In fact, Congress put pressure on the 
Clinton administration to step up the speed of  enlargement and to 
commit to a timeline in .270 Further, the Republicans included swift 
enlargement of the alliance as a key building block among the bills out-
lined in their  Contract with America plank for the  midterm elec-
tions.  enlargement thus became one of the few issues enjoying wide-
spread bipartisan support  in  the mid-s.271 After  taking control  of 
both houses of the th Congress in the elections, Republicans became 
even more blunt in their criticism of the sluggish pace of enlargement. 
Said the newly minted Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt 
Gingrich: “I am not sure that this administration is ever going to expand 
.”272
5.5.1. A “Collective Yawn”273—Ratification and Accession 
Congressional  discussion  of  the  protocols  was  anti-climactic,  a  fact 
helped by the low interest both the better part of Congress and the Amer-
ican public took in the issue of  enlargement.274 Indeed, an October 
 Pew poll showed that while almost two-thirds of the American pub-
lic supported  expansion in general, only ten per cent could identify 
270 As evidenced for example by the Senate’s 1994 NATO Participation Act (title II of 
Public Law 103-447), which suggested new members be invited “at an early date,” 
the House of Representative’s 1994 NATO Enlargement Act (HR 4210), which 
suggested new members should join by January 10, 1999, at the latest, and the 1996 
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A 
of Public Law 104-208).
271 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 79–86, 100; Sloan, Permanent Alliance?, 107–8.
272 David G. Haglund, “Introduction: The Debate over Enlarging NATO,” in Will 
NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, ed. David G. 
Haglund (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University Centre for International Relations, 
1996), 2.
273 Rauchhaus, “Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement,” 188.
274 As one Senate staffer interviewed by Goldgeier put it, the position of Congress 
regarding NATO enlargement was one of “favorable indifference.” Goldgeier, Not 
Whether but When, 78.
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even  one  of  the  three  countries  identified  as  potential  members  at 
Madrid.275 
The situation was less clear cut among policy elites, where many opposed 
the idea of enlargement for a variety of reasons. These included in partic-
ular  concerns  of  U.S.  overstretch,  the  risk  of  alienating  Russia,  and 
’s continued viability. On the eve of the Madrid summit, George F. 
Kennan,  doyen  of  the  U.S.  foreign  policy  community,  warned  that 
“expanding  would be the most fateful error of American policy in 
the entire post-cold war era.” He further deplored the “total lack of any 
necessity for this  move.”276 His historian colleague John Lewis  Gaddis 
was no less critical. In a  op-ed, Gaddis bemoaned that he “had diffi-
culty finding any colleagues who think  expansion is a good idea. 
Indeed, I can recall no other moment when there was less support in our 
profession for a government policy.”277 Major criticism was also voiced in 
an open letter to President Clinton authored by a bipartisan group of 
over forty former U.S. Senators, officials, and policy experts. The authors, 
which included such luminaries as former Senator Nunn, Paul H. Nitze, 
and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, asserted that
the U.S.-led effort to expand  […] is a policy error of 
historic proportions. We believe that  expansion will 
decrease allied security and unsettle European stability [...]278 
275 Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, “America’s Place in the World 
II,” October 1997, 6, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/102.pdf. See also 
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276 George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times, February 5, 1997.
277 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion,” New York Times, 
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In the end, scholarly and elite opposition was not strong enough to halt  
the process at this stage.279
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March , , by a vote of 
 to  recommended the Senate ratify the three accession protocols. As 
expected, the Senate on April , , voted in favor of expanding the 
alliance to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. With  
votes  in  favor  and    against,  the  draft  protocols  easily  cleared  the 
required two-thirds majority.280 The U.S. ratification had knock-on effects 
throughout the alliance. Indeed, most allies had held off on initiating their 
respective ratification processes until after the United States had begun its 
domestic process.281
5.5.2. High Noon: Three Countries Officially Join the Alliance
Speaking in Independence, Montana, on March , , Polish Foreign 
Minister Bronisław Geremek explained that today was “high noon” for 
his  country. Geremek  had  brought  with  him  a  Solidarność campaign 
poster from Poland’s semi-free elections in June of . It showed a still 
from  the  classic    movie  High  Noon with  a  grim-looking  Gary 
Cooper bringing a ballot instead of revolver to the duel.282 Geremek’s ref-
279 For further examples of pundits opposing NATO enlargement, see James D. Boys, 
Clinton’s Grand Strategy: US Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 144–45.
280 The missing vote was that of Senator John Kyl (R-AZ), an enlargement supporter. 
Sloan, Permanent Alliance?, 114.
281 Only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Norway ratified before the United States 
began its process. See Jeanette Hamster, President & Congress. The Making of the 
U.S NATO Enlargement Policy, NATO-EAPC Fellowship Program 1998-2000 
(Brussels: NATO, 2000), n. 2, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hamster.pdf, 
last accessed May 19, 2016.
282 Apparently a popular gift for Polish officials to give: President Komorowski gave 
the same poster to German President Gauck on occasion of the latter’s first trip to 
Poland in 2012. See Gerhard Gnauck, “‘High Noon’-Überraschungsgeschenk Für 
Gauck,” Welt Online, March 27, 2012, sec. Politik, 
http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article13949299/High-Noon-
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erence  to  the    elections  and  the  revered  Polish  opposition  trade 
union highlighted the historical significance of the moment for Central 
and Eastern European countries.
That day, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary attained their goal of 
 membership. After ratification by all   countries, the three 
countries deposited their instruments of accession with the U.S. govern-
ment per Article  of the North Atlantic Treaty, making them full mem-
bers of the alliance as of March , . The ceremony was held at the 
Harald S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Montana—a site 
chosen as a nod to the president in office during ’s birth. Besides the 
location, the Department of State also deliberately picked March  as 
the date. It marked the th anniversary of President Truman’s address to 
a joint session of Congress announcing U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey—
the first articulation of what came to be known as the ‘Truman Doctrine’ 
of providing aid to all democratic countries.283
U.S. Secretary of State Albright probably best characterized the jubilant 
atmosphere after the ceremony, tempting the otherwise staid diplomat to 
let a “Hallelujah!” slip.284 After all, a major foreign policy goal of the 
Clinton  administration  had  been  achieved  at  Independence, Montana, 
and  her  native  Czech  Republic  was  among  those  joining  that  day. 
Albright’s  Central  European  counterparts  were  no  less  enthusiastic. 
283 Thomas W. Lippman, “NATO Embraces 3 From Warsaw Pact,” Washington Post, 
March 13, 1999; Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President of the United States 
Delivered before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey” (Washington, DC, March 12, 
1949), 
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Poland’s Foreign Minister Geremek noted that for his country, the Cold 
War ended today and that “Poland forever returns where she has always 
belonged—to  the  free  World.”285 His  Hungarian  colleague,  János 
Martonyi, echoed the sentiment of his country coming home: “At long 
last, […] Hungary has come home, we are back in the family.”286
5.6. Towards Further Enlargement: The U.S. Role After 
The Clinton administration had scored an important foreign policy vic-
tory, both over domestic critics and reticent allies, when the first three 
Central  and Eastern  European states  officially  acceded  to   at  its 
 summit in Washington. The alliance had reached an important way-
point, enlarging for the first time since the end of the Cold War by taking 
in three former Soviet states. Throughout the six years of discussing  
enlargement, it had become clear that there was support among allies for 
enlarging the alliance further. Equally, there was a demand among other 
newly independent states to join the alliance. 
 had reaffirmed its openness towards enlargement and hinted at pos-
sible future candidates in Madrid. In contrast to the previous round of 
enlargement, this time, the fundamental question whether  should 
expand did not pose itself. The alliance and the United States had repeat-
edly underscored the importance of the commitment to an ‘open door’ 
policy towards new members during the first eastern enlargement. 
285 Bronisław Geremek, “Address at the Ceremony of Deposition of Accession 
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Beginning with his speeches committing the United States to a timeline 
for enlargement287 and to supporting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland (and only them) for the first round of enlargement,288 President 
Clinton had voiced support for future rounds of enlargement. Said Clin-
ton: 
I also pledged for my part, and I believe for ’s part as 
well, that ’s doors will not close behind its first new 
members.  should remain open to all of Europe’s 
emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the 
responsibilities of membership.289
In  particular, U.S. officials  made  the  case  for  inviting  the  three  Baltic 
countries.
Legally, ’s open door is enshrined in Article  of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.290 In  this  vein, the  Madrid  communiqué  notes  “[t]he  Alliance 
expects to extend further invitations in coming years […]”291 and specifi-
cally identified the Baltic states, Romania, and Slovenia as aspirants for 
membership.292 The main question after Madrid was thus “not  whether 
but to whom the benefits and responsibilities of  membership will be 
extended.”293  reavowed its open door at its anniversary summit in 
Washington in . Paragraph  of the summit communiqué states: 
287 Clinton, “Remarks to the Community in Detroit, October 22, 1996.”
288 Clinton, “Statement on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 
June 12, 1997.”
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Treaty”, article 10.
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We reaffirm today our commitment to the openness of the 
Alliance under Article  of the North Atlantic Treaty and in 
accordance with Paragraph  of the Madrid Summit 
Declaration. We pledge that  will continue to welcome 
new members in a position to further the principles of the 
Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-
Atlantic area294
and that
[t]he Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming 
years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities 
and obligations of membership, and as  determines that 
the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political 
and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion 
would enhance overall European security and stability.295 
At the Washington summit, the allies further agreed to revisit the next 
round of enlargement by .296 
5.6.1. The Membership Action Plan
To better structure the interactions between  and prospective mem-
bers, the allies at the  Washington Summit introduced the Member-
ship Action Plan () to complement the .297 Building on the experi-
ence of working with the three countries that joined in the first round, the 
 was intended to help aspirants prepare for membership through a 
variety  of  practical  cooperation  offers. Not  an  automatic  pathway  to 
membership,  the    is  in  essence  a  way  for    to  monitor  the 
progress of aspirants towards self-set goals on a number of issue areas 
294 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, “Washington Summit Communiqué. An 
Alliance for the 21st Century.,” April 24, 1999, para. 7, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm.
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including political, economic, defense, security, and legal issues.298 To this 
end, the alliance offered “advice, assistance and practical support”299 to 
the nine countries that had declared an interest in joining  at that 
time,  the  so-called  ‘Vilnius  9.’300 The  aspirants  are  to  submit  annual 
reports to the alliance setting out developments in five ares: Political and 
economic, budgetary, defense, security, and  legal. In  turn, the  alliance 
promises  “focused  and  candid  feedback”301 on  their  progress  towards 
membership as well as annual meetings. 
While similar to the  in that it promises cooperation and consultation 
between  and non-members, the two programs differ in important 
regards. Notably, the  is  geared towards improving interoperability 
between the allies and non-members through Individual Partnership Pro-
grams () and the Planning and Review Process ().  participants 
have chosen to pursue interoperability with  independent of their 
aspirations for  memberships. Then and now, many participants in 
the  have no intention to join , but want to improve interoper-
ability for a variety of reasons. In contrast, the , whilst not offering a 
guarantee for membership, clearly aims to help aspirant members prepare 
for their possible accession.302
298 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook, 189.
299 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
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ministers demanding NATO membership, the group has become known as the 
‘Vilnius 9’ or ‘Vilnius Group.’ See the “Vilnius Statement,” May 19, 2000, 
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security-policy/co-operation-with-nato-member-states-and-
candidate-countries/conference-nato-s-role-in-the-changing-security-environment-in-
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In the final years of the Clinton administration, ’s further enlarge-
ment did not enjoy the same prominence as it did until the  anniver-
sary. Domestically, a sense of accomplishment after the first round con-
spired with the Lewinsky scandal that Clinton was embroiled in. Like-
wise, the Senate and administration officials preferred not charging for-
ward with another round of enlargement immediately—rather, they con-
sidered it advisable to wait and see how the integration of the first three 
countries  plays  out.303 Internationally, managing  the  alliance’s  Kosovo 
intervention and peacekeeping efforts  in  the Balkans  took precedence. 
The agenda of the May  meeting of  foreign ministers illus-
trates this vividly—its final communiqué sets out a full thirty-three con-
cerns before reiterating the alliance’s commitment to enlarge.304
Moreover,  there  was  no  European  champion  for  immediate  further 
enlargement. Germany, the premier advocate for the first round of eastern 
enlargement  in  Europe, was  undergoing  its  own  leadership  transition 
after  the    elections  ended   years  of  conservative  governments. 
What is more, one of Germany’s goals at Madrid had been preventing 
discord among the alliance. This did not translate into any urgency for 
Berlin to push for a swift  implementation of the compromise solution 
reached in Madrid.305 In similar fashion, the other allies awaited a signal 
from Washington as to the timeline for the next round of enlargement.
CRS Report for Congress, no. RL30168 (April 25, 2003): 2; Paul Gallis, 
“Partnership for Peace,” CRS Report for Congress, no. 94–351 (August 9, 1994).
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After welcoming the three new allies, Washington remained in a wait-
and-see mindset. Despite the frantic  reading of tea leaves that follows 
international  summits,  the  Clinton  administration’s  position  remained 
vague beyond supporting ’s open door. On the eve of ’s first 
post-Cold  War  expansion,  President  Clinton  noted  that  the  alliance 
would remain “[…] open to new members from the Baltics to the Black 
Sea […]”306 and in  June “that   membership will  remain  open to 
other responsible democracies from central and southeastern Europe.”307 
But hopes in those regions for more specific support for membership were 
dashed  for  the  time  being.  In  fact,  Clinton  and  his  administration 
remained largely silent on the issue of expansion in their final years in 
office—and if they spoke out, their comments were non-committal and 
vague beyond reaffirming ’s open door.
Indeed, Clinton did not even discuss the issue of  enlargement with 
European leaders during his farewell tour of Europe. European leaders 
and Clinton did not discuss the issue at a May  meeting in Portugal 
despite  the  Vilnius    having  just  come  out  calling  for  a  ‘big-bang’ 
approach to enlargement, i.e. admitting them all in one go. Clinton casu-
ally told a reporter asking whether the topic had been discussed: “Well, 
the short answer to your question is, we didn’t talk about further  
enlargement.”308
306 William J. Clinton, “Remarks at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Commemorative Ceremony, April 23, 1999,” in Book 1. Presidential Documents - 
January 1 to June 31, 1999, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing 
Office, 2000), 620.
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January 1 to June 31, 1999, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing 
Office, 2000), 869.
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Much as in the  U.S. presidential elections, both major parties’ can-
didates expressed general support for enlargement in the run-up to the 
 elections. Vice President Al Gore and Governor of Texas George W. 
Bush—the Democratic  and Republican contenders—had sent letters  of 
support  to  the  meeting  of  the  Vilnius  , offering  general  support  for 
enlargement.309 However,    enlargement  figured  much  less  promi-
nently in  compared to , even bearing in mind that foreign pol-
icy issues generally take the backseat in U.S. elections. Only one question 
in the presidential debates between Gore and Bush touched tangentially 
upon ,310 giving Bush the opportunity to express general support for 
the alliance: 
It’s important for  to be strong and confident and to help 
keep the peace in Europe. And one of the reasons I felt so 
strongly that the United States needed to participate [in the 
Kosovo intervention, DJR] was because of our relations with 
, and  is going to be an important part of keeping 
the peace in the future.311
While the alliance and allies had thus committed to enlarge in principle, 
there were no strong advocates for swift action in the outgoing s. 
Indeed, “enlargement has been demoted from ’s agenda and over-
whelmed by other events.”312 Nevertheless, the alliance had publicly and 
to June 26, 2000, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2001), 
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May 20, 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/05/20/nine-
nations-united-in-bid-to-join-nato/83b716cf-d196-4c8f-b08d-6dbf43687253/; 
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“October 11, 2000 Debate Transcript,” 2000, http://www.debates.org/index.php?
page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript.
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repeatedly committed to enlarge, and reneging would have undermined 
its credibility. Lacking impetus, the allies would therefore—much as in the 
first round—have to agree on when to invite prospective members, and 
whom to invite of the countries given a nod at the Madrid and Washing-
ton summits. As the alliance headed into the new millennium, enlarge-
ment  was  thus  “no  longer  a  question  of  [whether  or]  when,  but 
whom.”313
Defining  a  U.S.  position  on  the  next  enlargement  round  was  left  to 
George W. Bush. After his inauguration as president on January , , 
the president and his new administration were comparatively quick to set 
out priorities for . As it had for Clinton, the president’s first trip to 
Europe became the action-forcing event that put U.S. positions on  
and  enlargement  on  the  front  of  everyone’s  mind in  the  bureaucracy. 
Unlike Clinton, however, Bush’s first trip to Europe came within months 
of his inauguration: Bush attended the mid-June   summit in 
Brussels, which he suggested  Secretary General Lord Robertson call. 
It was the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council in its highest forma-
tion since the alliance had welcomed the new members in . In his 
brief remarks to the council, Bush commended ’s past performance 
and explained that to succeed in the future, “we must extend our hands 
and  open  our  hearts  to  new  members,  to  build  security  for  all  of 
Europe.”314 The president was more specific in later remarks to the coun-
cil, in which Bush outlined five challenges the alliance faced—overcoming 
Cold War thinking, reaching out to Russia, maintaining defensive capabil-
ities, stabilizing the Balkans, and, lastly, expanding . Said Bush: 
313 Adapted from James M. Goldgeier, “Not When but Who,” NATO Review, no. 
March (2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/Examining-Enlargment/Not-
when-but-who/EN/index.htm.
314 George W. Bush, “Remarks at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
HQ, Brussels,” June 13, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613e.htm.
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We should continue to include new members able and willing 
to strengthen our Alliance. No state should be excluded on the 
basis of history or geography. And no third state should have a 
veto. […] Based on the aspirants’ progress to date, and the 
progress they should continue to make, I am confident we will 
be able launch [sic] the next round of enlargement when we 
meet in Prague.315
Whilst  the  allies  released  no communiqué at  Brussels,  Secretary 
General Lord Robertson reported there was consensus on reaffirming the 
commitment to invite new allies at the Prague Summit in , as was 
enshrined in the  Washington Summit communiqué and reiterated 
by President Bush that day.316
On the heels of Brussels and the U.S.-EU summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, 
the president visited Warsaw. In the Polish capital, Bush on June  deliv-
ered his first public comments strongly supporting enlargement:
I believe in  membership for all of Europe’s democracies 
that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that  
brings. The question of when may still be up for debate within 
; the question of whether should not be. […] Next year 
’s leaders will meet in Prague. The United States will be 
prepared to make concrete, historic decisions with its Allies to 
advance  enlargement. […] The expansion of  has 
fulfilled ’s promise, and that promise now leads eastward 
and southward, northward and onward.317
Bush’s remarks ended the period of limbo that had ensued after the Wash-
ington Summit, and made clear that the new U.S. administration would 
315 George W. Bush, “Excerpted Remarks to the North Atlantic Council,” June 13, 
2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613g.htm.
316 George Robertson, “Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson,” June 13, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010613d.htm.
317 George W. Bush, “Address at Warsaw University, June 15, 2001,” in Book 1. 
Presidential Documents - January 20 to June 30, 2001, ed. Office of the Federal 
Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 2002), 678–79.
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push for further enlargement of the alliance. Senior U.S. officials reiter-
ated that point in the weeks after the president’s trip. 
The U.S. Congress also welcomed Bush’s remarks. In a hearing held on 
June , , Chairman Joseph R. Biden (D-DE) said he was “heart-
ened” by the Warsaw speech and welcomed the president’s  promise to 
“rally support for further  enlargement at next year’s Prague Sum-
mit.”318 The  ranking  Republican  member,  Jesse  Helms  (R-NC),  was 
equally enthusiastic, praising the speech as “almost historic,” “one of the 
defining  moments  of  [President  Bush’s]  administration.” Helms  further 
said  the speech  had “moved decisively  forward the  debate  over   
enlargement.”319 In  his  testimony  to  this  hearing,  Secretary  of  State 
Colin S. Powell reiterated President Bush’s pledge to head into the Prague 
Summit “with a clear intent to advance the cause of freedom by enlarging 
.”320 
Even prior to the new president’s commitment, the Senate had maintained 
its pro-enlargement stance and called for action. Within weeks of the new 
th Congress convening for the first time, the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relation’s subcommittee on European affairs held a hearing on “The 
State of the  Alliance.”321 Subcommittee Chair Senator Gordon H. 
Smith (R-OR) deplored the “declined momentum of  enlargement 
over the last  three and a half years,” warned that “the Alliance’s open 
door policy today stands on wobbly legs.” Hence, Smith urged the Bush 
318 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Security Interests in Europe. 
Senate Hearing 107-91.” (2001), 3.
319 Ibid., 6.
320 Ibid., 10.
321 Subcomittee on European Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
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administration “to lead the effort to build a new and powerful consensus 
in support of enlargement.”322
Despite the fundamental differences with the Clinton administration on 
many issues, continuity was to be the hallmark of U.S.  policy.323 
With his administration having come out in favor of further enlargement, 
consideration  of  candidates  to  invite  in    could  begin  in  earnest. 
Looking back, the trajectory of the three new members since   had 
proved satisfactory, with Poland in particular having made great strides 
forward. The allies thus saw no need for tightening membership criteria, 
which  continued to  gravitate  around those  set  out  in  the    
study. Moreover, with the , the alliance had since  a much better 
idea of the situation in the aspirant countries for the second round than it 
did for those in the first. 
The , with its structured reporting and feedback mechanism between 
 and aspirants, also clearly delineated the group from which candi-
dates to be invited at Prague would be drawn. The nine countries partici-
pating in the 324 performed very differently when measured against 
the standards  laid  out  by  in  . Slovenia was considered the 
strongest candidate, and, together with Romania, it had already garnered 
strong support from France, Italy, and southern allies in the first round of 
enlargement.325 Both countries had also been identified specifically in the 
 and  summit declarations, further buttressing their case.
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Treatment of the three Baltic countries proved to be a point of contention 
between the United States and its allies. Whereas the United States had 
been supportive of their  perspective since the Clinton administra-
tion and had fostered close relations, the Europeans—with the exception 
of Denmark, Norway, and Poland—were much more skeptical.326 In par-
ticular, Europeans questioned the strategic rationale of inviting Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania—the three small countries had no military capabili-
ties to speak of and Russian opposition to them joining  was certain. 
Objectively, however, the three Baltic countries had a very strong case for 
a  bid, having made great strides towards meeting  membership 
criteria and boasting an impressive economic track record. Further, the 
alliance had also expressly recognized the Baltic states as candidates for 
membership in its Madrid and Washington communiqués.
The United States, on the other hand, had historically never recognized 
the three Baltic states’ incorporation into the Soviet Union and had come 
out  in  support  of  the  countries  aspiration  for  integration  into  Euro-
Atlantic  structures during the Clinton adminstration.327 Notably, Presi-
dent Clinton and his Baltic counterparts in  signed a charter of part-
nership, the Baltic charter.328 The United States offered explicit support 
for Baltic  membership,329 and at the signing ceremony, President 
326 See e.g. Senator Biden’s recounting of meetings in Europe, Subcomittee on European 
Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The State of the NATO 
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Clinton  said  “’s  door  is  and  will  remain  open  to  every  partner 
nation, and America is determined to create the conditions under which 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through that door.”330 
Congress also had a long-standing record of supporting the Baltic states’ 
accession to ,331 as did policy elites.332
Given such a strong U.S. commitment, the concerns of some European 
allies were unlikely to win the day. At the end of the day, the nine  
countries comprised those with strong U.S. and northern allies’ support 
(the Baltics) and the clear-cut cases of the Central and Southeast Euro-
pean candidates  (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)  most  strongly 
supported by southern allies, but acceptable to the others. Left out were 
two    countries  that  no  one  strongly  supported—Albania  and  the 
.333 Further, the nine  countries  fared very differently  when 
measured against  ’s   guidelines  for  membership.334 A widely 
Government Publishing Office, 1999), 72.
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read  report found Slovenia and Slovakia met the criteria, the Baltic 
states were “advanced,”335 and Bulgaria and Romania fell short of ’s 
preconditions.  Albania  and  Macedonia  fared  even  worse,  and  “their 
prospects for membership are distinctly long term.”336
France became the first of the three major European allies to read the 
writings on the wall and draw the consequences from President Bush’s 
Warsaw speech. In a reversal of policy, French President Jacques Chirac 
dropped his opposition and fell in line by supporting Baltic  mem-
bership on a July  trip to the Baltics.337 President Chirac  expressed 
support for including them in a future enlargement round, saying that 
countries must be allowed to choose their own alliances.338 
Germany, while  arguably  less  enthusiastic  about  the  second  round  of 
enlargement had not come out strongly against it, either. Rather, Germany 
had remained ambiguous while emphasizing the prospect of EU member-
ship for most of the countries  considered.339 Remarks by Chancellor 
Schroeder during a  Baltics trip in which he played down the likeli-
hood of  membership illustrate this position well.340 In the wake of 
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Bush’s Warsaw speech, Germany increasingly fell in line, eventually acqui-
escing to another round of enlargement at Prague. And it was no coinci-
dence that President Bush chose Berlin to deliver another major speech 
calling for enlargement in . In his speech before a special session of 
the  German  parliament,  President  Bush  called  on    to  “act  deci-
sively”341 and invite  new members, and reiterated:  “As our  summit  in 
Prague approaches, America is committed to  membership for all of 
Europe’s democracies that are ready to share in the responsibilities that 
 brings.”342 
5.6.2. The  Prague Summit Invites Seven New Members 
Since the Washington Summit, the allies had emphasized the December 
 summit in Prague would be the next reckoning point for enlarge-
ment. And it was—but other issues dominated the agenda in the wake of 
the  terror attacks on the United States and the first invocation of 
Article  of the North Atlantic Treaty in their wake. The alliance’s invita-
tion to seven states to commence accession negotiations, its biggest offer 
to date, was thus relegated to the depths of the summit communiqué and 
was “a secondary issue”343 at  best. Instead, when allies  met in Prague 
November  -, , the  “transformation  summit” was  to  cap  the 
reform process ushered in at London more than a decade before, and the 
alliance thus focused on restating its mission and generating capability 
goals for allies to meet.
341 George W. Bush, “Remarks to a Special Session of the German Bundestag, May 23, 
2002,” in Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to July 31, 2002, ed. Office of 
the Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2003), 855.
342 Ibid.
343 Paul Gallis, “The NATO Summit at Prague, 2002,” CRS Report for Congress, 
March 1, 2005, 3.
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In Prague, the alliance then invited seven of the now ten344  countries 
to begin accession negotiations for full membership in . Noting that 
consensus had emerged gradually,  Secretary General Lord Robert-
son was able to put to a vote the invitation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, which passed successfully.345 
Croatia, Albania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were 
left empty handed, but, as had become customary, the alliance reaffirmed 
its commitment to maintaining an open door.346  Secretary General 
Lord Robertson amplified this message further: “The message is: the door 
to  membership remains open. Today’s the [sic] invitees will not be 
the last. Through the  process, we will continue to help you pursue 
your reform process, and we remain committed to your full integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.”347
As regards  the  seven  countries  invited, accession  negotiations  were  to 
commence immediately, with an eye to completing the accession proto-
cols by March . The  allies were expected to ratify the protocols 
at the latest in time for the May , so that  could welcome seven 
new members at its summit then.348
344 Croatia joined the MAP in May 2002 after signing up to the “Vilnius 9” the year 
prior. See “NATO’s Relations with Croatia,” October 5, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_31803.htm; Ryan C. Hendrickson and 
Ryan P. Smith, “Croatia and NATO: Moving Toward Alliance Membership,” 
Comparative Strategy 25, no. 4 (2006): 297–306..
345 George Robertson, “Announcement on Enlargement,” November 21, 2002, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121c.htm; NATO Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 
November 21, 2002, “Prague Summit Declaration,” accessed June 13, 2016, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.
346 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, “Prague Summit Declaration,” 
para. 2.
347 George Robertson, “Closing Remarks, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the 
Level of Heads of State and Government,” November 21, 2002, 
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Negotiations with the seven invitees were concluded swiftly, and all acces-
sion protocols were signed by the  allies on March , . President 
Bush forwarded the seven protocols to the Senate on April , which in 
turn unanimous voted to ratify the seven protocols on May , .349 
Congressional turnaround was remarkably quick even when considering 
the unfailingly strong support in Congress for enlargement, and made the 
United States the third ally to ratify the accession protocols. 
A year later, on March , , the seven countries’ prime ministers sub-
mitted their instruments of accession to the U.S. government in Washing-
ton, DC, making them full members of the alliance and completing the 
alliance’s largest round of enlargement ever.
5.7. Interim Observations about U.S. Behavior
Having reviewed  the  first  round of  post-Cold-War   enlargement, 
some initial observations regarding the American role in the process can 
be made. I will group them around the three aspects outlined in the theo-
retical part of this work: Entanglement theory, freedom of action theory, 
and  as a hierarchical structure.
To recall, entanglement theory portrays the impact of alliances on U.S. 
foreign policy as a negative one. In particular, alliance membership forces 
the United States to pursue policies that are not in its national interest 
and that it would not otherwise have pursued. In contrast, freedom of 
action theory posits that given its preponderance of power and, in the 
Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, “Prague Summit Declaration,” 
para. 5.
349 Brian Knowlton, “Senate Votes Unanimously to Approve Expansion of NATO,” 
New York Times, May 8, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/international/worldspecial/08CND-
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case of , unique position, the United States will be able to avoid the 
detrimental effects predicted by entanglement theory.
Beyond the basic observation that if the United States had not been in 
, it  would not have been party to the eastern enlargement of the 
alliance, entanglement theory’s predictions do not appear to have been 
borne out in the first round of  enlargement. Rather, the episode 
underscores  the  supreme  position  held  by  the  United  States  in  the 
alliance. Throughout, the United States has been in the driver’s seat of 
enlargement, accelerating or decelerating the process as it  saw fit. The 
United States initiated the enlargement policy, steamrolled allies’ criticism, 
and eventually prevailed with its position of letting the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary accede by .350 In Waltz’s words: “The forward 
thrust of  was the doing of the United States; the Europeans showed 
little enthusiasm.”351 Like  as a whole, the alliance’s expansion was 
“an American-run show.”352 Waltz’s assertion that Europeans were unen-
thusiastic should be taken with a grain of salt, however. It only applies to 
western  European  countries—except  Germany, which  supported   
enlargement  from the  outset. As  outlined  above, Central  and  Eastern 
European leaders were set on joining western institutions and  in 
particular. Indeed, the two most comprehensive analyses of U.S. decision-
making on enlargement both note the crucial impact meetings with lead-
ers  from Eastern Europe have had on President  Clinton’s  thinking  on 
enlargement.353
While  Eastern  Europeans  may  have  put  the  issue  on  the  agenda, the 
United States remained at the helm. The United States “drove the alliance 
350 Rauchhaus, “Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement,” 174.
351 Waltz, “The United States: Alone in the World,” 35.
352 Rauchhaus, “Conclusion: Explaining NATO Enlargement,” 175.
353 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 23–24; Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 20.
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throughout this process”354 and “all of the key decisions were made in 
Washington.355 As  I  showed  above,  U.S. decisions  have  resulted  in  a 
domino effect among the allies, causing them to fall in line e.g. in the rati-
fication process.
Likewise, the United States led the way on establishing the formal criteria 
 would use to gauge any aspiring members’ bids. Not for nothing 
did  these  benchmarks  become  known  as  the  “Perry  Principles.” The 
eponymous U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in  presented a 
set of four principles for  he argued should guide enlargement: col-
lective defense, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security.356 
Without question, there has been opposition to U.S. positions, notably on 
the issue of how many new members the alliance should take in in the 
first  round.  Indeed, Goldgeier  quotes  Hermann  von  Richthofen, Ger-
many’s then Permanent Representative to , as complaining
Washington was riding roughshod over its allies, negotiating 
terms of possible membership with the Eastern Europeans and 
presenting  with accomplished facts instead of consulting 
with them.357
Several considerations are worth bearing in mind on this. First, this oppo-
sition did not foil U.S. policies. Rather, the U.S. position was a subset 
included in the opposing position. The opposition wanted to invite more 
countries, the U.S. fewer—but all U.S.-preferred countries were also sup-
ported by the opposition. At the end of the day, it was the U.S. position of 
inviting three members that the alliance eventually adopted. 
354 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 4.
355 Ibid., 5.
356 William J. Perry, The Enduring Dynamic Relationship That Is NATO. Remarks to 
the Wehrkunde Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Germany, February 5, 1995, 
1995; Cited in Moore, NATO’s New Mission, 59.
357 Quoted in Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, 85.
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Throughout  the  debate  and  eventual  implementation  of  the  alliance’s 
enlargement, U.S. officials were keenly aware of the risk of alienating its 
 allies. Given the United States’ unparalleled military position and 
economic resurgence in the first Clinton term, Secretary Albright and her 
Deputy Talbott worried about the “hegemon problem.”358 Whilst this did 
not preclude the United States from pursuing its perceived interest in the 
intra-alliance  debate  on  enlargement—note  the  above  Von  Richthofen 
quote—, these considerations did play a role in the U.S. acquiescence into 
the compromise wording at the Madrid Summit.
Taken together, the United States managed to steer clear of the pitfalls 
predicted by entanglement theory. While European allies put the issue of 
enlargement on the agenda initially, the United States was an early sup-
porter, too. Indeed, it managed to steer the discussion in  and ensure 
the alliance adopts the U.S.-preferred course of a  small  first  round of 
enlargement. It did so through established procedures in  and intra-
alliance diplomacy. While there was allied opposition to aspects of U.S. 
policy, it did not constrain the United States to the extent expected by 
proponents of entanglement theory. Rather, the United States remained 
free of significants constraints, as freedom of action theory predicts.
Asserting that the United States dominated the enlargement process is one 
thing, explaining why it did another. Arguably, enlargement has served 
perceived U.S. interests both systemic and subsystemic. Systemically, the 
end of the Cold War resulted in a power vacuum in Central and Eastern 
Europe, at the latest with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For offen-
sive realist approaches, it comes as no surprise that the United States and 
the alliance it leads should rush in to fill the void. Removing the void by 
bringing the newly independent states into the United States’ camp is a 
358 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 221–22.
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cheap and undangerous way of expanding power. No wars had to be 
fought, no territory conquered, and there was no counterweight after the 
Soviet  Union  had  disappeared.  From  an  offensive  realist  perspective, 
expanding  was the smart thing to do.
Defensive  realists  reject  the  notion  that  the  drive  to  maximize  power 
flows automatically from the anarchical nature of the international sys-
tem. For them, the assumption shared with their offensive brethren that 
states  care  about  their  relative  position  thus  does  not  translate  into 
expansive behavior. States, they assume, are not automatically driven to 
seek domination or hegemony. Rather, states are content with the status 
quo most of the time. 
Where does this leave us with regard to  expansion, at first sight a 
clear-cut case for offensive realists? I would argue that defensive realists 
likewise can explain the phenomenon, and that further, their predictions 
are better borne out by the record. While it is becoming more difficult to 
imagine today, vast parts of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
were in disarray throughout the s and in particular during the first 
half of the decade. The newly independent states were undergoing diffi-
cult  transitions  to  democracy,  Yugoslavia  was  disintegrating  and  the 
Balkans descending into war, and Russia was caught up in economic and 
political turmoil. Viewed from Washington, it was hard to make out a 
place without problems anywhere between St. Petersburg and Tirana. The 
one thing available in abundance seemed to be instability—an instability 
that  threatened to radiate  to  the  U.S.-led   countries  and thus  to 
affect directly a structure with the U.S. at the top in which the United 
States has a vested interest.359 In other words, the instability throughout 
359 See also Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership 
Won the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 554–57.
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Central and Eastern Europe threatened a key U.S. interest: the security 
system it had established since the end of World War II, in which it com-
mands supreme influence. 
U.S. comments calling for stability can and should be read in this vein. 
Stability  in  Europe was  a  key  plank in  U.S. policy  on  Europe in  the 
s; a position that, unlike many, transcended the Bush and Clinton 
administrations. As Hutchings, a former staffer on the Bush , notes in 
his analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the early s, “no idea was more 
strongly and deeply held in the upper levels of the administration than 
the  core  conviction  that  the  American  presence  was  indispensable  to 
European stability and therefore to vital American interests.”360 
Similarly, the Clinton administration’s foreign policy in its first term grav-
itated around maintaining stability. This is best encapsulated in the con-
gressionally mandated  National Security Strategy.  Since the  Gold-
water-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, U.S. adminis-
trations have been required to produce annually an outline of their grand 
strategy.361 The Clinton administration presented its first National Secu-
rity Strategy in July , almost a year and a half after the president’s 
inauguration.362 Noting  the  “wrenching  economic  and  political  transi-
tions”363 in the successor states of the Soviet Union, the Clinton adminis-
tration’s  first  strategy  highlights  “promoting  cooperative  security  mea-
360 Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An 
Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), 157.
361 Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 2nd 
ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 2, 
http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf.
362 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1994.pdf.
363 Ibid., 1.
106
sures” as a “central component.”364 Specifically, it cites the establishment 
of the  as a tangible result of the administration’s foreign policy. Fur-
ther, the strategy emphasizes that “European stability is vital to our own 
security  [...]”365 and  that  “an  unparalleled  opportunity  to  contribute 
toward a free and undivided Europe”366 exists for the United States. By 
maintaining its forward presence, the United States would further remain 
able “to prevent the development of power vacuums and dangerous arms 
races, thereby  underwriting  regional  stability  by  precluding  threats  to 
regional security.”367
Further, a  report by the Department of State to Congress highlights 
the importance of  enlargement for stabilizing Europe. If the United 
States should fail to “seize this historical opportunity to help integrate, 
consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk a 
much higher price later.”368 The report expressly notes that 
[h]istorically, when the security status of Central and Eastern 
Europe has been left unclear, the resulting uncertainty has 
exerted a strong and dangerously destabilizing influence for 
the whole of Europe. In the wake of such events, states to both 
the East and West of Europe’s center have suffered. By 
fostering stability and confidence,  enlargement will 
advance the longer-term security interests not only of those 
states but of the United States, Western Europe, Russia, 
Ukraine and others throughout the region.369 
364 Ibid., 2.
365 Ibid., 21.
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid., 8.
368 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, “Report to 
Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, 
Benefits, Costs, and Implications” (Washington, DC, February 24, 1997), 
https://fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_97/wh970224.htm.
369 Ibid.
107
Moreover, “[t]he most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee stabil-
ity in Europe is to do so collectively with our European partners, old and 
new, through ” and “by admitting new members  will make 
itself better able to address Europe’s new security challenges […] and help 
avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and instability in Europe […].”370
370 Ibid.
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6. Out of Area or Out of Business? ’s 
Changing Mission(s) and the Balkans 
Crucible
The North Atlantic Treaty sets out ’s geographical purview by defin-
ing the scope of the Article  collective defense provision. Article  stipu-
lates that an attack on allied territory north of the Tropic of Cancer as 
well as on allied forces, aircraft, and vessels in the Mediterranean and 
North Atlantic constitutes an attack under Article .371 When founding 
, the allies thus defined a core geographical area that the alliance 
would  cover.  Other  areas—sizeable  ones  at  that—were  deliberately 
excluded. These included the colonial holdings of France and the United 
Kingdom, but also U.S. security commitments in Asia. Excluding these 
areas from the Article  commitment does not per se preclude the alliance 
from unanimously  deciding  to  become active  there. However, colonial 
wars of independence and in particular the U.S.-European disagreements 
during the Vietnam War helped establish the alliance consensus that such 
out-of-area operations remain outside of ’s purview.372
The  boundaries  of  ’s  area  of  operations  shifted  dramatically 
throughout the s. While no new area of responsibility was defined or 
the limits of Articles  and  abandoned, the alliance increasingly took on 
missions and responsibilities that had been unthinkable during the Cold 
War—both functionally and geographically. It helped distribute humani-
371 NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” para. 6.
372 Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950-
1993, 81–82.
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tarian  aid  to  former  Soviet  republics,  deployed  ground  forces  to  the 
Balkans, and engaged in a substantial air war in  . One factor that 
has widened the alliance’s geographic scope was obviously its  enlarge-
ment, which extended the territory of allies covered by Articles  and . 
Another was the changing notion of what  is for, which is encapsu-
lated in two new strategic documents the alliance issued in the s and 
which was backed up by its actual operations. This chapter will outline 
both developments and the U.S. involvement in them.
Viewed from Washington in , America’s engagement in Europe was 
a  major  financial  and military  burden. At  the  time, the  United  States 
deployed around , personnel in uniform to Europe, not including 
around  , civilian employees and  , dependents.373 Accord-
ing to contemporary estimates, annual costs to the United States of main-
taining this presence amounted to US$  billion towards the end of the 
Cold War.374 
While the disparity in defense expenditures between the United States and 
the  allies had been a bone of contention since the early days of the 
alliance, many saw the winding down of the Cold War as an opportunity 
to lower costs by scaling down the deployment to Europe. Commentators 
noted  that  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  demise,  smaller  deployments  to 
Europe would suffice, and ensuring stability in Europe’s periphery could 
serve as a good incentive for Europeans to finally up their defense spend-
ing. Equally, domestic expectations in the United States for a “peace divi-
dend” were pronounced, calling for savings in the face of lowered ten-
sions in the Cold War. These calls gained more traction when the U.S. 
373 Ibid., 182.
374 Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Case for U.S. Strategic Independence,” Cato Institute 
Foreign Policy Briefing, no. 16 (1992): 1.
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economy entered a recession in July , which, albeit mild in macroe-
conomic terms, had an unusually severe impact on the job market.375
Against this backdrop, the United States committed to a cap on troop 
numbers in Central Europe of , and , in the rest of Europe 
by    under the Conventional Forces in Europe () Treaty, which 
limited  and Warsaw Pact matériel in Europe.376 Responding to Sad-
dam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in  , the United States ended up 
deploying half of its European ground forces to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Most  of  them  would  not  return  to  Europe,  and  by  October  , 
, troops remained in Europe.377 This proved to be an interim step 
on  the  path  towards  the  approximately  ,  U.S.  troops  that 
remained deployed in Europe in the mid-s, despite previous asser-
tions that , was the minimum number the U.S. government was 
prepared  to  agree  to  in  Europe.378 Meanwhile, the  Soviet  Union  also 
underwent a series of cuts to its troop presence in Europe, which propor-
tionately were even more significant than the U.S. cuts.
These moves on conventional forces went hand in hand with progress on 
reducing strategic  and non-strategic  nuclear arsenals  on both sides. In 
May  , President Bush announced that the United States would not 
375 Jennifer M. Gardner, “The 1990-91 Recession: How Bad Was the Labor Market?,” 
Monthly Labor Review 117, no. 6 (1994): 3–11.
376 “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” November 19, 1990, 
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2008), 84–86.
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378 Michael R. Gordon, “Scowcroft Asserts 195,000 Is Minimum for U.S. Troops,” 
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pursue the upgrade of the Lance missile system deployed to Europe.379 
European allies, in particular Germany, had long criticized the follow-on-
to-Lance () project, and they enthusiastically welcomed the decision 
to abandon the replacement program.380 By May , both the United 
States and the Soviet Union had fulfilled their obligations under the  
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces () treaty by withdrawing or scrap-
ping the respective missiles. Four months later, President Bush announced 
the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear systems from Europe and a number 
of other arms reduction initiatives.381 His Russian counterpart followed 
suit later that year, and this series of steps culminated in the negotiations 
and signature of the  and   treaties in  and .382
Taken together, these developments amounted to a dramatic de-escalation 
of  tensions  in  Europe  and  beyond, both  in  the  conventional  and  the 
nuclear realm. This arguably translated into a diminished significance and 
prominence of  in the early s. With the primary raison d’être—
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reducing-us-soviet-nuclear-weapons.html.
382 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 164–65.
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defending the alliance against Soviet aggression—diminished, the alliance 
entered into a period of discussion and uncertainty over what its tasks 
should be in the new post-Cold War world. Besides the calls for abolish-
ing the alliance altogether outlined in Chapter , a variety of conceptions 
for ’s role emerged in the debate leading up to the  Rome Sum-
mit, at which the alliance approved a new strategic concept. 
It is worth bearing in mind that ’s soul-seeking over its mission did 
not occur in a vacuum. Indeed, external factors were key in shaping the 
debate, most notably through the specter of instability and war on the 
Balkans, but also through the international reaction to Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in August of . The two crises left distinctly different impres-
sions of . Largely sidelined in the international response to Saddam 
Hussein’s aggression, the alliance gradually took on more and more func-
tions on the Balkans. Indeed, ’s series of operations in the Balkans—
outside the alliance’s traditional area of operations—proved to be forma-
tive. While  was not the default choice for addressing conflict in the 
Balkans, it did emerge as the sole organization materially and institution-
ally prepared to conduct large-scale military operations there. Maintain-
ing stability in Europe was a challenge for the alliance that reemerged in 
the early  s,383 whereas using    farther afield was not seriously 
discussed. 
383 “Reemerged” because European stability was an important part of the alliance’s 
initial rationale when it was founded, as enshrined in a quote ascribed to ’s first 
Secretary-General, Lord Hastings Ismay. Asked what ’s purpose is, Hasting is 
said to have replied: “To keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans 
down.” The quote (and variations on it) is the most common shorthand for ’s 
functions, but its origins and veracity are uncertain. 
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6.1. Too Far Afield—The Allied Response to Iraq’s Invasion of 
Kuwait
At first glance, little would lead one to expect    to play a role in 
countering  Iraqi  aggression  against  Kuwait  in  ,  which  did  not 
involve an attack on an ally nor the prospect of one. Indeed, Iraq was 
well  outside  of  ’s  area  of  responsibility.  Nevertheless,  the  soul-
searching at the alliance in the early s allowed for considering even 
such a seemingly far-fetched mission. Further, there was the question of 
whether ’s distinctive military command structure and infrastructure 
could be leveraged for missions outside its traditional remit.
Alas, any hopes for a  role in the Gulf region there may have been 
were  dashed. As  the  alliance’s  preeminent  historian  notes, “[…]   
appeared to be paralyzed by Saddam Hussein’s sudden assault on Kuwait 
in August  . It stood aside, unable to take common action […].”384 
Whilst  endorsed the ensuing U.S.-led action against Iraq, its mem-
bers only contributed on an individual basis—and not through —to 
the coalition buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia and the  operations 
to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. Whilst  did not shift gears from 
a defensive to an expeditionary organization, the alliance did take steps 
to ensure the defense of its members. This pertained mainly to Turkey, the 
one ally bordering Iraq. To this end,  decided to launch its first-ever 
operation, Anchor Guard, to protect its southern flank against possible 
fallout from Saddam Hussein’s aggression.385 Within days of Iraq’s inva-
sion of Kuwait, the alliance tasked its Airborne Warning and Control Sys-
tem ()  - aircraft with surveying Turkey’s border with Iraq and 
384 Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, 168.
385 NATO Allied Command Operations, “NATO’s Operations 1949-Present,” accessed 
June 18, 2016, http://www.shape.nato.int/resources/21/nato%20operations,
%201949-present.pdf.
114
sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.386 The alliance also deployed 
up to seven of its  Airborne Early Warning Force -s to forward-
operating locations in Greece, Italy, and Turkey.
’s second-ever mission, Operation Ace Guard, also sought to address 
implications of the second Gulf War. Reacting to a Turkish request for 
assistance  under  Article    of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty,  the  alliance 
deployed the air  component of Allied Command Europe ()  mobile 
force ()387 as well as German and Dutch air defense systems to Turkey 
in  early  .  Despite  its  limited  involvement,  ’s  two  missions 
related to the second Gulf War had an important effect on the debate on 
’s functions. As one  staffer notes in his history of Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (): “The term ‘out-of-area,’ for years a taboo if 
associated with , became a matter of open discussion at [the] politi-
cal level.”388
That the  Gulf War had demonstrated both the continued need for 
military alliances and the need for   to broaden its mission was a 
position held strongly by U.S. officials. While  had participated indi-
rectly, it seemed desirable to formulate an official role for the alliance in 
crises outside its traditional regional scope. As U.S. Permanent Represen-
tative to the North Atlantic Council () William Taft noted in  : 
“Despite the fact that the war took place on ’s periphery, it has firm 
386 Pat Dennis, “NATO AWACS: Alliance Keystone for Out-of-Area Operations,” 
Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 4 (2007): 24–25; Magnus Petersson, “The 
Forgotten Dimension? NATO and the Security of the Member States,” in Pursuing 
Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi, ed. Hakan Edström and 
Dennis Gyllensporre (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 128–29.
387 AMF (Air) consisted of Belgian, German, and Italian aircraft.
388 Franco Veltri, “AFSOUTH, 1951-2004: Over Fifty Years Working for Peace and 
Stability,” 2004, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080429054705/http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/
history.htm; cited in Dennis, “NATO AWACS: Alliance Keystone for Out-of-Area 
Operations.”
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and,  I  think,  important  implications  for  European  security,” notably 
demonstrating  the  impact  seemingly  far-flung  events  could  have. Taft 
went on to argue that despite its limited involvement,  had been key 
in  ensuring  the  coalition’s  success,  primarily  through  the  consultative 
mechanism it provided for allies and through the high degree of interop-
erability between the allies among the coalition ensured by decades of 
training  and standardization.389 These  assets  could  be  used  to address 
challenges beyond the traditional remit of the alliance, too.
6.2. The Alliance’s First Post-Cold War Strategic Concept
Meeting in Rome in November of ,  heads of state and govern-
ment adopted a new strategic concept for the alliance, its fifth overall.390 
Strategic concepts lay out the alliance’s priorities and  raison d’être. The 
 Strategic Concept superseded the  / Strategic Concept, which 
had been in effect for almost  years—by far the longest of any   
strategic concept. With the changes wrought in Europe by the end of the 
Cold War and the specter of instability in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the 
Middle East, the need for a review was obvious. The allies also chose not 
to classify the strategic concept and to even publish it, an unprecedented 
step towards transparency.391 
Substantively, the  strategic concept had two major aspects. On the 
one hand, it reavowed the alliance’s treaty foundations, i.e. the defense of 
allied states, while reducing the role of nuclear weapons. The concept reit-
389 William H. Taft, “European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War,” NATO 
Review 39, no. 3 (1991): 16–21.
390 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” November 
8, 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.
391 Needless to say, the accompanying military guidance, the MC Directive for Military 
Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (MC 400), remained classified. 
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erates the fundamental commitment of allies that is the cornerstone of 
: “Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever 
direction,  would  be  covered  by  Articles    and    of  the  Washington 
Treaty.”392
On the other hand, the document went beyond the traditional security 
concerns  of  the  alliance.  The   Strategic  Concept  broadened  the 
alliance’s  conception  of  the  security  challenges  it  faced  substantially, 
reflecting  the  changed security  environment  in  Europe  in  particular.393 
Specifically, the document notes that “the risk of a surprise attack [by the 
 on allied territory, DJR] has been substantially reduced.”394 The new 
threats to the alliance then are “are multi-faceted in nature and multi-
directional,” and “[r]isks to Allied security are less likely to result from 
calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from 
[...]  serious  economic, social  and  political  difficulties, including  ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes”395 in Central and Eastern Europe. In this 
environment, the alliance identified four “fundamental security tasks” it 
faces:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable 
security environment in Europe, based on the growth of 
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to 
intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose 
hegemony through the threat or use of force.
392 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” para. 12, 
see also para. 15.
393 Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance, 32–33; Sten Rynning, NATO 
Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 41.
394 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” para. 7.
395 Ibid., para. 8.
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II. To serve, as provided for in Article  of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any 
issues that affect their vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for members’ security, and for 
appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common 
concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression 
against the territory of any  member state.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.396
These four tasks amount to a “blend of old and new.”397 Tasks I and II 
reiterate fundamental provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Task IV, 
too, amounts to little more than a description of what  in its view 
had done for the previous four decades, but also implicitly acknowledges 
the continued risks to stability emanating from the still sizeable military 
forces to the East. Truly new is task I. By stipulating that    is but 
“one  of  the  indispensable  foundations”  for  security  in  Europe,  the 
alliance had opened up space for alternatives. In the early s, France 
and to a lesser extent Germany were the main drivers behind the notion 
that there can and should be European security institutions complemen-
tary to  .398 Among the contenders for a role to play in European 
security were in particular the European Communities (), the Western 
European Union (), and a possibly institutionalized  Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (). 
For the United States, maintaining primacy of  among these institu-
tions was a clear policy objective, and the differences with France in par-
ticular over the role and relative standing of a European security contri-
bution shaped the debate over  strategy in the early s. Nation-
396 Ibid., para. 20.
397 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 41.
398 Ibid., 42.
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ally, the United States had transitioned to a new National Security Strat-
egy  in  .399 The new strategy  placed  less  emphasis  on  direct  con-
frontation with the Soviet Union, and instead identified region conflagra-
tions as a key challenge for U.S. security policy. The regional challenges 
were to serve as the “organizing focus for American military capabili-
ties.”400 The strategy also acknowledges the void that had emerged for 
 in the wake of the end of the Cold War: 
Politically, a key issue is how America’s role of alliance leader
—and indeed our alliances themselves—will be affected, 
especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat. The positive 
common basis of our alliances—the defense of democratic 
values—must be reaffirmed and strengthened. Yet, differences 
among allies are likely to become more evident as the 
traditional concern for security that first brought them 
together diminishes in intensity. We need to consider how the 
United States and its allies can best respond to a new agenda 
of political challenges—such as the troubled evolution of the 
Soviet Union or the volatile Middle East—in the framework of 
the moral and political values we continue to share.401
Given these national priorities, the United States advocated for similar 
priorities  for    and viewed the development of  alternative  institu-
tional arrangements for security policy with skepticism.402 In particular, 
the United States rejected the French-led project for a European Security 
and Defense Identity (), i.e. the establishment of independent Euro-
pean military structures. An exception was the , for which U.S. offi-
399 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, 
D.C, 1991).
400 Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 9.
401 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, 1.
402 Sebastian Harnisch, Europa und Amerika: die US-amerikanische Haltung zur 
westeuropäischen Integration 1987 - 1994 (Sinzheim: Pro Universitate, 1996), 167–
68.
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cials initially considered a role in military missions outside ’s tradi-
tional remit.403
6.3. Beyond the Comfort Zone:  Joins the Fray in the 
Balkans
Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a 
year, and will probably dissolve within two. […] The violence 
will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States 
and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.
—U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 15-90404
  was not the institution of choice to react to the violence in the 
Balkans in early  s. Rather, it was a last resort after European and 
United Nations efforts had faltered or run into serious troubles due to a 
lack of military capabilities. As Sten Rynning notes in his recounting of 
the - period, “ was pulled into Balkan affairs.”405
The wars that erupted in the Balkans beginning in the early s were 
the pinnacle of a decade-long economic decline and constitutional crisis. 
An amalgamate of different ethnicities that emerged out of World War I, 
Yugoslavia  disintegrated  amidst  bloodshed  not  seen  in  Europe  since 
World War II. The end of  the Cold War and the wave of  democratic 
change that swept across Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia’s neighbor Alba-
nia brought to the fore ethnic rivalries and tensions that had slumbered 
under  a  facade of  stability  during the  Cold War. President  Josip  Broz 
Tito’s  constitutional  reforms  before  his  death  in  ,  which  were 
403 For an overview over the ESDI debate, see Peter Barschdorff, Facilitating 
Transatlantic Cooperation After the Cold War: An Acquis Atlantique (Münster: LIT 
Verlag, 2001), 53–70.
404 U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, “Yugoslavia Transformed. National 
Intelligence Estimate NIE-15-90,” October 18, 1990, iii, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990-10-01.pdf.
405 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 28.
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intended  to  balance  Yugoslavia’s  six  constituent  republics,406 failed  to 
appease tensions. The northern states, Croatia and Slovenia, in particular 
were discontented and severed their commercial ties with the southern 
republics in . 
Croatia and Slovenia were also the first to break away by declaring inde-
pendence on June , . The proximate cause was the refusal by Ser-
bia to accept a Croat for the rotating president of Yugoslavia the previous 
month, but as indicated above, the underlying causes were long-standing 
and manifold. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević reacted by dispatch-
ing the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army () to the two rene-
gade republics. In  Slovenia, the  attempt  to  foil  the secession  by force 
failed in the face of strong resistance and a well-planned defense. Not so 
in Croatia, which had suspended its June , , declaration of inde-
pendence under the Brioni Agreement, which ended the ten-day war in 
Slovenia. Croatia eventually severed all ties with Yugoslavia in October 
 amidst escalating fighting between its  army and ethnic  Serbians. 
Croatia’s  significant  Serb  minority  supported  Belgrade’s  plans  for  a 
‘Greater Serbia,’ and secured political and military support from Serbia. 
According  to  one  estimate,  more  than  ,  were  killed  and  over 
, displaced during Croatia’s  breakaway war from the Yugoslav 
federation, resulting in a refugee crisis the likes of which Europe had not 
seen since World War II.407
The war in Croatia quickly spread to neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where fighting broke out in March of —only months after  had 
issued its new strategic concept in Rome, which foresaw a more active 
406 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, as 
well as the two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina.
407 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 1.
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role for the alliance in ensuring stability and peace abroad. As during the 
/ Gulf  War,    did  not  intervene  in  the  Balkans  and  in 
Bosnia in particular as an organization at first. Rather, individual mem-
bers contributed to United Nations efforts, to which  took the back-
seat.
The alliance remained largely absent from efforts to address the Balkans 
crisis in /. This reflected the view of both sides of the Atlantic 
that the Balkans were a European problem that should be solved by the 
Europeans. As Jacques Poos, at the time foreign minister of Luxembourg 
and chairman of the  Council of ministers, famously said regarding the 
escalating conflict in Yugoslavia: “This is the hour of Europe […] if one 
problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This 
is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to 
anyone else.”408 His colleague Jacques Delors, chairman of the   Com-
mission, echoed this sentiment: “We do not interfere in American affairs. 
We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours.”409
Initially, the Bush administration tried to push for a discussion of the situ-
ation in Yugoslavia in . However, it was swiftly rebutted by France, 
which seemed bent on making Yugoslavia a test case for a more inte-
grated European foreign policy.410 Reportedly, France even accused the 
United States of “overdramatizing” the situation in the Balkans.411 This 
rift was rooted in the starkly differing positions of the United States and a 
408 Cited in Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: 
Mandarin, 1994), 32.
409 Cited in Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge 
to Neo-Isolationism (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996), 91.
410 Moore, NATO’s New Mission, 20–21.
411 David C. Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” in The World and 
Yugoslavia’s Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1996), 127.
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strong group within the  , notably Austria and to a lesser degree Ger-
many, regarding the viability of a peaceful breakup of the Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. Whereas U.S. Secretary of State James Baker 
warned of the dangers of letting Yugoslavia disintegrate when no peaceful 
separation  seemed possible, Austria  saw the  federation  as  artificial  to 
begin with, and Germany also pressed for swift recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia.412 
Further, the Bush administration considered Serbia the main culprit  in 
Yugoslavia, noting in particular its actions in Kosovo. Europeans, on the 
other  hand,  were  less  swift  to  assign  blame  and  were  more  heavily 
invested in the fate of Yugoslavia’s northern republics.413 With the United 
States headed into an election year, few in Washington considered the 
Balkans worth picking a fight over. Nor did many take issue with the 
Europeans taking the lead on the Balkans. As one contemporary observer, 
last  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Yugoslavia  Warren  Zimmermann,  noted: 
“[B]etween  July   and  March  , the  United  States  was  not  a 
major  factor  in the Yugoslav crisis. […] Yugoslavia had become a tar 
baby in  Washington. Nobody wanted  to  touch it. With  the  American 
presidential elections just a year away, it was seen as a loser.”414 In fact, 
the Bush administration to an extent even welcomed European efforts to 
resolve the situation, encouraging its European partners “at the highest 
levels and at every turn” to engage.415 However, as David Gompert noted, 
412 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 164. No episode illustrates the differences better than 
Secretary Baker’s last-ditch effort to persuade Croatia and Slovenia to postpone their 
secessions by visiting Yugoslavia in June . See Wayne Bert, The Reluctant 
Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), 136.
413 Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 124.
414 Warren Zimmermann, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of 
Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (1995).
415 Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 127.
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the United States had “no vital interests” at stake in Yugoslavia, and Sec-
retary of State James Baker famously agreed that “we have no dog in this 
fight.”416 
In hindsight, there existed a contradiction between the Bush administra-
tion’s desire to maintain  as Europe’s premier security organization 
as enshrined in the alliance’s  Strategic Concept, and its willingness 
to let Europeans take the lead on Yugoslavia outside . As we have 
seen, the Rome Strategic Concept specifically envisioned a role for the 
alliance in addressing regional conflicts. Some observers have interpreted 
this conflicting U.S. behavior as a ploy to expose the Europeans’ inability 
to cooperate militarily without U.S. involvement. For example, Brendan 
Simms quotes a State Department staffer recalling that Secretary of State 
Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger thought “the European bluff 
should  be  called.” Moreover,  Eagleburger  reportedly  expected:  “[The 
Europeans] will screw it up,” which “will teach them a lesson” and “teach 
them to  burden-share.”417 More  convincingly, the  Bush  administration 
was cautious to commit the United States to a region that, certainly with 
the end of the Cold War, had become a tangential interest at best. Strate-
gically, becoming involved in the Balkans on the heels of the  Gulf 
War also bore the risk of signalling that the United States would enforce 
Bush’s “new world order” as a global policeman. Lastly, the political and 
economic costs of launching another large-scale war, requiring according 
to U.S. estimates , to , troops on the ground and a lengthy 
416 Cited in Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia 
(London: Penguin Books, 2002), chap. 2. Baker later reiterated in his memoirs: 
“[O]ur vital interests were not at stake.” James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy. 
Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), 636.
417 Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia, chap. 2.
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occupation,418 would have been exorbitant.419 In sum, in the words of 
The Independent’s commentator Neal Ascherson,   was “staying in 
its bunk with its polished boots on.”420 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council had in late September 
 unanimously passed resolution  imposing a “general and com-
plete embargo on all  deliveries  of weapons and military equipment to 
Yugoslavia.”421 This  embargo  became  the  avenue  for  the  alliance’s 
involvement  in  the  Balkans  amidst  the  failure  of  other  institutions  to 
redress the Yugoslav crisis.  Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 
also in October appointed former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as 
his personal envoy for Yugoslavia. On November , , the Security 
Council passed resolution . It noted that  peacekeepers would not 
deploy until all parties respected the ceasefire brokered in Geneva the pre-
vious week.422
The alliance first commented on the situation in Yugoslavia at its Decem-
ber  Rome Summit. The allies at Rome only expressed concern over 
the  situation  in  the  Balkans, but  did  not  suggest  any  allied  action  in 
addressing the situation.423 Rather, the allies condemned the use of force 
to move borders and expressed “support and appreciation for the efforts 
418 David Cohen and Fritz W. Ermarth, “Memorandum for National Foreign 
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Balkans” (National Intelligence Council, 1992), 38–39, 
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the Philippines to Iraq (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 117–18.
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of the European Community, the   and the Security Council of the 
United  Nations  to  resolve  this  crisis.”424 In  February  , the  allied 
heads of state and government echoed  Resolution , and called on 
all parties to respect the cease-fire so that United Nations peacekeepers 
could deploy. Peacekeepers eventually deployed to Croatia in the early 
summer of   after the Security Council had authorized the deploy-
ment of the United Nations Protection Force () on April  , 
.425 Notably, the resolution coincided with the United States’ deci-
sion to formally recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia as 
well as of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had declared its independence ear-
lier in April after a referendum supported parting ways with Yugoslavia 
in February.426 This brought the United States in line with the Europeans, 
which had recognized Croatia and Slovenia in January  and Bosnia 
in April.
  first became actively involved in July  , when alliance forces 
began monitoring the arms embargo against  Yugoslavia in the eastern 
Mediterranean.427 Following a  decision to launch a naval monitoring 
mission,  foreign and defense ministers meeting in Helsinki in July 
424 NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, “The Situation in Yugoslavia,” November 8, 1991, 
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yugoslav-republics-as-independent.html.
427 Tarcinio Gazzini, “NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-
1999),” European Journal of International Law 12, no. 3 (2001): 393–94.
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decided to follow suit and launch an operation.428 Employing Standing 
Naval  Force  Mediterranean  ()  assets,    remained 
within its established area of operations as set out in the North Atlantic 
Treaty.    forces were to operate independently of the  , but to 
coordinate and cooperate. ’s Operation Maritime Monitor formally 
commenced on July , , off the coast of Montenegro, where it was 
tasked with the “surveillance, identification and reporting of  maritime 
traffic  in  areas  to  be  defined  in  international  waters  in  the  Adriatic 
Sea.”429
 foreign ministers had laid the groundwork for this mission at their 
June  meeting in Oslo. There, the allied foreign ministers agreed that 
  would  support    missions  on  a  case  by  case  basis.430 The 
alliance became gradually more involved in the course of  , which 
became a watershed for ’s role in the Balkans and beyond. Adding 
to its naval assets, the alliance in October committed its  airplanes 
to monitoring—but not enforcing—the military no-fly zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina imposed by   Security Council Resolution .431 As the 
428 “Statement on NATO Maritime Operations. Helsinki, 10 July 1992,” July 10, 1992, 
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yugoslavia-. By the time the operation and its successors terminated when the Un 
embargo was lifted in mid-June 1996, it had challenged about 74,000 ships and 
inspected around 7,500 both at sea and in port (ibid.).
430 “The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line 
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431 UN Security Council, Resolution 781 (1992). Adopted by the Security Council at 
Its 3122nd Meeting on 9 October 1992, 1992, para. 1, 
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 toughened its approach to the Yugoslav crisis, so did : In Octo-
ber  ,  Operation  Maritime  Fence  replaced  Operation  Maritime 
Guard. The new operation had an expanded remit, which now included 
halting and inspecting all maritime traffic bound for or originating in any 
(former) Yugoslav republic.432
In  December  ,  new   Secretary-General  Boutros  Boutros-Ghali 
asked  Secretary-General Manfred Wörner to provide  support 
for   resolutions.433 As it  had done for the  , the North Atlantic 
Council on December , , decided that the alliance would in princi-
ple be available for peacekeeping missions authorized by the  Security 
Council. However, final  decisions  would  only  made on a case-by-case 
basis.434 On January ,  foreign ministers then decided in principle 
that the alliance would support efforts to enforce a no-fly zone over the 
former territory of Yugoslavia, should the United Nations launch such 
efforts. 
6.3.1. Clinton Transition
Foreign policy played no major role in the   presidential campaign. 
Where  it  did, the  Democratic  candidate  Bill  Clinton  called  for   
enlargement, criticized the administration for not using force to resolve 
the Balkans situation, and expressed strong support for the -imposed 
no-fly zone over Yugoslavia. In particular, Clinton called for lifting the 
arms  embargo  and  conducting  airstrikes  against  Bosnian  Serbs  after 
432 Eric Victor Larson et al., Interoperability of U.S. and NATO Allied Air Forces: 
Supporting Data and Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 
72–74.
433 Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance, 65.
434 This move reaffirmed the alliance’s commitment made in the Rome Strategic 
Concept, see “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State 
and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” para. 
41.
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reports of concentration camps and ethnic cleansing emerged over the 
summer of .435 In their confirmation hearings, senior members of his 
cabinet similarly called for turning the screws on the Serbs. Said desig-
nated Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his confirmation hearing 
before the Senate:  “Europe and the world community in general must 
bring real pressures, economic and military, to bear on the Serbian leader-
ship to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing.”436
Yet the United Nations and by its authorization    had significantly 
expanded their involvement in the former Yugoslavia during the course of 
. Likewise, the  outgoing  Bush  administration  had  stepped  up  its 
rhetoric  during its  final  days, culminating in  the   Christmas Day 
message threatening military action if Serbia moved against Kosovo. In 
sum, the stakes in the Balkans had signficantly increased in the year pre-
ceding Clinton’s inauguration on January , .
As  Clinton  was  preparing  for  inauguration  and  throughout  the  first 
months  of  the  new  administration,  “Topic  A  was  always  Bosnia” as 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake recalled.437 Clinton agreed that 
435 William J. Clinton, “Statement by Governor Bill Clinton on the Crisis in Bosnia, 
July 26, 1992,” July 26, 1992, http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-
science/speeches/clinton.dir/c7.txtp; William J. Clinton, “Statement by Governor Bill 
Clinton on Killings in Serbian Camps, August 4, 1992,” August 4, 1992, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/speeches/clinton.dir/c55.txtp; 
E.J. Dionne Jr., “Clinton Turns Sights to Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, July 29, 
1992, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/29/clinton-turns-
sights-to-foreign-policy/af5bda94-0d08-43fa-8ea9-54e6010579b2/; Gwen Ifill, 
“Conflict in the Balkans: Clinton Takes Aggressive Stances On Role of U.S. in 
Bosnia Conflict,” New York Times, August 10, 1992, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/10/us/conflict-balkans-clinton-takes-aggressive-
stances-role-us-bosnia-conflict.html.
436 Warren Christopher, “Statement by Secretary-Designate Christopher before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 13, 1993,” U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 4 (January 25, 1993).
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the issue took up “a good deal” of his time438 and called Bosnia “the most 
frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today.”439 In the 
same vein, Richard Holbrooke highlighted the significance of addressing 
the situation in Bosnia in a memorandum to the president-elect a week 
before the inauguration, advocating a break with the Bush policy of rela-
tive restraint:
Bosnia will be the key test for American policy in Europe … 
inaction or a continuation of the Bush policies in Bosnia by 
the Clinton administration would be the least desirable course. 
Continued inaction carries long-term risks which could be 
disruptive to U.S.-European relations, weaken , increase 
tension in Greece and Turkey, and cause havoc with 
Moscow.440
Holbrooke’s plea did not go unheard and fell on open ears with President 
Clinton given his concern that the tide was turning against Muslims in 
Bosnia—due not least to the impact of the -mandated arms embargo. 
To  Clinton  (and  many  observers  in  the  United  States),  the  embargo 
advantaged the Bosnian Serbs, who could draw on weapons caches left 
behind by the Yugoslav People’s Army () and the support of the new 
Serbian-led Yugoslavia.441
As  is  customary  for  new  administrations,  the  Clinton  administration 
embarked on a review of Bosnia policy under Presidential Review Direc-
tive/-. Specifically, the review’s “objective is to develop broad strate-
gic goals and strategies that will guide our policies toward the former 
438 William J. Clinton, “Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, February 5, 1993,” in Book 1. Presidential 
Documents - January 20 to July 31, 1993, ed. Office of the Federal Register, Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Publishing Office, 1994), 52.
439 Cited in Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 6.
440 Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1999), 50.
441 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 511, 527.
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Yugoslavia.”442 For  the  new administration, Secretary  of  State  Warren 
Christopher on February , , released the first conclusions drawn 
from the review.443 The most significant were the new administration’s 
significant concerns with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (). The epony-
mous   envoy Cyrus Vance and   negotiator David Owen had pre-
sented their plan in October , just before the U.S. presidential elec-
tions.  envisioned dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina into a loose confed-
eration of cantons with a central government responsible predominantly 
for foreign and security policy. It had found widespread European sup-
port, whereas President Clinton had publicly expressed concern. In partic-
ular, he was wary of imposing a deal on the parties from the outside, 444 
and worried that the  “might work to the immediate  and to the 
long-term further disadvantage of the Bosnian Muslims.”445 Instead, U.S. 
Secretary of  State  Warren Christopher  announced on February  the 
United States would become directly engaged in negotiations on a new 
plan, would be ready to enforce a deal, and called for enforcing the   
no-fly  zone, and  providing  humanitarian  assistance.446 This  not  with-
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https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1993-01-22.pdf.
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standing, Christopher underscored “[t]he United States is not the world’s 
policeman” and portrayed the  Yugoslav crisis  as  a  touchstone for  the 
adaptation of .447
The Clinton administration thus sought to make good on its campaign 
promise of doing more in the Balkans while steering well clear of commit-
ting ground troops. Clinton went to great lengths to emphasize that U.S. 
ground troops would not “in any way engage in the present conflict.”448 
However, if an agreement was reached, the United States would contrib-
ute to   measures  to  secure the arrangement.449 The easiest  measure 
with almost no risk to American troops’ lives that was sure to garner 
public support was providing humanitarian aid. After coordinating with 
 Secretary-General  Boutros-Ghali,  President  Clinton  was  able  to 
announce the beginning of U.S. humanitarian airdrops into Bosnia-Herze-
govina on February , .450 Clinton emphasized publicly that the air-
drops would “have no combat connotations whatever,” and be “purely 
humanitarian and quite limited.”451
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6.3.2. The Lift-And-Strike Debate and ’ s First Steps Toward 
Involvement
Within three months of Clinton taking office,  airplanes were oper-
ating in the Balkans enforcing a  -mandated no-fly zone. The United 
Nations had extended their flight ban on March , , to include all 
flights not authorized by , and had authorized members to use 
all  means  necessary  to  enforce  the  ban under  Chapter  VII  of  the   
Charta.452 The  on April  agreed  would enforce the flight ban, 
and the United States committed  fighter jets and support planes to the 
effort beginning on April , .453 France and the Netherlands also 
committed  airplanes  for  immediate  deployment,  and  Turkey  and  the 
United Kingdom offered assets for later stages of the operation.454 By the 
same token, the   extended the scope of its naval blockade and also 
authorized the use of force to enforce it on April , .455 
Amidst Serbian advances on Srebrenica, the Clinton administration went 
through an acrimonious internal debate over its options to make good on 
its campaign promises and to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign on to the 
Vance-Owen plan. The debate pitted advocates for large-scale air strikes 
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(Vice  President  Al  Gore, U.S. Permanent  Representative  to  the  United 
Nations Madeleine Albright)456 against those calling for lifting the arms 
embargo and conducting more limited air strikes (National Security Advi-
sor Lake, Secretary of State Christopher). This “lift-and-strike” approach 
was also recommended by a fact-finding mission that had returned from 
the  region  in  April.457 The  military  brass, represented  by  Secretary  of 
Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Pow-
ell, noted that only a large deployment of ground troops would quell the 
conflict.458 
The president came down in favor of the lift-and-strike approach in a 
five-hour meeting on May , despite well-known European concerns over 
the security of their troops deployed in the Balkans. Cognizant of these 
concerns, the president tasked Secretary Christopher with selling the pol-
icy  to  the Europeans. As Clinton said to  Christopher:  “[N]ow you’ve 
really got your work cut out for you.”459 Christopher left for Europe the 
same day Clinton had weighed in to sound out the European govern-
ments on their positions on lift-and-strike in light of the continued Ser-
bian refusal to sign on to Vance-Owen. Christopher recalls he “ran into 
trouble from the moment I landed in Europe on May .”460 France and 
Britain, who were supplying the bulk of    troops,461 rebuffed 
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Christopher  and expressed strong objections  to  any airstrikes.462 Like-
wise, they  rejected  lifting  the arms embargo, fearing this  would mean 
more arms flowing to all sides.463 While Christopher was touring Europe, 
the Bosnian Serbs on May  indicated they would sign on to the  , 
undermining any case Christopher may have had even further.464 By the 
time Christopher returned to Washington on May , a “sea change” had 
occurred with regard to lift and strike.465 Support had crumbled, and the 
policy was not pursued any longer in the face of European opposition 
and what seemed like Bosnian Serbs’  acquiescence. Instead, containing 
the conflict became the paramount concern of the Clinton administration, 
as Christopher testified before Congress in May.466 This approach was 
enshrined in the Joint Action Program signed in Washington on May  
by the foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, Spain, Britain and 
France.467 Notably, the five countries pledged to work towards the imple-
mentation of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina as envisioned by  Secu-
rity Council resolutions passed in April and May.468 
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On June , , the  decided the alliance would offer its “protec-
tive airpower in case of attack against  in the performance of 
its overall mandate, if it so requests.”469  thus effectively endorsed 
the Joint Action Program despite previous grumblings,470 and readied air-
planes  for  this  scenario. This  was necessary given a series  of  Bosnian 
Serbs’ military successes, in which their forces had surrounded most of 
’s safe areas, including Sarajevo.471 The next month, Tony Lake 
again tried to sell  the French and the British on the idea of proactive 
airstrikes to break the siege of Sarajevo, taking a more direct approach 
than  Christopher  had before. As  Daalder  notes, Lake emphasized  the 
president’s backing for this approach and that “the future of the alliance 
was on the line.”472 In a series of continued discussion with French and 
British  officials, enough common ground was reached to allow a  
decision at its  August   meeting. The  decided the alliance would 
“make  immediate  preparations  for  undertaking, in  the  event  that  the 
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale 
interference  with  humanitarian  assistance, stronger  measures  including 
air strikes against those responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.”473 However, any airstrikes would require authorization by 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/221/90/IMG/N9322190.pdf?OpenElement; UN 
Security Council, Resolution 824 (1993). Adopted by the Security Council at Its 
3208th Meeting on 6 May 1993, 1993, para. 3, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/262/07/IMG/N9326207.pdf?OpenElement.
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Athens, Greece, 10 June 1993,” June 10, 1993, para. 3, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930610a.htm.
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Times, May 27, 1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/27/world/nato-
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both the   and  , giving each organization—and by proxy France 
and Britain in particular—a veto.474 Whilst fighting eased somewhat in 
the aftermath of  ’s August decision, the Bosnian Serbs once more 
increased  their  pressure  on  the  -mandated  safe  areas  in  the  fall  of 
.
6.3.3.  Doubles Down And Moves Toward Enforcement
February of  proved a momentous month for the alliance, with its 
forces seeing their first combat action ever and the  threatening air 
strikes over the siege of Sarajevo. Serbian forces’ shelling of Sarajevo’s 
Markale market place on February , , proved to be an action-forc-
ing event for the international community. The mortar attack killed  
and injured close to , making it the deadliest but by no means the first 
incident of its kind.475 Responding to the Markale shelling, the  on 
February , , made  three  crucial  decisions:  First,   agreed  to 
launch air strikes against artillery positions threatening Sarajevo at the 
request of the United Nations. Second, the  issued a ten-day ultima-
tum for the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from within  km of Sara-
jevo area not under ’s control, and, third, threatened air strikes 
against  any heavy weaponry not  removed or  placed under   
control within ten days.476 Serbian forces eventually complied with the 
ultimatum.  On  February  ,  ,   saw  its  first-ever  combat 
action.477 Allied planes shot down four of six planes violating the  no-
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c930802a.htm.
474 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 22–23.
475 Fiona Watson and Robert Ware, Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum, House 
of Commons Research Paper 94/33 (London, 1994), 1.
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477 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 26.
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fly zone and dropping bombs in the area of Banja Luka, Bosnia’s second 
city.478 This historic event notwithstanding, the importance of the no-fly 
zone remained limited given that combat action was mainly conducted by 
ground forces. Continuing the well-established pattern of  support-
ing and enforcing United Nations efforts,   bombings in  and 
the first half of  thus focused mainly on preventing or rolling back 
the movement of Serbian heavy artillery into the vicinity of -declared 
safe areas.479 For example, after Bosnian Serbs launched an offensive on 
the safe area of Goražde, the  on April , , authorized airstrikes 
if Serbian forces did not withdraw immediately. Further, the  issued 
an ultimatum for the withdrawal of all  heavy weapons from within a 
 km radius around Goražde by April .
Underpinning this  increased role  for   was the growing insight  in 
Washington that military action was necessary to flank the administra-
tion’s diplomacy and sanctions efforts. On the day of the ’s decision, 
President  Clinton  highlighted  the  alliance’s  “resolve,” saying  “ is 
now set to act” on its threats of air strikes.480 He added the United States 
“and the international community cannot and will not stand idly by in 
the face of a conflict that affects our interests, offends our consciences, 
and disrupts the peace.”481 This notwithstanding, Clinton maintained his 
previous position that the conflict would have to be resolved by the par-
ties  on  the  ground,  and  that  the  United  States  would  only  become 
478 United Nations Department of Public Information, “United Nations Protection 
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involved “proportionate to [its] interests, no more and no less.”482 To this 
end, the United States increased its  military commitment by deploying 
assets in support of the February   decision, and its political commit-
ment by pledging to become more actively involved in the Geneva negoti-
ations.483 ’s  transition to a  more active, enforcing role  thus  went 
hand in hand with an expanded U.S. role, marking a “turning point” for 
both.484 
However,  airstrikes remained linked to the  , leaving little room 
for an independent role for the alliance. This caused considerable prob-
lems, with  the  United  States  pushing  for  the  expansion  of  air  strikes 
against the objections of its European allies throughout . Effectively, 
the U.S. position continued to focus on a lift-and-strike approach, despite 
Secretary Christopher’s unsuccessful pitch of the plan to the Europeans in 
the spring of . Meanwhile, the fighting in Bosnia continued after the 
Serbs refused to accept without caveats an agreement brokered by the 
Contact Group in July of .485 The Clinton administration faced an 
arduous choice between upping military pressure on the Serbs through 
(unilateral)  air  strikes  and  maintaining  unity  with  the  alliance  given 
staunch European opposition to increased air strikes. The administration 
itself was divided on which course to pursue throughout most of   
and  , with  Secretary  of  State  Christopher  and  National  Security 
Advisor Lake calling for air strikes and  Ambassador Albright support-
ing the introduction of U.S. ground troops.486 
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483 Watson and Ware, Bosnia, the UN and the NATO Ultimatum, 3, 18.
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Intra-alliance relations reached a nadir as Bosnian Serbs attacked Bihać, a 
 safe area, in November , and when overall  attacks picked up 
again and intensified in the spring of . During the  Bihać offensive, 
 airstrikes were being called in with increasing frequency.487 They 
included two large  operations  against  an  airfield  and missile  batteries 
held by Bosnian Serbs in late November. In the aftermath, the Clinton 
administration again argued for expanding air strikes, while London and 
Paris  threatened  to  pull  out  their  troops  should  air  strikes  proceed. 
Daalder identified this fallout as “on par” with the  Suez crisis, lead-
ing the Clinton administration to back down.488 In the meantime, Clin-
ton’s opposition to the arms embargo further hurt transatlantic relations. 
Under intense congressional pressure, Clinton had earlier in  unsuc-
cessfully  tried  to  get  the  Security  Council  to  drop  the  embargo.  On 
November  ,  Clinton  announced  the  United  States  would  no  longer 
enforce the arms embargo over resumed Serbian aggression.489 In con-
trast,  the    on  November  ,  ,  upheld  its  support  for  the 
embargo.490 The Clinton administration afterwards announced it would 
no  longer  share  information  pertaining  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
embargo  with  its  allies,491 resulting  in  what  The  Economist  called  a 
487 United Nations Department of Public Information, “United Nations Protection 
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“bombshell” and the “first formal parting of the ways.”492 Tensions con-
tinued and were further accentuated when Serb forces  shelled   safe 
areas  and  took  close  to  four  hundred  predominantly  European 
 peacekeepers  hostage  after    had  struck  Serbian  arms 
depots in late May .493 This included using the captured peacekeep-
ers as ‘human shields,’ chaining them up in the vicinity of supposed  
targets. All hostages were eventually released in mid-June in an unofficial 
trade-off for   abandoning the -enforced heavy weapons 
exclusion zones established the year prior.494 The episode led to a lot of 
soul-searching in Europe and Canada, which also had seen several of its 
troops  kidnapped,  over  the  purpose  of   and  the  Balkans 
deployment. The UK and Canada were openly discussing pulling out their 
troops, and the French suggested either doubling down or getting out of 
the Balkans altogether.495
Maintaining allied unity was a key factor driving the Clinton administra-
tions decision to abandon its push for lift and strike altogether, as illus-
trated by a November , , memorandum from Tony Lake to the 
president which suggested focusing on rebuilding the United States’ rela-
tions with its allies.496 Likewise, Defense Secretary Bill Perry, recalling a 
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June   meeting, noted: “[…] , paralyzed into inaction, was 
shown to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. […] In sum, at 
that meeting, it appeared to me that  was in the process of unravel-
ing.”497
President  Clinton  was  similarly  troubled,  and  keeping  the  alliance 
together figured prominently in his thinking: “I also didn’t want to divide 
the  alliance by unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, espe-
cially since there were European, but no American, soldiers on the ground 
with the   Mission. And I didn’t want to send American troops there, 
putting them in harm’s way under a  mandate I thought was bound to 
fail.”498 The president was also coming under increasing Congressional 
pressure to chart an American course on Bosnia independent of the Euro-
peans. Indeed, Congress in July and August of  voted to unilaterally 
lift the arms embargo if   peacekeepers withdraw or the Bosnian gov-
ernment requests the embargo be lifted. This forced the president to use 
the second veto in his tenure.499 Congressional assertiveness was driven in 
parts by the massacre in Srebrenica in July of . Meanwhile, Serb 
forces in Bosnia were stretched thin in the wake of months of territorial 
gains,  causing  a  reversal  of  their  fortunes  in  western  Bosnia,  where 
Bosnian troops made significant advances in the summer of .
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’s role expanded again after  the meeting in London of interested 
parties on July , , called by British Prime Minister John Major. In 
the weeks preceding the emergency meeting, Bosnian Serbs had overrun 
Srebrenica and Zepa, two -mandated safe areas, and were now threat-
ening Goražde, a third safe area and the last predominantly Muslim area 
in eastern Bosnia.500 The allies decided to make a stand over  Goražde, 
threatening substantial airstrikes should Serbs advance on the city. As Sec-
retary Christopher recalls, “the meeting was a vital turning point […]: we 
finally committed to put some real muscle behind our rhetoric.”501 The 
meeting also decided that  air power should be used more offen-
sively and more proactively. To this end, it was decided that the double 
authorization  by  the   and    previously  required  for  airstrikes 
would be scrapped for the safe areas.  authorization would suffice in 
the future. 
The French, British, and Dutch had previously also upped the military 
stakes in the Balkans by dispatching a rapid reaction force of , in 
support  of  .502 ’s  Operation  Decisive  Force  of  August 
 entailed an intermittent series of bombings of Bosnian Serbs’ posi-
tions after they had shelled Sarajevo and continued with intermissions 
through most of September. 
Against  this  backdrop, in  particular  the still  very  real  prospect  of   
withdrawal by year’s end, the Clinton administration launched a diplo-
matic  effort  to  secure a  negotiated settlement  for  Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The  U.S.  concept  envisioned  a  %-%  split  of  territory  between 
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Bosnian Muslims and Serbs under the roof of a common federal Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Tony Lake pitched the idea to European capitals in mid-
August, and in stark contrast to Warren Christopher’s  lift-and-strike 
tour, reactions were positive throughout. Said Christopher of the Lake 
trip:  “Europe was finally ready to respond to unequivocal U.S. leader-
ship.”503
Combined with diplomatic pressure applied by the ‘Contact Group for 
Yugoslavia,’ the  air campaign and a Croat ground offensive into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. diplomatic offensive helped bring the Serbs 
to the negotiating table eventually. U.S. negotiators led by Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Europe Richard Holbrooke secured a ceasefire agreement 
on October .504 
6.3.4. Dayton, Paris, and Beyond
On December , , the parties formally signed the ‘General Frame-
work for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ the settlement better known 
as the Dayton Peace Agreement, in Paris.505 With U.S. guidance, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia had hammered out the agreement 
throughout November in tense negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base outside Dayton, Ohio. Under the terms of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment,  would deploy a ,-strong force to implement the agree-
ment.506 The deployment would hence be called Implementation Force 
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(). ’s mandate was to supervise the territorial division, and to 
keep the parties separate and to maintain the peace for one year after the 
signature of the Dayton accords.
The North Atlantic Council had voted to authorize military planning for 
 on December , , i.e. before the signature of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. All  allies with armed forces pledged to contribute to the 
mission, as  did  fourteen  non- states, including  aspirant  members 
such as the Baltic countries and the Visegrád-. With planning underway, 
the  gave the green light to  on December , , and deploy-
ment under Operation Joint Endeavor was to commence immediately.507 
 formally handed over responsibilities to  on December 
, placing all    and non- assets under the authority of  
Commander Admiral Leighton Smith. By mid-February, the alliance had 
completed the deployment of around ,  and non- troops 
to Bosnia. Of these troops, the United States provided ,—that is 
about a third of all  troops.508 
Whilst  proved relatively successful in the year of its existence, it was 
clear  to  all  in  late   that  maintaining  the  peace  in  Bosnia  would 
require a continued international presence. To this end,  under a  
mandate launched the Stabilization Force () to succeed .  
was to maintain a military presence—at initially  , just over half 
that of —in Bosnia for an initial period of   months after ’s 
expiration on December  , .509 In  the end,  ’s mandate was 
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renewed continually, and it stayed in Bosnia for eight years before being 
replaced with a civilian-focused  mission in .
6.4. The - Kosovo Crisis and ’s First War
While the international force led by  managed to secure the peace in 
Bosnia  after  the  Dayton  accords,  all  was  not  well  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia in the second half of the  s. Several sources of potential 
instability  remained  besides  the  region’s  religious  divides:  the  Dayton 
Peace  Agreement  could have  collapsed, a  sizeable  Hungarian  minority 
lived uneasily in Serbia, Montenegrins became increasingly alienated with 
Serbia, and Serbian forces for several years after Dayton remained in the 
Eastern Slavonia enclave in Croatia.510
Trouble eventually erupted in Kosovo, a region of Serbia predominantly 
inhabited by ethnic Albanians. Tensions there had been rife for the better 
part  of  a  decade  after  the  region  lost  its  autonomy rights  within  the 
Socialist  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  in  the    consitutional 
reforms, stripping it of rights it had enjoyed since the mid-s. Indeed, 
the Bush administration was concerned enough over the possibility of an 
intervention in Kosovo by the Yugoslav central government that the out-
going administration threatened military action. In his   ‘Christmas 
Warning’  letter,  President  Bush  warned  Serbian  President  Slobodan 
Milošević that the United States “would employ military force against the 
Serbs  in  Kosovo  and  in  Serbia  proper” should  its  forces  move  on 
Kosovo.511 Bush’s statement was likely motivated by a desire to prevent 
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the conflict in the Bosnia from spreading farther south—and towards U.S. 
 allies Greece and Turkey.512 In subsequent years, the threat of the 
Bosnian war spreading south was contained, e.g. through the deployment 
of a small contingent of U.S. troops to Macedonia as a tripwire force.513 
Accordingly, the Dayton Agreement contained no provisions concerning 
Kosovo.
The international community only concerned itself with Kosovo when the 
situation  there  deteriorated  dramatically  in  the  spring  of  .  The 
Kosovo Liberation  Army ()514 and government  forces  clashed with 
increasing frequency, and first reports of grave human rights violations 
emerged. Meanwhile, Kosovo’s moderate leader Ibrahim Rugova sought 
to negotiate the restitution of Kosovar autonomy within Serbia. However, 
the tide of popular support was turning away from Rugova toward the 
 as tensions with Serbia mounted. Drenica, the  ’s stronghold in 
western Kosovo, was the site of the first assault by Serbian police forces 
on alleged   operatives. Several dozen died in the attack, which also 
caused over , inhabitants of Drenica Valley to flee their homes.515 
With  Albania  in  the  throes  of  political  turmoil  itself  and  Albanians 
28, 1992, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/28/world/bush-warns-serbs-
not-to-widen-war.html.
512 Gompert, “The United States and Yugoslavia’s Wars,” 137.
513 R. Cody Phillipps, Operation Joint Guardian: The U.S. Army in Kosovo 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), 10–11; New York 
TImes, “300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia To Try to Contain Balkan War,” July 13, 
1993, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/13/world/300-us-troops-in-
macedonia-to-try-to-contain-balkan-war.html.
514 Or Ushtria Çlimitare e Kosovës (UCK). The group carried out its first attacks 
against Serbs in Kosovo in April 1996—less than half a year after the signature of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. See Misha Glenny, The Balkans. Nationalism, War, 
and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Penguin, 2000), 652–53.
515 R. Jeffrey Smith, “At Least 46 Albanians Killed in Kosovo Fighting,” Washington 
Post, March 10, 1998; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Eerie Quiet Follows Assault in Kosovo,” 
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accounting for about a quarter of the population of neighboring Mon-
tenegro, the specter of war returned to the Balkans. 
Given similarities to the situation in Bosnia before the outbreak of war 
there, the international community took notice and acted quickly. Already 
in December , the  called for dialogue and political solution to 
the mounting ethnic tensions in Kosovo, noting the alliance’s interest in 
maintaining stability.516 On March , , the Contact Group recon-
vened, having adopted a statement similar to that of the  in Septem-
ber . Originally established in May  during the Bosnian War, 
the group brought together France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Their statement issued on March  con-
demned actions by both Serbian forces and the , called for the with-
drawal of Serbian special police forces within ten days, and raised the 
possibility of imposing economic sanctions and an arms embargo against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ().517 Further, the statement called 
for  a United Nations  High Commissioner for Human Rights  () 
and an  mission to Kosovo. Given Italian and Russian reticence, the 
meeting failed to commit to a timeline for imposing sanctions or indeed 
committing to do so.518 Nevertheless, the increased western pressure did 
lead to Milošević withdrawing forces from Kosovo.
Having remained largely indifferent to events in Kosovo until then, the 
 Security Council on March , , passed resolution  at the 
516 “Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 16 December 1997,” December 16, 1997, para. 
17, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-155e.htm.
517 Contact Group, “Statement on Kosovo Adopted at the Contact Group Meeting in 
London, 9 March 1998,” March 9, 1998, 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/travels/980309_kosovo.html.
518 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia, MS: 
University of Missouri Press, 2010), 172.
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initiative of the Contact Group.519 The resolution provided for an arms 
embargo against Yugoslavia to include Kosovo, and called for a political 
process with the goal of maintaining the ’s integrity.520 However, reso-
lution  did not provide for any mechanism to monitor or to enforce 
the resolution  beyond requiring monthly  reports  by the   Secretary-
General on its implementation. Lacking enforcement, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan reported that the embargo was not being observed, based on 
information gleaned from the .521
 military planning began in April and June of , focusing both 
on peacekeeping operations  after  a  successful  settlement  and offensive 
military  operations.522 Ground  troops  were  swiftly  ruled  out,  with 
airstrikes emerging as the prefered option.523 With no diplomatic solution 
in sight, the specter of an even worse humanitarian disaster hung over 
Kosovo in the summer and fall of . The onset of winter would have 
spelled  certain  death  for  the  hundreds  of  thousands  displaced  within 
Kosovo  and  to  neighboring  Albania  and  Montenegro, and  large-scale 
fighting continued. The  summer offensive of  killed an estimated 
,  and  displaced  around  ,.524 Against  this  backdrop,  
conducted  a  series  of  air, land, and  naval  exercises  in  the  regions  to 
519 UN Security Council, Resolution 1160 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at 
Its 3868th Meeting, on 31 March 1998, 1998, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf.
520 Ibid., paras. 8, 5.
521 See e.g. Kofi Annan, “Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to 
Resolution 1160 (1998) of the Security Council (S/1998/470),” June 4, 1998, 
http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/1998/u980604a.htm.
522 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, 32–34.
523 Bruce Nardulli et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 14.
524 Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo,” Survival 41, no. 3 
(1999): 112.
149
demonstrate its resolve and readiness to react to any contingency there.525 
To increase the pressure on Milošević,  Secretary-General Solana on 
August  made public that the alliance had initiated contingency plan-
ning for military in Yugoslavia: “[…] [T]he Council today reviewed mili-
tary planning for a full range of options to bring an end to violence and 
to create the conditions for negotiations. These include the use of ground 
and air power and in particular a full-range of options for the use of air 
power alone.”526 The  Security Council in September passed resolution 
, demanding under Chapter VII “that all parties, groups and individ-
uals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo” and 
determining the situation posed a threat to peace and security.527
The Clinton administration meanwhile pursued a two-track strategy of 
combined diplomatic and military pressure on the  to secure an agree-
ment before the onset of winter. In May, the administration dispatched 
newly designated U.S. Permanent Representative to the  Richard Hol-
brooke  to  Yugoslavia  after  imposing  additional  economic  sanctions 
against the .528 Holbrooke succeeded in bringing the Albanian and Ser-
525 Operation Determined Falcon, an overflight of Albania and Macedonia by 80 
planes drawn from 13 of the allies’ air forces, took place on June 15, 1998. Allied 
Joint Forces Command Naples, “The Crisis In Kosovo,” accessed June 30, 2016, 
https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/15-the-crisis-in-kosovo; Steven R. 
Bowman, “Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations,” CRS 
Report for Congress, July 8, 2003, 1.
526 Javier Solana, “Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, 12 August 1998,” 
August 12, 1998, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-094e.htm.
527 UN Security Council, Resolution 1199 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at 
Its 3930th Meeting, on 23 September 1998, 1998, para. 1, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199(1998). 
Controversially, NATO SYG Solana on October 10, 1998, claimed that this 
resolution gave NATO legal authority for military action in Yugoslavia. 
528 Philip Shenon, “U.S. Dispatches Its Balkans Mediator With a Warning to the Serbs,” 
New York Times, May 9, 1998, sec. World, 
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a-warning-to-the-serbs.html.
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bian side to meet after offering significant incentives to both.529 The meet-
ings included first-ever talks between moderate Albanian leader Rugova 
and Milošević, and between  and  representatives in Switzerland in 
June. “The combined threat of the use of force and diplomacy is the best 
way of proceeding,”530 Secretary Albright said after briefing U.S. Senators 
with Secretary of Defense Cohen on October , defending the administra-
tion’s policy. She added “ is now prepared to act.”531 Cohen similarly 
stressed there is a “credible military threat” against  Milošević.532 Indeed, 
the alliance had begun contingency planning for military action after a 
decision of the defense ministers in June, and conducted air exercises over 
Albania and Macedonia that month.533 U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen 
welcomed the decisions, noting that the situation in Kosovo “threatens 
stability in the whole region”534 and expressed his preference for a diplo-
matic  solution.  However,  Cohen  also  welcomed  the  envisioned   
exercises and initial planning for a  intervention aimed at “halting 
or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion 
529 Steven Erlanger, “Allies Upset as U.S. Eases Stance on Kosovo,” New York Times, 
May 28, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/28/world/allies-upset-
as-us-eases-stance-on-kosovo.html; Steven Erlanger, “First Bosnia, Now Kosovo,” 
New York Times, June 10, 1998, sec. World, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/10/world/first-bosnia-now-kosovo.html.
530 Cited in Helen Dewar and John M. Goshko, “Hill Signals Support for Airstrikes,” 
Washington Post, October 2, 1998, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/10/02/hill-signals-support-
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October 1, 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/01/kosovo.02/.
532 Ibid.
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Defence Ministers Session,” June 12, 1998, para. 4, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-077e.htm; Craig R. Whitney, “NATO to 
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in Kosovo.”535 The United States also pushed for the alliance to issue an 
Activation Warning (), which  defense ministers approved 
during their informal September -, , meeting in Vilamoura, Por-
tugal.536 The  first  in  ’s  multi-step  mobilization  procedure,  an 
 allows the    to ask allies to identify forces they would 
contribute to operations. Any pledges at this stage are politically but not 
legally binding.537 The  issued at Vilamoura was specifically for 
“a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo.”538
On October  , the  Clinton  administration  again  dispatched  seasoned 
negotiator  Richard  Holbrooke  to  lead  negotiations  with  the  . The 
main goal was to secure agreement on an international mission to moni-
tor a troop withdrawal from Kosovo.539 At the time, the  had—in par-
tial compliance with  Security Council resolutions—withdrawn about 
% of its special forces and troops from Kosovo.540 The U.S. diplomatic 
initiative flanked the increasing military pressure applied by  at U.S. 
prodding. On October , Secretary-General Solana concluded in a letter 
to  permanent representatives “that the Allies believe that in the par-
ticular circumstances […] there are legitimate grounds for the Alliance to 
threaten, and if necessary, to use force.”541 Further, Solana said publicly 
535 Ibid.
536 Javier Solana, “Statement by the Secretary General Following the ACTWARN 
Decision,” September 24, 1998, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm.
537 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 135–36.
538 Solana, “Statement by the Secretary General Following the ACTWARN Decision.”
539 Jane Perlez, “NATO Raises Its Pressure On the Serbs,” New York Times, October 
12, 1998, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/12/world/nato-raises-its-
pressure-on-the-serbs.html.
540 Steven Erlanger, “NATO Plans to Intensify Its Pressure on Milosevic in Stages,” 
New York Times, October 9, 1998, sec. World, 
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on October  there was “a sufficient legal basis” for threatening and 
using force.542 Solana thus floated the possibility of military action against 
the  without further  resolutions, thereby paving the way for allied 
action circumventing Russian objections. Based on the probably flawed 
belief in the initial efficacy of the threat of airstrikes in Bosnia,543 the  
on October , , issued an Activation Order () for airstrikes 
against Serbian forces. This  moved the alliance a step further towards 
actual  military  action:544 The  alliance  had  for  the  first  time  formally 
threatened airstrikes within a possible -hours timeline.545 U.S. officials 
backed up ’s threat of force, which the Clinton administration had 
pushed for over weeks.546 Analogies drawn to the successful threat of air 
strikes in Bosnia underlay this approach. Most prominently, U.S. Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright had publicly threatened the use of force 
repeatedly, hoping to pressure  Milošević into an agreement.547 On Octo-
ber , National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized “that  is 
European Journal of International Law 10 (1999): 7.
542 Quoted in Kaufman, NATO and the Former Yugoslavia, 163.
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ready to act” in a “complete  air campaign.”548 Berger had earlier 
stated: “The ball is in Mr.  Milošević’s court. He can come into compli-
ance, or he can face  military action.”549 However, Berger expressly 
ruled out committing U.S. ground troops.
Diplomatic and military pressure payed off when Holbrooke secured two 
agreements with the ’s  Milošević on October , one with the , 
one with .550 The October agreements provided for the withdrawal 
or garrisoning of  troops in Kosovo, a , strong unarmed   
monitoring mission on the ground (Kosovo Verification Mission, ), a 
 air reconnaissance mission (Operation Eagle Eye) with the implicit 
threat of airstrikes in case of noncompliance, and a political process on 
Kosovo’s autonomy.551 The  Security Council welcomed the agreements 
and urged the  to implement them in an October , , resolu-
tion.552
Despite this, the  intensified its policy of “ethnic cleansing” through-
out the fall and winter of /. The massacre in Račak, a hamlet in 
548 Quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith and George Lardner, “Accord on Kosovo Remains 
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Province,” Washington Post, October 12, 1998.
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New York Times, October 15, 1998, sec. World, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/15/world/2000-monitors-to-go-to-kosovo-but-
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central Kosovo, in mid-January became the symbol for the failure of the 
October agreements.553 After days of shelling, Serb units entered the vil-
lage, executing  Kosovar Albanians. An American diplomat serving on 
the ’s  who visited Račak within hours of the massacre described 
his “personal revulsion” at this “unspeakable atrocity,” calling it “a mas-
sacre, a crime against humanity.”554
Events in Račak compelled the international community towards further 
action, underlined  that  the  October  agreements  had  fallen  apart, and 
helped proponents of increased military pressure win the upper hand in 
the Clinton administration. In short, Račak became a turning point in the 
international  reaction  to  the  unfolding  events  in  Kosovo.  Račak also 
seemed to help the United States and Russia bridge their differences, with 
the two countries’ foreign ministers releasing a joint statement on January 
. In it, Albright and Igor Ivanov “reiterate their indignation at the mas-
sacre of Kosovar Albanian at  Račak, which cannot be justified”555 and 
called  for  a  full  investigation.556 On  January  ,  the  Contact  Group 
agreed in London to “summon” the parties for negotiations in Rambouil-
let outside Paris beginning on February . Within one week, the parties 
were to negotiate based on a peace plan proffered by the Contact Group. 
The Contact Group foreign ministers further reiterated their established 
demands that the  comply with   resolutions and cease offensive 
553 David L. Phillips and Nicholas Burns, Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and 
U. S. Intervention (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 98–99.
554 R. Jeffrey Smith, “This Time, Walker Wasn’t Speechless,” Washington Post, January 
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actions against Kosovo.557 The previous day,  Secretary-General Annan 
had  visited    headquarters,  where    Secretary-General  Solana 
stated  the  alliance’s  support  for  the  Contact  Group  initiative  to  be 
announced the following day. The Contact Group’s decisions, Solana said, 
would “be fully backed by ’s military capabilities. We are ready to 
act,  if  necessary.”558 Likewise,  Annan  tacitly  floated  the  possibility  of 
using force against the . In remarks to the , Annan acknowledged 
“the need to use force, when all other means have failed” and added: “We 
may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia.”559 A 
January  decision by the North Atlantic Council echoed these points, 
expressing support for the Contact Group and noting that the alliance 
“stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by 
both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international commu-
nity, and observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions […].”560 
Importantly, the allies further shortened the timeline for military action 
by placing the decision on the use of force solely in the hands of  
Wesley Clark: “The Council has therefore agreed today that the  
Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on  terri-
tory”561 if the parties fail to respect an immediate ceasefire, agree on a 
peace agreement at Rambouillet by February , and do not comply with 
the October  agreements.
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While negotiations in Rambouillet went ahead, guarded allied optimism 
based on the hope for a second Dayton soon proved to be misplaced. The 
  only  sent  low-level  delegates  to  the  talks,562 which,  after  being 
extended twice, were suspended on February . Indeed, Daalder and 
O’Hanlon describe the Rambouillet negotiations as a U.S. effort to satisfy 
European demands for diplomacy despite low odds for success. The likely 
failure of talks would then strengthen the case for military action both 
within the Clinton administration and vis-à-vis European allies.563 When 
negotiations eventually resumed in March, Albanian Kosovars were, after 
securing significant concessions, prepared to sign an agreement, whereas 
the  delegates objected to the deployment of a -led peacekeeping 
force. Meanwhile, the  was massing troops at  the Kosovar  border 
while  the  Rambouillet  talks  collapsed  within  days  after  resuming  on 
March . Serb forces intensified their operations in Kosovo immediately, 
displacing an additional , ethnic Albanians over the weekend of 
March  alone as the  mission pulled out.564
For a last time, the United States tried to secure a diplomatic solution by 
dispatching  its  star  negotiator  Richard  Holbrooke  to  the    on 
March  to impress on Milošević that the  would face a crushing air 
campaign if it did not agree to an immediate ceasefire. Concurrently, Pres-
ident Clinton weighed in publicly when talks broke down and on the day 
of Holbrooke’s trip. “In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation 
is  a  license  to  kill.  But  action  and  resolve  can  stop  armies  and  save 
562 Kaplan, NATO and the UN, 178.
563 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, 88–89.
564 Jane Perlez, “NATO Authorizes Bomb Strikes; Primakov, in Air, Skips U.s. Visit,” 
New York Times, March 24, 1999, sec. World, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/24/world/conflict-balkans-overview-nato-
authorizes-bomb-strikes-primakov-air-skips-us.html.
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lives,”565 Clinton explained on March , adding: “I think that the thresh-
old [for military action, DJR] has been crossed.”566 While Holbrooke was 
in Belgrade, Clinton reemphasized his point on March : “If President 
Milošević continues  to  choose  aggression  over  peace,  ’s  military 
plans must continue to move forward.”567
But the last-ditch diplomatic effort failed. Holbrooke returned to Wash-
ington empty-handed after briefing  Secretary-General Solana on the 
outcome of his meeting with Milošević. On March , Solana instructed 
 Clark to launch Operation Allied Force,568 what was to become a 
-day air campaign against Yugoslavia that commenced on March .569
As  launched its air campaign against the , more than , civil-
ians  had  perished  in  the  previous  twelve  months  and  an  estimated 
,  been  displaced  within  Kosovo  and  throughout  the  region.570 
Yugoslavia intensified its attacks on Albanian guerillas and its policy of 
“ethnic cleansing” when airstrikes began, causing a steep increase in the 
number of casualties and displaced persons. A December  report by 
the U.S. Department of State found that by the end of the Kosovo war in 
565 William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference. March 19, 1999,” in Book 
1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999, ed. Office of the Federal 
Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Publishing Office, 2000), 410.
566 Ibid., 414.
567 William J. Clinton, “Remarks on the Situation in Kosovo. March 22, 1999,” in 
Book 1. Presidential Documents - January 1 to June 31, 1999, ed. Office of the 
Federal Register, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2000), 427.
568 Javier Solana, “Press Statement. 23 March 1999,” March 23, 1999, 
http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm.
569 Javier Solana, “Press Statement Following the Commencement of Air Operations. 
24 March 1999,” March 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
041e.htm.
570 Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, “Kosovo and U.S. Policy,” CRS Issue Brief for 
Congress, January 10, 2001, 2; Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over 
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June,  ,  Kosovars  had  been  killed  and  .  million—or  %  of 
Kosovo’s  population—displaced.571 
U.S. military capabilities were once more key to Operation Allied Force. 
The United States supplied two-thirds of the aircraft involved in the oper-
ation ( of the roughly ,). Of these ,,  were capable of 
offensive action. The United States provided , or about % of all 
attack aircraft.572 Of the , sorties  under Operation Allied Force, 
U.S. planes flew %, dominating in particular intelligence and recon-
naissance sorties (% of which were conducted by U.S. planes). The fig-
ure for actual strike sorties  are more balanced, with the United States 
conducting % of the , strike sorties.573
On June ,  Milošević accepted a G- peace proposal presented by EU 
envoy Martti  Ahtisaari  and Russia’s  Viktor  Chernomyrdin, paving the 
way for the signature of a military technical agreement at Macedonia’s 
Kumanovo air base on June .574 The agreement provided for the phased 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo by June  and placed the 
province under international control. The following day,  suspended 
its  air  campaign as the   Security  Council  adopted resolution , 
which endorsed the peace agreement and “an international security pres-
ence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation” 
571 U.S. Department of State, “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting,” December 
1999, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html. 
NATO figures are similar, listing one million refugees and half a million internally 
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Support to the Victims of the Kosovo Crisis,” NATO Review 47, no. 2 (1999): 9–13; 
Lois B. McHugh and Joyce Vialet, “Kosovo: Refugee Assistance and Temporary 
Resettlement,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, September 1, 1999.
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573 Ibid., 4–5.
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to secure the peace.575 Thus ended the -day campaign involving, at its 
peak, over  airplanes from  countries flying over , sorties out 
of    locations.576 As  in  Bosnia, a  -led  deployment  followed the 
peace deal:  On June , the Kosovo Force () began moving into 
Kosovo.
6.5. The  Strategic Concept
As the alliance fought its first war over Kosovo, the lag between what 
 was and had been doing—stabilizing a peripheral zone outside its 
traditional area of operations—and what its central strategic documents 
envisioned became increasingly clear. Indeed, the alliance had identified 
new, non-traditional challenges to security as early as the late s and 
in its  Strategic Concept.577 Since the mid s and clearly with the 
deployment of  and , the alliance’s primary focus had been on 
stabilizing the Balkans.578 Whilst the  Strategic Concept was touted 
as a wholly new concept for a new world, its successor proved to be more 
moderate  in  its  ambitions.579 Allied  leaders  at  their    summit  in 
Madrid tasked the  with reviewing the strategic concept, and the  
availed itself of the opportunity for “examination, and, updating as neces-
sary” of the strategic concept.580 In particular, two issues were front and 
575 UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at 
Its 4011th Meeting, on 10 June 1999, 1999, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf, annex 2, para. 4.
576 Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, “Operation Allied Force,” accessed July 20, 
2016, https://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/page6322744/16-operation-allied-force-.
577 Deni, Alliance Management and Maintenance, 56.
578 Ivo H. Daalder, “The United States and Europe. From Primacy to Partnership?,” in 
Eagle Rules? Foreign Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century, ed. 
Robert J. Lieber (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 77.
579 Rynning, NATO Renewed, 78.
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International Power and Domestic Interests,” Security Studies 11, no. 2 (2001): 78.
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center  in  the  intra-alliance  debate:  Whether  and how far  ’s  geo-
graphical scope should expand, and whether Kosovo was a model for 
future operations, in particular with regard to the absence of a  autho-
rization.581 True to this conservative approach, ’s tasks set out in the 
 strategic document largely echo those in its predecessor. The excep-
tion  is  the  addition  to  ’s  “fundamental  security  tasks” of  “crisis 
management” and extending the alliance’s partnerships. These two tasks 
aim at enhancing “the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.”582 
The inclusion of crisis management, while undoubtedly an apt description 
of the alliance’s most visible undertakings in the s, marked a break 
with established conceptions of ’s functions.583 In fact, the previous 
strategic document, while noting manifold new challenges, had expressly 
ruled out the use of force “except in self-defence.”584
Notably, the new strategic concept contained no limitations on the geo-
graphical remit of the alliance’s missions. This was the compromise struck 
between the Clinton administration, which during the deliberations had 
strongly pushed for a broad purview for , and the European allies, 
which sought to place limitations on ’s geographical responsibili-
ties.585 In particular since the summer of , Albright’s State Depart-
581 Ted Galen Carpenter, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or 
Conceptual Muddle?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 23, no. 3 (2000): 7–28.
582 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government 
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.,” 
April 24, 1999, para. 10, 
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International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010): 491.
584 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” para. 35; 
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585 Carpenter, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Coherent Blueprint or Conceptual 
Muddle?,” 11–12, 14; William Drozdiak, “European Allies Balk at Expanded Role 
for NATO,” Washington Post, February 22, 1998, 
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ment had pushed for the idea of significantly expanding the possibilities  
for    out-of-area  missions.586 This  complemented  the  U.S.-driven 
expansion of the “in area” of  that occurred with the  and  
rounds of enlargement. Said President Clinton in Berlin in May : 
“Yesterday’s  guarded our borders against direct military invasion. 
Tomorrow’s  alliance  must  continue  to  defend  enlarged  borders  and 
defend against threats to our security from beyond them: the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, regional conflict.”587 Cog-
nizant of allied concerns, Secretary of State Albright in  downplayed 
the U.S. vision for what  can and should do, rejecting the notion 
that the Clinton administration was trying “to create some kind of new 
‘global .’”588 Rather, Albright explained, her goal was overcoming 
“any lingering sense of complacency caused by the Cold War’s end”589 
and “using the flexibility the [North Atlantic, DJR] Treaty always offered 
to  adapt  this  Alliance  to  the  realities  of  a  new strategic  environment 
[…].”590 She dismissed concerns that this would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the alliance as “hogwash.”591 
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6.6. Summary
Taken together, a mixed picture of U.S. policy towards  emerges in 
the Bosnia War, the Kosovo intervention, and the concomitant debate on 
expanding the alliance’s geographical reach. Whereas the United States 
was reluctant to become involved in the wars immediately resulting out 
of  the  break-up  of  Yugoslavia,  the  Clinton  administration  was  more 
forceful in committing the United States to action in Kosovo early on. 
Whilst U.S. leadership proved critical in the eventual resolution of both 
conflicts,  the  United  States  was  certainly  more  forward-leaning  on 
Kosovo, and successfully kept the European allies on board. In the revi-
sion of  strategy, the Clinton administration was less successful in 
pushing through the U.S. vision of an alliance with a scope going beyond 
Europe and its periphery. While this was not formally enshrined in the 
 strategic concept, dropping the formerly prominent statements on 
geographical limitations of the alliance did open up room for debate. The 
United States thus managed to introduce an element of ambiguity into the 
alliance’s self conception, paving the way for operations unthinkable a 
decade earlier, e.g. in Afghanistan and Libya in the s as well as for a 
discussion of membership—remote as it may be—for countries such as 
Georgia.
Initially, the United States was unable to secure allied support for its pref-
ered policy of lift-and-strike, under which the arm embargo against the 
territory of Yugoslavia would have been lifted and air strikes against the 
rump Yugoslavia conducted. As outlined above, the European opposition 
to  the  incoming  Clinton  administration’s  plans  gravitated  around  the 
safety of the—predominantly European— peacekeepers on the ground 
in the Balkans. Whilst the United States could have acted unilaterally, this 
would have severely strained relations with “the  Allies, principally 
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Britain and France,”592 as a contemporary U.S. intelligence report notes. 
Considerations  for  alliance  cohesion  were  prominent  in  the  Clinton 
administration, as was the notion that  should remain the premier 
security institution in the face of competing European schemes. Therefore, 
a public rift in the alliance had to be avoided to maintain an image of 
unity. Further, a role for  in the Balkans had to be carved out—
standing by idly would have been hard to reconcile with the vision of 
’s enduring importance outlined by U.S. officials.593 Thus, considera-
tion for allies did initially preclude the United States from pursuing its 
preferred policy options in the Balkans. As the crisis deepened and Euro-
pean initiatives outside  faltered, however, the transatlantic alliance 
once more became a natural recourse for addressing the deteriorating sit-
uation in the Balkans. In the end, it was a  intervention with pre-
dominantly U.S. contributions that secured the Dayton agreement. The 
Bosnian crisis further does not corroborate entanglement theory’s main 
prediction that the alliance drew the United States into unwanted conflict. 
Rather, the U.S. government pushed for a strong  role in responding 
to the breakup of Yugoslavia and eventually succeeded in securing it over 
the initial European opposition.
The lead-up to the  intervention in Kosovo followed a similar pat-
tern, albeit with important differences. Again, it is hard to see any evi-
dence for the predictions made by entanglement theory. As in the Bosnian 
case, the United States from the outset envisioned an international inter-
592 “Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia. National Intelligence 
Council Memorandum,” May 13, 1994, 9, 
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vention under ’s auspices. In contrast to Bosnia, there was no period 
in which U.S. efforts took a backseat to European efforts. Apparently, one 
of the lessons learned in European capitals in the aftermath of Bosnia was 
the importance of  and thus American involvement. This view was 
buttressed by the haphazard progress on European defense and security 
cooperation in the s. 
The Balkans episodes also illustrate how the United States has used  
for enshrining U.S. leadership and hierarchy in a unipolar system. Not 
least,  provides the United States and the allies with a forum for con-
sultation. In this,  served as a two-way street—both for the United 
States to influence its partners, and for them to make their voices heard 
and enjoy privileged access to the hegemon. Compared to the issue of 
 expansion, intra-alliance coordination in  formal  channels  played 
less of a role in the case of the alliance’s Balkans operation. Instead, the 
U.S. government repeatedly resorted to consultations outside established 
channels to advocate its positions, as illustrated e.g. by Warren Christo-
pher’s  and Tony Lake’s  tours  of European capitals  advocating a more 
aggressive policy towards the . Vice versa, coordination outside  
was paramount for the Europeans until the alliance committed to a more 
robust role in the Balkans in /. 
From an American perspective, the Clinton administration succeeded not 
only in securing its goal of a premier role for  in the post-Cold-War 
security sphere. The administration also managed to do so while keeping 
costs to the United States at an acceptable level. Against the backdrop of 
the Cold  War, any U.S. commitment  in  Europe was  bound to  appear 
minor, regardless of its actual size. However, the Bush and Clinton admin-
istrations both successfully avoided committing U.S. ground troops to the 
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Balkans in an enforcing role, leaving that task to a largely European—in 
particular French, British, Dutch, and Danish— mission. 
Nevertheless, the United States played a crucial role in applying military 
pressure on the FRY from the air. U.S. matériel made up for the bulk of 
aerial assets deployed by  both in support of the -mandated no-fly 
zone over the former Yugoslavia and in the  Kosovo air campaign. 
However, U.S. contributions were not outsized. In fact, the U.S. contrib-
uted disproportionately little to the campaigns in absolute terms, and U.S. 
assets only accounted for about half of all strike sorties. Meanwhile, U.S. 
assets were critical, in particular for allied intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The Clinton administration also successfully limited the 
U.S. contributions to the international missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo, respectively, despite the United States’ outsized role in secur-
ing the diplomatic settlements ending the war in Bosnia and the air cam-
paign against Serbia. 
Taken together, the United States has thus employed  as a cost-effec-
tive way of securing international support and of maintaining an interna-
tional system essentially beneficial to it. Pooling military capabilities and 
resources is evidently less important for the unipole, being by definition 
the  most  materially  powerful  international  actor. Yet  the  transatlantic 
alliance has served the separate, important functions of legitimizing the 
U.S.-led  international  order,  e.g.  by  serving  as  a  formal  consultation 
mechanism. In other words, , through a history of cooperation and 
the  constant  invocation  of  its  inherent  value, has  allowed  the  United 
States to shore up international support for its policies. Few instances 
illustrate this mechanism better than the U.S. preference for aerial combat 
against the  both over Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite initial European 
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resistance in the Bosnian case, the U.S. government eventually succeeded 
in convincing its European allies.
Pace entanglement theory, U.S. participation in combat action over Bosnia 
and Kosovo did not bog down the United States in open-ended commit-
ments there. Rather, the Clinton administration only introduced ground 
troops after a settlement had been reached in , and thereafter gradu-
ally extricated itself from  and  .594 In 6, the U.S. provided 
about 6,  troops to  , a number it swiftly cut in the following 
years.595 In similar fashion, the United States contributed to , provid-
ing the largest national contingent until the  handover to an  mis-
sion. However, the European countries always provided the majority of 
 troops. Further, the U.S. commitment was minor when considering 
e.g. population size—for example, in  only Canada and Turkey con-
tributed less than the United States when adjusted for population size.
In sum, freedom of action theory’s propositions are better borne out by 
record, with the United States avoiding significant costs through sidestep-
ping. It did so by not committing ground troops in the early, active phase 
of the conflicts, choosing instead to contribute aerial assets. These were 
considered as posing less of a risk of being drawn into the conflicts as 
well as offering lower odds of U.S. casualties. Further, U.S. contributions 
were disproportionately small in comparison to those of the European 
allies, both in numbers and in their participation in risky missions. While 
U.S. assets provided crucial capabilities in e.g. reconnaissance, Europeans 
carried a disproportionate share of strike sorties against enemy targets.
594 Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances. Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. 
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7. Conclusion: Whither Neorealism?
This  dissertation  set  out  with a twofold  research interest—empirically 
describing and analyzing U.S.  policy after the end of the Cold War, 
and theoretically inquiring what if  any contribution neorealism has to 
make to this topic. The following will review theoretical and empirical 
findings before drawing conclusions for the further development of neo-
realism.
At  the  outset, this  dissertation  presented  two ways  of  thinking  about 
costs imposed on the United States by . One, called entanglement 
theory,  suggests  that  because  the  United  States  is  any  ally,  it  will 
inevitably be drawn into conflicts it would not otherwise have entered. 
This approach highlights the dramatic costs of alliance membership for 
any  state,  including  the  hegemon.  The  second  approach,  freedom  of 
action  theory, instead  suggests  the  United  States  could, because  of  its 
power  advantage, successfully  extricate  itself  from such commitments, 
reducing costs and increasing benefits of alliance membership. Whilst nei-
ther approach offers a full-fledged theory, both focus on a common issue: 
How do alliances affect  the hegemon? This  directly  impacts  neorealist 
predictions about , which were uniformly gloomy in the early s. 
Most scholars in the realist tradition then forecast that the U.S. would 
abandon  and/or that the alliance would crumble. Instead, it  has 
flourished. However,  these  neorealist  predictions  are  premised  on  the 
notion  that    does  indeed  impose  restrictive  costs  on  the  United 
States. If it does not, if, in other words, costs and benefits are balanced as 
freedom of action theory would suggest,  membership is neutral or 
even positive for the hegemon. In this line of reasoning, the United States 
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power advantage would allow it to leverage  to its advantage by 
reducing costs and using it to influence allies.
7.1. On the Offensive-Defensive Schism
The theoretical section noted the split between offensive and defensive 
variants of structural realism. The two approaches differ significantly in 
terms  of  what  behavior  is  considered  optimal—tragically  striving  for 
global hegemony, or preserving one’s status relative to others. Vice versa, 
they differ in which state behavior is suboptimal and will, in a structural 
logic, be punished. The cases reviewed here remain ambiguous as far as 
offensive versus defensive expectations are concerned, notably because of 
the  inherent  vagueness  of  both  approaches’  predictions. Consider, for 
example, the enlargement of . A largely U.S.-driven process, offen-
sive realists would presumably argue that the inclusion of new members 
broadened the American sphere of influence. Thereby, additional coun-
tries are brought under overbearing U.S. influence. Moreover, offensive 
realists would expect ’s structures and dealing to become increas-
ingly hierarchical over time. Defensive realists in turn would point to the 
security vacuum that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, arguing that the 
need to forestall instability on the alliance’s perimeter drove its expan-
sion. 
The empirical evidence is not clear cut, as noted in the respective chap-
ters. Nevertheless,  the  evidence  on  the  whole  would  appear  to  point 
towards a status-quo driven U.S. policy, one that values stability while 
reducing  defense  burdens.  Whilst  the  issue  of  ’s  organizational 
reform has remained outside the scope of this dissertation, there appears 
to be little evidence of the United States striving to make the organization 
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more hierarchical to its benefit. Nevertheless, U.S. positions have usually 
won the day, making the offensive realist case for increasing hierarchy 
questionable to begin with. Of the instances here, consider for example 
the successful drive for  expansion and its decisive influence on the 
size and scope of the two rounds of enlargement reviewed here. However, 
the United States has also had to compromise of some issues, especially 
on the push for  a more global   with potential  members  such as 
Georgia. As outlined in the case study, U.S. suggestions of such an alliance 
were met with circumspection in Europe and appear to have been lan-
guishing since. Clearly, expanding  beyond its traditional geography 
is not a hot topic in European capitals.
Empirically, the cases reviewed in this dissertation presented mixed evi-
dence for offensive and defensive logics. However, the evidence is clear on 
the expectations of freedom of action and entanglement theory. In the 
period reviewed here, there was little if any evidence of the alliance entan-
gling the United States. Rather, the United States has successfully pre-
served its freedom of maneuver and indeed used the alliance towards its 
own goals as the hegemon. The crucial implication of this assessment is 
that it  narrows the gap between offensive and defensive realist predic-
tions for the U.S. role in  under unipolarity. If alliance membership 
comes with no strings attached, the unipole would be foolhardy to scrap 
the alliance. Offensive realists  would consider the institution a spring-
board for increasing and expanding a U.S.-led hierarchy. Defensive real-
ists  in  turn would emphasize the status-quo orientation of  the United 
States, under which there simply would not be an incentive to scrap an 
institution that is potentially useful for political support and capability 
aggregation as long as it imposes no significant costs. When looked at this 
way, ’s weakness may be its strength, and its persistence may have 
been overdetermined for realists.
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Regardless of which structural logic one subscribes to, it  is  states that 
heed or ignore structural pressures. While structural realists make predic-
tions about what constitutes optimal behavior, explaining why states do 
or do not heed the structural imperative has traditionally fallen outside 
the remit of realist works. This has begun to change over the past decade 
or so, which has seen a renewed interest in classical realist work, and a 
reintroduction of subsystemic variables into realist work. These scholars 
refer to themselves as neoclassical realists, highlighting their link to a rich 
realist tradition, from which structural realism and its parsimony consti-
tute an exception rather than a rule. Their research interest lies in the 
mechanisms by which structural incentives are transposed into unit-level 
policies. In  other  words:  Why do states  behave  optimally  or  subopti-
mally? Logically, any estimation of optimal behavior requires a bench-
mark  against  which  to  measure  state  behavior.  In  effect,  the  chasm 
between  offensive  and  defensive  realists  that  has  emerged  within  the 
strictly structuralist camp is bound to also divide neoclassical realists. To 
date, this has not occurred with the same ferocity as it has among struc-
turalists. This may have to do with the wholesale rejection of the neoclas-
sical approach by many of offensive realism’s prominent representatives. 
Nevertheless, the offensive-defensive schism is bound to emerge within 
neoclassical work, too.
Conceptually, this  dissertation  has  argued  that  by  virtue  of  being  the 
dominant actor in , the United States has been able to forego the 
negative effects of alliances predicted by entanglement theory. Rather, it 
has maintained its freedom of action, minimized costs imposed by the 
alliance,  and  successfully  pursued  national  interests.  The  case  of  the 
alliance’s  eastward enlargement illustrated a successful U.S. push for a 
certain policy, despite considerable allied opposition—initially to enlarge-
ment  itself,  later  the  small-group  approach  advocated  by  the  United 
171
States  for  the  first  round. In  the  case  of  the  Bosnia  intervention, the 
United States was initially less successful in their advocacy of a specific 
policy,  i.e.  lift-and-strike.  However,  here,  too,  the  alliance  eventually 
adopted a U.S.-supported strategy of escalating air strikes. The episode 
also illustrated the essential role played by the hegemon as an enabler of 
allied operations: U.S. assets were crucial for both the Bosnia and the 
Kosovo campaigns. Meanwhile, the United States managed to keep costs 
to itself low, for example by conducting a proportionately smaller share 
of strike sorties. Likewise, the United States restricted its contributions to 
the possibly expensive post-intervention stabilization mission, and gradu-
ally extricated itself from them.
The cases reviewed here also highlighted the importance of subsystemic 
variables  traditionally  ignored by neorealism. In particular, the role of 
individuals  and  the  influence  of  decision-making  procedures  played  a 
decisive role in shaping U.S. policy. Any explanation of U.S. foreign policy 
would be incomplete  without  taking into consideration the president’s 
views on the issue. Note for example the impact President Clinton’s meet-
ing with Eastern European leaders had on his stance on the issue of  
enlargement. Likewise, individuals sitting in key positions of the adminis-
tration have been key drivers of both enlargement and the Balkan inter-
ventions, e.g. Secretary Albright or National Security Advisor Lake. They 
successfully fought steered their policies through the inter-agency process, 
winning over many opposing players. This also points to the importance 
of the structure of decision-making, a long-time subject of Foreign Policy 
Analyis. Even the seemingly mundane issue of elections has affected some 
decisions on enlargement in particular, as evidenced by President Clin-
ton’s  postponement  of  a  public  commitment  to  enlargement  in 
/. All this of course has been common sense for analysts of for-
eign policy and liberal scholars, but neorealists have until recently largely 
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ignored these variables. This has begun to change with the adoption of 
these and other variables by neoclassical realists. The next section will 
address  theoretical  challenges  to  neorealism  and  discuss  neoclassical 
approaches as a promising avenue for theory development.
7.2. Added Variables, Added Benefits? The Promise Of 
Neoclassical Realism
Above, I  have highlighted some of  the central  theoretical  problems in 
contemporary  neorealism, i.e. the  rift  between offensive  and defensive 
structural imperatives and the need to include subsystemic variables for 
explaining an individual state’s reaction to systemic pressures. Offensive 
and defensive logics are fundamentally at odds, and this split is likely to 
remain, as both arguments are logically sound and axiomatic. On the sec-
ond count, however, innovative research has emerged that has sought to 
incorporate new, subsystemic variables into neorealism. This school has 
been labelled “neoclassical realism” (see Chapter 3). 
As outlined in the theoretical part of this dissertation, the systemic pres-
sures suggested by neorealism only stake out a broad playing field within 
which states act. Structural realism cannot explain why states fail to heed 
systemic pressures or why states in similar systemic positions act differ-
ently. While these cases are not within Waltz’s original purview, neoclassi-
cal realists focus on explaining the foreign policies of states as opposed to 
general outcomes.596 For them, structural realism is underdetermined.
Combining the structural and unit level of analysis, neoclassical realism 
596 Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang, “The Typologies of Realism,” Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 1 (2006): 121.
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icy.597Although neoclassical  realists  differ  in  which variables  they  add, 
they give systemic variables primacy over unit-level variables. The latter 
are only intervening and do not have an independent causal role. Rather, 
they act as a “filter” or “transmission belt” between systemic pressures 
and actual foreign policy behavior. Because of the focus on intervening 
variables at the unit-level, some refer to neoclassical realism as “state-cen-
tric realism.”  All  in all, neoclassical  authors share a commitment to a 
multi-level approach, incorporating domestic intervening variables while 
maintaining  states’  relative  power  positions  and  systemic  pressures  as 
independent variables.
Taken together, neoclassical work has made important contributions to 
the realist tradition and international relations more broadly:
7.2.1. Complementing Neorealism
By introducing  intervening  unit-level  variables  they  manage to  greatly 
improve  neorealism’s  predictive  and  explanatory  power. This  move  is 
complementary to Waltz’s theory and does not violate its core assump-
tions. Theory of International Politics provides a theory of outcomes of 
state behavior that is compliant with the imperatives of the international 
system.598 Furthermore, Waltz claims that non-compliant behavior is pun-
ished and eventually self-defeating. Yet he does not provide a theoretical 
account of why states fail to recognize these imperatives imposed by the 
system or act  accordingly. This  is  where neoclassical  realism brings in 
597 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 146; Taliaferro, “State 
Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State,” 
466–68; Wivel, “Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The 
Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,” 357.
598 Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and 
Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” 295–96; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism 
and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 161–62; Randall L. Schweller, “New Realist 
Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” 
American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 927–30.
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domestic variables, that explain the flawed transmission of systemic pres-
sures into foreign policy in these cases: 
When states do not respond ideally to their structural 
situations, neorealism tells us we should find evidence of 
domestic politics and ideas distorting the decision-making 
process.599
Because it keeps the crucial role of systemic influences and the notion that 
misbehavior  will  eventually  be  punished,  neoclassical  realism  falls 
squarely into the neorealist paradigm. In view of that, Rathbun sees it as 
a “logical extension of structural realism” that “vindicates Waltz” ideas.600
7.2.2. Crossing Levels of Analysis…
Stressing that the international system determines the broad, long-term 
framework in  which states  operate  while  incorporating domestic  vari-
ables, neoclassical realism bridges the gap between two levels of analy-
sis.601 It is thus one of the few theories to take a genuinely multi-level 
approach, which Valerie Hudson sees as one of the hallmarks of Foreign 
Policy Analysis.602 Neoclassical realism may thus narrow the gap between 
international relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.
7.2.3. …and Disciplinary Boundaries
Not only does it bridge the gap between two levels of analysis most other 
theories  of international  relations see as  incommensurate, it  also tran-
scends  the  barriers  between  Foreign  Policy  Analysis  and International 
Relations. Especially concerning the theories employed in each, the two 
599 Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and 
Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” 296.
600 Ibid.
601 Feng and Ruizhuang, “The Typologies of Realism,” 122.
602 Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of 
International Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (2005): 2.
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have in my opinion developed relatively independently of each other. Of 
course, there  were  and  are  many  points  of  contact, but  the  body  of 
knowledge within Foreign Policy Analysis has grown considerably more 
specialized over time. With neoclassical realism, for the first time there is 
a theory that can be employed both in International Relations and in For-
eign  Policy  Analysis  with  equally  satisfying  results.  Furthermore,  the 
range  of  independent  variables  neoclassical  realists  have  used  in  their 
work so far holds the promise that a fair amount of the theoretical and 
empirical work conducted in Foreign Policy Analysis can be incorporated 
into and used in neoclassical research.
In sum, the ease with which neoclassical realism can incorporate insights 
generated by Foreign Policy Analysis and other research focusing on the 
domestic  level  is  its  greatest  strength  and  promises  further  innovative 
research in the years to come.
7.2.4. Problems
All of this, however, is not to gloss over the considerable difficulties and 
challenges  neoclassical  realism  faces.  While  not  insurmountable,  they 
have to be acknowledged and addressed here.
Firstly, the very strength of being able to include many different indepen-
dent variables can also be a weakness. With the variety of variables the 
authors discussed here use, it is all but impossible to tell which of them is 
decisive.603 In  the  long  run, the  number  of  variables  will  have  to  be 
reduced if a feasible research program is to emerge. The plethora of dif-
ferent cases neoclassical  authors examine exacerbates this  problem. To 
remedy this, neoclassical realism has to develop a coherent research pro-
gram with a competitive design: At least some of the cases should be ana-
603 Feng and Ruizhuang, “The Typologies of Realism,” 123.
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lyzed through several of the competing approaches in order to determine 
which variables matter when.
Secondly, and  somewhat  related, the  diversity  of  different  approaches 
makes it extremely difficult to falsify neoclassical realism.
Thirdly, future research might run the danger of developing a number of 
ad hoc fixes for all those cases neorealism cannot explain. 604 This would 
greatly diminish intellectual coherence and appeal of neoclassical realism.
Lastly, there  remains  the  issue  of  ontological  pureness:  Can  a  theory 
based on the quintessentially positivist and materialist neorealism of Ken-
neth Waltz incorporate ideational elements such as decision-makers’ per-
ceptions without losing its coherence?
7.3. The Kids Are Alright
This  dissertation  has  explored  the  ramifications  of  current  neorealist 
thought and sought to address the case of U.S.  policy after the end 
of the Cold War. In doing so, I have argued that the initial neorealist pre-
dictions of ’s demise rest on a certain assumption of the effect of 
 membership on the United States, i.e. that it has adverse effects and 
significant costs. Instead, the empirical record reviewed above suggests 
that the United States has managed to steer clear of the negative effects of 
alliances suggested by proponents of entanglement theory. In this light, 
both offensive and defensive realists would, albeit for different reasons, 
have expected  to persist. The empirical section has, however, also 
illustrated the need to include subsystemic variables into any account of 
an individual state’s foreign policy. This, I argue, is the major contribution 
604 Wivel, “Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise 
and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,” 365.
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and promise of neoclassical realism. This school of thought faces several 
challenges,  but  on  the  whole  offers  a  very  promising  mechanism  for 
incorporating insights drawn from other research programs. The found-
ing generation of neorealism may disagree, but the kids are alright after 
all.
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